ASEAN and the Spratly dispute<\/p>\n
By J. Soedjati Djiwandono<\/p>\n
JAKARTA (JP): The sixth in the series of workshops entitled
\n\"Managing Potential Conflicts in the South China Sea\", initiated
\nby Indonesia in 1990 with Canadian support, is being held in
\nBalikpapan, East Kalimantan, this week.<\/p>\n
The workshop is intended to be an informal forum, in which the
\nparticipants take part, in their personal capacities, in an
\nexchange of ideas and information on the problems in the South
\nChina Sea.<\/p>\n
It is not to be a dispute-settlement mechanism, but is aimed
\nat seeking possible common ground as a basis for multilateral
\ncooperation among the littoral states of the South China Sea for
\ncommon benefit, without dealing with the existing claims and
\ncounter-claims to the Spratly Islands.<\/p>\n
By putting aside the issue of sovereignty, such multilateral
\ncooperation, as joint exploration and exploitation of resources
\nand jointly-conducted scientific research, is expected to help
\ncreate a climate that would be conducive to an eventual
\nsettlement of the dispute.<\/p>\n
ASEAN as a group is not directly involved in the dispute over
\nthe Spratlys. But it is understandably concerned about potential
\nconflicts over the issue, which also involves a majority of its
\nmember states (Brunei Darussalam, Malaysia, the Philippines and
\nnew member Vietnam).<\/p>\n
Moreover, the South China Sea has great strategic importance.
\nExtending across Southeast Asia, it links the Indian and Pacific
\noceans. It links Southeast Asia with mainland Asia. It contains
\nimportant sea lanes. Thus located, it can serve as a staging area
\nfor surveillance, possible sea-lane interdiction and naval
\noperations to disrupt shipping. It is thought to contain economic
\npotential such as deposits of gas, oil and minerals. And it is
\ncertainly a large fishing ground.<\/p>\n
ASEAN's concern also relates to the uncertainty that has
\ncharacterized the post-Cold War world. It concerns, in
\nparticular, the future role and intentions of China in the
\nregion. There is no assurance, for instance, that China will not
\nresort to force in support of its claim on the Spratlys.<\/p>\n
On the contrary, in a number of past cases China has not
\nhesitated to do so. The ASEAN states called for restraint from
\nthe use of force over the issue in a statement of 1992 and
\nrenounced the use of force in the settlement of disputes in the
\nTreaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia signed at the
\nfirst ASEAN Summit in Bali in 1976. However, no similar statement
\nhas been made by the Chinese.<\/p>\n
In the mean time, there have been reports that China, as well
\nas the nations of Southeast Asia, have increased their military
\ncapabilities over the past few years.<\/p>\n
Moreover, all of the claimant states, except for Brunei, have
\ndeployed troops in the area to sustain their respective claims.
\nYet it seems doubtful if any of the claimants are capable of
\ndefending their claims by military means.<\/p>\n
Any military action by any one claimant is likely to impinge
\non other claimants. And a major military action by the Chinese
\nwould probably provoke American intervention, a risk the Chinese
\nare not likely to risk under the circumstances.<\/p>\n
It would also mean an internalization of the issue; something
\ndreaded by the Chinese. While the Americans are neutral on the
\nSpratly issue, they have made it clear that they would not
\ntolerate disruption of the maritime lines of communication in the
\narea.<\/p>\n
America is even prepared to protect civilian ships passing
\nthrough the sea lanes concerned. Otherwise, the United States
\nseems at the moment more interested in Europe and the Middle East
\nthan in the South China Sea, Southeast Asia or even the Asia-
\nPacific region.<\/p>\n
At all events, while their relations with the Americans are in
\ntrouble, the Chinese are not likely to want a confrontation with
\nASEAN. While insisting upon China's \"indisputable sovereignty\"
\nover the Spratlys, the Chinese foreign minister stated at a
\nmultilateral meeting in Brunei last July that, apart from its
\nhistorical claim, China would submit to a solution according to
\nInternational Law.<\/p>\n
The Chinese, moreover, have reportedly sold weapons to the
\nPhilippines. They would not have done so if they thought military
\nconfrontation with that country was likely, despite the recent
\nMischief Reef incident.<\/p>\n
The uncertainty as to China's future international behavior is
\nmade greater by uncertainty about that country's domestic scene.
