Armed Forces: From state violence to a welfare state<\/p>\n
By J. Sumardianta<\/p>\n
YOGYAKARTA (JP): The Armed Forces (ABRI) is by far the
\ncountry's dominant political player. Political reform is only
\npossible if ABRI allows it.<\/p>\n
The institution, however, is currently putting its credibility
\non the line due to its excessive adherence to the policy of
\ndwifungsi, its dual function of security and politics in society.
\nABRI's involvement in the political arena has tainted its image
\nthrough its alleged involvement in the abduction of several pro-
\ndemocracy activists and the May 12 shooting incident at Trisakti
\nUniversity. There are some who even believe ABRI was behind the
\nMay riots in Jakarta and various cities in the country and the
\nvictimization of Chinese-Indonesians.<\/p>\n
ABRI has a long list of human rights atrocities: Tanjung
\nPriok, Aceh, Dili, Ujungpandang, Timika, Situbondo, Sanggau Ledo,
\nTasikmalaya, Banjarmasin and Madura. Its socio-political role was
\nthe most important factor in the triggering of such violence.<\/p>\n
Several factors account for ABRI's active involvement in the
\ncountry's socio-political life. The 1945 Constitution does not
\nclearly stipulate a civilian-military relationship. History also
\npointed to the precedence of a military not accountable to the
\ncivilian government. The revolutionary period of 1945 to 1949,
\nwhen ABRI was born, required the military to take necessary
\nmeasures to defend the state during wartime. Civilian politicians
\nwere so weak during the 1950s, that ABRI decided to take over.<\/p>\n
ABRI's dual function originated through Gen. Nasution's
\nconcept of Jalan Tengah (middle road) in 1955. The concept was
\noriginally intended to justify the military's move against the
\nfragile civilian government. The concept was continued through
\nthe Tri Ubaya Cakti 1966 and the Catur Dharma Ekakarma 1967
\ndoctrines which were an ABRI interpretation of articles 1 (2), 2
\n(1), 27 and 30 of the 1945 Constitution and of Law No. 20\/1982
\nfor Defense and Security.<\/p>\n
During the New Order, ABRI used its historical and legal
\nbackgrounds to justify its domination over certain civilian
\ndomains. ABRI controlled seats in the House of Representatives
\n(DPR), while active or retired officers became presidential
\nadjutants, ambassadors, governors, regents, mayors and managing
\ndirectors of state firms. ABRI members even led sports
\norganizations since it was thought that they were best at
\nleadership, conflict management and innovation.<\/p>\n
Political stability was one of the upsides to ABRI's socio-
\npolitical role and subsequently allowed segments of society to
\nthrive under economic development. However, this came at a cost
\nof a military domination of society. Since stability was the
\ngovernment's main goal, uniformity became its main priority. As a
\nresult, a phony democracy was showcased by the New Order's
\nbureaucratic authoritarian system. Moreover, a culture of
\ncoercive power and violence was substituted for the principles of
\nlaw enforcement.<\/p>\n
The excesses that came as a result of ABRI's dual function
\npolicy are reflected in its weak discipline and professionalism,
\nits declining ability to counter foreign military threats and its
\nfavoritism for certain political forces.<\/p>\n
The strange thing is that ABRI's role as the stabilizer of
\nsociety has been persistently institutionalized, resulting in a
\nvirtual state of emergency being enforced over the country. ABRI
\nseems to have always interpreted public criticism over its socio-
\npolitical role harshly. It often labeled such criticism as having
\ncome from leftists or rightists who should be regarded as
\nsubversive and antidevelopment.<\/p>\n
Excessive military intervention in all sectors of life has
\nexacerbated many social conflicts. ABRI's interference in
\npolitical parties, universities, labor disputes and legal affairs
\nhas helped create a divisive culture. The July 27 incident, the
\nTrisakti shootings, the murders of Marsinah and Udin, and the
\nNipah and Jenggawah cases are examples of this.<\/p>\n
In practice, the dual function policy has gone too far. There
\nis an urgent need to review and reform the policy in light of
\nsuch past incidents and current conditions. The establishment of
\nthe National Commission on Human Rights, the evolvement of
\nstudent movements and the strengthening roles of non-governmental
\norganizations all indicate that Indonesia's internal conditions
\nhave changed since the inception of the dual function policy.<\/p>\n
Outside factors have also led to changes in the country.
\nRevolutionary advances in telecommunications have helped
\ndemocratic ideas flow into Indonesia. Democratic values have
\nchallenged the core arguments behind particular Indonesian
\nvalues. The dual function, which has been claimed as being
\nuniquely and typically Indonesian, has lost its popularity in the
\ninternational community. With the country's economy becoming ever
\nintegrated within global capitalism, Indonesian leaders would
\nhave difficulties in defending such political particularism while
\nthe world becomes more enamored with democratization and human
\nrights.<\/p>\n
Advanced countries have criticized our Pancasila-based
\ndemocracy -- something which is not surprising -- in light of the
\nfact that ABRI's dual function is inconsistent with the
\nprinciples of universal democracy. International pressure
\ncontinues to mount for Indonesia to develop a stronger democracy,
\na cleaner government, a better adherence to human rights,
\nmilitary professionalism, a clear division of labor, greater
\ntransparency and competitiveness.<\/p>\n
Democratization has become one of the essential goals of the
\neducated middle-class. People are becoming more and more
\ncosmopolitan and independent and they are demanding that the dual
\nfunction be more accommodating. The transition from an
\nauthoritarian military regime to a democratic government in some
\nadvanced countries in the Asia-Pacific region have made people
\nmore aware of their political rights -- and more critical of the
\ndual function policy.<\/p>\n
In this era of globalization, the idea of maintaining
\npolitical stability through the security approach has lost its
\nmeaning. ABRI can no longer hide itself behind a myth of
\nhistorical legality. If it decides to move ahead with its past
\nways of maintaining political stability, Indonesia will plunge
\ninto a state of disintegration.<\/p>\n
From now on, ABRI must look to advising a civilian government
\nrather than directly controlling and participating in governance.
\nIdeally, ABRI's socio-political function should be restricted to
\nparticipation within the People's Consultative Assembly (MPR).<\/p>\n
Such a political limitation would go a long way to restricting
\nABRI's growing vested interests. This alternative would also
\nresult in a more democratic, sovereign and independent House of
\nRepresentatives. Rule of law would be more enforceable and the
\nmilitary would ultimately be brought down to a more equal footing
\nwith the civilian officials in government.<\/p>\n
The police force should also be separated from the Armed
\nForces so that law enforcement of civilians is placed under
\ncivilian administration. A general reform of the nonmilitary
\nfunction of ABRI may help this country change from rule by state
\nviolence into a welfare state.<\/p>\n
The wrier is a researcher at Lembaga Pengkajian dan
\nPengembangan untuk Kemaslahatan Masyarakat (LPPKM) \"Sovranita\"
\nIndonesia, Yogyakarta and a teacher at Kolese De Britto High
\nSchool.<\/p>",
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