Armed Force is the dominant political player<\/p>\n
YOGYAKARTA (JP): One could easily be misled into thinking that
\nthe country's most powerful group will win next week's election.<\/p>\n
But a quick evaluation of the political system reveals that
\nnone of the three parties hold the most power.<\/p>\n
Anyone with a little knowledge on national politics knows that
\nthe Armed Forces (ABRI) has the most political clout. For nearly
\n30 years, the Armed Forces has determined national politics.<\/p>\n
No important political development passes without the Armed
\nForces' participation or intervention, so everyone is keenly
\nwatching for structural change in the military. Politicians focus
\nand anticipate the Armed Forces' moves rather than their rivals'.<\/p>\n
Staff demotions, assignments and promotions are studied
\ncarefully for political meaning. The removal of one officer may
\nbe seen as a move to topple a political faction.<\/p>\n
Military analyst Salim Said has said the military's dominant
\nrole stems from its history of establishing itself rather than
\nbeing established by a civilian government.<\/p>\n
Therefore, the Armed Forces was used to having \"things its own
\nway,\" Salim said. It had never been in favor of a civilian
\ngovernment and there were several examples of this.<\/p>\n
In October 1952, Armed Forces officers demonstrated about
\n\"interference\" because the civilian government had elected the
\nArmy's chief.<\/p>\n
In 1958, then army chief of staff Gen. A.H. Nasution made a
\nspeech, saying that the Armed Forces refused to become \"a tool of
\ncivilians\" or a military regime.<\/p>\n
Nasution's speech on the Armed Forces' \"middle road\" led to
\nthe \"dual-function\" concept in which the military has a defense
\nand political role.<\/p>\n
The dual-function concept may have been influenced by the
\nUnited States President John F. Kennedy's Civic Action Program
\nbecause many local officers had trained in the U.S.<\/p>\n
The dual-function concept became firmly entrenched in the New
\nOrder era when there was a \"national consensus\" not to elect
\nmilitary personnel to the legislature.<\/p>\n
In return, the Armed Forces was allocated 43 of the 350 seats
\nin the Gotong Royong House of Representatives of 1967. This was
\nincreased to 75 of 414 seats in the House a year later.<\/p>\n
In 1982, the Armed Forces was given 100 of the 500 seats in
\nthe House. After long negotiations, an agreement was reached last
\nyear to reduce the Armed Forces' seats in the House to 75 after
\nthe May 29 election.<\/p>\n
Bureaucracy<\/p>\n
The Armed Forces' political influence has not been limited to
\nthe legislature.<\/p>\n
In 1966, 29 percent of all top bureaucratic, director general
\nand ministerial positions were held by military people.<\/p>\n
This rose to 71 percent in 1971 and peaked at 89 percent in
\n1980. But in recent years, the military's occupation of high
\nranking bureaucratic positions has fallen sharply.<\/p>\n
There is a similar trend for the positions of provincial
\ngovernors. At the beginning of the New Order period, two-thirds
\nof governors were military men. Now less than half are.<\/p>\n
Whether the drop translates to a loss of political clout
\nremains questionable since the Armed Forces still wields power
\nthrough its patronage of Golkar.<\/p>\n
Despite a civilian, Harmoko, being chairman, Golkar's lower
\ntiers are still headed by ABRI people.<\/p>\n
The Armed Forces used to refrain from blatantly supporting
\nGolkar, but this changed last year when Army Chief of Staff Gen.
\nHartono said: \"It was my duty to receive guidance from Golkar
\ndeputy chairman Mbak Tutut.\" He was referring to Siti Hardiyanti
\nRukmana, the eldest daughter of President Soeharto.<\/p>\n
Hartono's comment caused a wave of protests.<\/p>\n
\"That's just the same as arming Golkar,\" said J. Kristiadi of
\nthe Centre for Strategic and International Studies. He said this
\nwas a dangerous precedent and \"a threat to political democracy\".<\/p>\n
Increasingly, the Armed Forces' political role is coming under
\nfire from all directions. Ironically, even Nasution considers the
\ndual-function role has been misused and abused.<\/p>\n
A National Institute of Sciences (LIPI) study commissioned by
\nPresident Soeharto in 1995 has recommended that the Armed Forces'
\npolitical role be limited to the People's Consultative Assembly.<\/p>\n
The study suggested that by the year 2007, the Armed Forces
\nshould not be involved in the House of Representatives,
\nbureaucracy, state-owned companies or other government
\ninstitutions.<\/p>\n
The study also suggested the following:<\/p>\n
* ABRI officers' presence in the bureaucracy should be limited
\nto institutions that deal with security.<\/p>\n
* ABRI's sociopolitical role should aim at improving
\nIndonesia's diplomatic standing in international forums.<\/p>\n
* ABRI should expand its role in human resources development
\nfrom merely dealing with illiteracy eradication.<\/p>\n
* ABRI should serve as a model in law enforcement and civil
\nempowerment, where the public believes that ABRI is not exempt
\nfrom obeying the law.<\/p>\n
The study seems to have had little impact because the Armed
\nForces seems to be trying to reassert itself through Golkar.<\/p>\n
Nepotism must also be considered since many sons of Armed
\nForces' members have joined Golkar.<\/p>\n
This means a wider role for the Armed Forces. (38)<\/p>", "url": "https:\/\/jawawa.id\/newsitem\/armed-force-is-the-dominant-political-player-1447893297", "image": "" }, "sponsor": "Okusi Associates", "sponsor_url": "https:\/\/okusiassociates.com" }