\nWhile it is not a monopoly of the Chinese, the question of the
\nnational leadership succession, for instance, or the mystery of
\nthe decision-making process or the relationship between the
\ncivilian and military leadership, only adds to the uncertainty.<\/p>\n
The Spratly dispute is important in another sense. With the
\nend of the Cold War, and thus of ideological alignments, the
\nwithdrawal of the Soviet Union and the partial withdrawal of
\nAmerican military presence and the resultant \"new world order\" --
\nwhich is still in the making -- a final settlement of the dispute
\nmay help the future pattern or management of relations among the
\nnations in the region of East Asia and, perhaps, of the whole
\nAsia-Pacific region.<\/p>\n
The fact that the first workshop was attended only by ASEAN
\nrepresentatives -- except some Canadians as resource persons --
\ndoes not mean that the ASEAN states have attempted to formulate a
\ncommon position, thereby forming an ASEAN grouping against China
\n(and Taiwan). No such grouping has been formed, notwithstanding
\nthe fact that an ASEAN-China meeting was held on the issue in
\nHangzhou in April 1995.<\/p>\n
The possibility of a hostile ASEAN ganging up against China is
\nremote, for with four of its member states being themselves
\ninvolved in the dispute, their claims also impinge on one
\nanother, not just China and Taiwan.<\/p>\n
If there is what may be called a common ASEAN position, it is
\nthat the ASEAN states favor a multilateral approach, although
\nsome member states have also been inclined to a bilateral
\napproach. The ASEAN Declaration of 1992 on the South China Sea
\nreferred to the earlier call for self-restraint on the part of
\nall claimants, for refraining from the use of force, and for
\navoiding actions that could destabilize the area. That
\ndeclaration could also be considered a common ASEAN position,
\nparticularly as it was reiterated at the ASEAN ministerial
\nmeeting in Brunei in July.<\/p>\n
Indeed, the Chinese have been reluctant to approach with the
\nissue on a multilateral basis, preferring instead a bilateral
\napproach. It is important to note, however, that the Chinese
\nparticipation in the workshops is an indication that they are not
\ncompletely averse to a multilateral approach, although limited in
\nscope.<\/p>\n
In any event, the dispute is already multilateral in nature.
\nYet a bilateral approach has not been abandoned altogether. The
\nChinese held talks with the Philippines last July on a code of
\nconduct in the area. Previously, in May, they held talks with the
\nVietnamese in Beijing, also discussing the issue. These bilateral
\ntalks may help reduce tension and, as such, they will not stand
\nin the way of multilateral negotiations. They may even assist in
\nthe multilateral process.<\/p>\n
If anything, the series of workshops have primarily served as
\nconfidence-building measures. This is important to reduce tension
\nand to avert armed conflict.<\/p>\n
The apparent increase in flexibility on the part of the
\nChinese is an opportunity not to be missed. The possibility of a
\nmechanism along the lines of the workshop may be considered for a
\nfuture solution to the Spratly dispute.<\/p>\n
The ASEAN Regional Forum is not appropriate, for it would mean
\na further internationalization of the issue involving major
\nexternal powers which would not be acceptable to the Chinese.
\nAlthough the present workshop is multilateral, it is \"regional\"
\nrather than \"international\".<\/p>\n
One possibility to be considered would be the workshop's
\ngradual development from an informal into a formal forum for
\nnegotiations in search of a final solution of the Spratly
\ndispute. The process may still be long, and thus the Spratly
\ndispute may still remain with us for a long time to come. But the
\nidea may merit serious consideration \"while the iron is hot\".<\/p>\n
It is important, however, that the ASEAN states should be able
\nto settle their own intra-ASEAN territorial disputes first,
\nperhaps also on a multilateral basis. This would serve as
\nevidence of their good faith. It might serve as an acceptable
\nmodel for a conclusive resolution of the Spratly dispute.<\/p>\n
The writer is a director of the Centre for Strategic and
\nInternational Studies.<\/p>",
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