Antiterror squad: Necessity or project-driven<\/p>\n
Imanuddin Razak, Jakarta<\/p>\n
Jakartans had just commemorated the 1st anniversary of the JW
\nMarriott Hotel blast in Kuningan business and residential area in
\nSouth Jakarta last month, when the capital was shaken by another
\nsimilarly motivated bomb blast near the site of the former on
\nSept. 9.<\/p>\n
Many condemned the Indonesian authorities' failure to
\nanticipate such an attack, and blamed the deadly blast on their
\ninability to take necessary preemptive measures, although a
\nnumber of foreign governments had issued warnings weeks before.<\/p>\n
The government's announcement on Wednesday of its plan to set
\nup a military-backed antiterror task force, which will fall under
\nthe auspices of the National Intelligence Agency (BIN) chief, who
\nwill coordinate intelligence work between the National Police's
\nantiterror squad, Army's Special Forces (Kopassus), the Navy's
\nSpecial Forces (Denjaka) and the Air Force's Special Forces
\n(Bravo), was an instant reply to such a demand.<\/p>\n
Legally and strategic-wise, there is nothing wrong with the
\nestablishment of such a task force, as it complies with the 2003
\nlaw on antiterrorism and the 2002 presidential instruction on BIN
\nand is meant to coordinate the work of all intelligence bodies in
\nthe country to deal with terror acts.<\/p>\n
Controversy, however, surrounds the National Police's long-
\nterm plan to establish antiterror squads nationwide, which was
\nannounced earlier -- days after the Marriott blast anniversary.<\/p>\n
The controversial plan was announced just as the police had
\ninaugurated the city police's 75-member antiterror detachment,
\ndubbed Detachment 88 or Den88.<\/p>\n
Though the city police cannot solely be blamed for the latest
\nblast, its failure to anticipate the Kuningan blast in the
\npresence of the newborn Den88, has drawn big questions regarding
\nthe capability of the antiterror squad, whose members have been
\nrecruited from among the police's top officers, to handle such a
\nbomb attack.<\/p>\n
The police's antiterror squad is controversial as it will
\nperform tasks already carried out by a number of internal police
\nunits. Members of the new squad are trained for the prevention of
\nterrorist attacks -- in intelligence, investigation and crisis
\nmanagement.<\/p>\n
The police already have their own counterterrorism task force,
\nknown as Gegana, while for intelligence activities, the police
\nindeed have the tasks covered by their Intelligence and Security
\nDirectorate (Ditintelpam). The police force also have their own
\nbomb squad to deal with bomb threats and explosions.<\/p>\n
And, should the police persist to establish antiterror squads
\nin provinces across the archipelago, the planned number of
\npersonnel for the squads would exceed each of those of the three
\nforces of the Indonesian Military (TNI), an unexpected factor
\nthat may heighten tension between the police force and its former
\n\"big brother\" the TNI.<\/p>\n
The police force used to be under the same roof as the TNI
\nbefore they \"parted ways\" on July 1, 2000.<\/p>\n
Once established, police squads nationwide would boast more
\nthan double the number of personnel registered with the Army's
\nSpecial Forces antiterror squads. Many more, also, than the
\nNavy's counterterrorism operations Kesatuan Gurita (Octopus
\nSquad) of over 250 men and the Air Force's Satgas Atbara
\n(Counterterrorism task Force) of about the same number.<\/p>\n
Equally controversial is the funding for the establishment of
\nthe squads.<\/p>\n
While top police officers have chosen to remain tightlipped
\nover the issue, The Associated Press recently confirmed that the
\ndetachment had been funded by the United States and trained by
\nU.S. military officers.<\/p>\n
\"The academy is funded by Washington and is staffed by
\nAmericans. It teaches hostage rescue, crime scene investigation
\nand bomb disposal,\" AP said.<\/p>\n
The establishment of the antiterror squads is controversial as
\nthe squads' presence proves to be effective in the aftermath of
\nan attack, but not as an early warning system, which an
\nintelligence body should be capable of.<\/p>\n
The ineffectiveness of such an antiterror squad to anticipate
\na bomb attack was indirectly revealed by the police themselves,
\nwho recently announced that they had received reports of the
\nwhereabouts of the two most-wanted Malaysian bombing suspects --
\nDr. Azahari bin Husin and Noordin Moh. Top -- at a rented house
\nin Cengkareng, West Jakarta, days before the Kuningan blast.<\/p>\n
If this is the case, the Japan-originated Koban system would
\nlikely be the appropriate \"formula\" to meet the demand for an
\nearly warning system, rather than the antiterror squad.<\/p>\n
The Koban system is currently on trial at the Bekasi Police.<\/p>\n
Koban are essentially one-room depots, which were introduced
\nfor the first time in 1881 in Japan, to protect officers from the
\nelements. Koban are open around the clock, with police officers
\nworking in three shifts, to fight crime and offer assistance.
\nPolice duties include patrolling the neighborhood, handling lost
\nand found property, giving street directions, directing traffic
\nand providing help for lost children.<\/p>\n
To add to the concept's success story, a Japanese police
\nofficer attached to the Bekasi Police helping with the
\npreparation and establishment of Koban in Bekasi, said the
\nconcept, to be applied at neighborhood unit (RW) levels, had
\nsuccessfully minimized the crime rate in Japan's big cities.<\/p>\n
Koban have also been adopted by Singapore, Fiji and Brazil.<\/p>\n
With police officers in uniforms in the neighborhoods, it is
\nexpected that the hideouts of crime suspects, like Azahari and
\nNoordin, could be immediately detected and the repetition of such
\na deadly blast could be prevented.<\/p>\n
However, the presence of police officers in the neighborhood
\nshould not bring a new problem -- creating anxiety among the
\npeople -- as citizens experienced when officers of the military's
\nBabinsa were stationed at subdistrict levels in the past.<\/p>\n
There must be clear guidelines and regulations for police
\nofficers in performing their tasks in neighborhoods.<\/p>\n
And to be frank, the police need Koban as a system as it is
\nmore suitable to perform preemptive measures, rather than
\nestablishing antiterror squads nationwide, which are more post-
\ncrime oriented.<\/p>\n
Police can retain the already established squads, but they
\nshould not necessarily exist in all provinces, and the number of
\ntheir personnel should be a few hundred only. The squads could
\nnot be considered \"special forces\" anymore, should they have
\nthousands of personnel.<\/p>\n
Imanuddin Razak is a staff writer for The Jakarta Post. He can
\nbe reached at iman@thejakartapost.com<\/p>",
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