Another Timor massacre must be avoided<\/p>\n
Aboeprijadi Santoso, Radio Netherlands, Amsterdam,
\naboeprijadi@yahoo.com<\/p>\n
Indonesia's past experience with East Timor has been a lesson
\nof political, military and human disaster. Jakarta's assault in
\nAceh, a province suffering from human rights abuses, puts the
\nlocals' hearts and minds at stake. Far from solving the problems,
\nit risks a greater danger.<\/p>\n
In February 1989, in a meeting with local civil servants in
\nDili, East Timor, the Indonesian military chief Gen.L. Benny
\nMoerdani sternly warned: \"There will be no independent state of
\nEast Timor. The man named Xanana, the movement called Fretilin,
\nany (separatist) attempt will be crushed!\" As he spoke, Jakarta's
\napparatuses had been heavily infiltrated by pro-independence
\nelements.<\/p>\n
The popularity of the resistance grew as the outburst of
\npeople's anger was soon manifested in a series of incidents,
\nculminating in the November 1991 killings. In August 1999, this
\ntrend was fully demonstrated when East Timor, in a clandestinely
\norchestrated public show, \"celebrated\" Indonesian independence
\nday by turning the territory into a sea of Indonesia's red-and-
\nwhite flags, and, yet, two weeks later, overwhelming voted for
\nindependence.<\/p>\n
The dynamic of oppression -- the ongoing human rights abuses
\n-- turned the people towards massive protests and deception. This
\nwas East Timor's most important lesson for Jakarta. But it took
\ninternational support, a regional crisis and the fall of a
\ndictator before a referendum brought freedom. Lacking such
\nlikelihood, Aceh has little prospects of independence.<\/p>\n
In Aceh, however, more than elsewhere, the crisis of 1998 had
\nprecipitated fresh dynamic as collective sentiments, born out of
\nsuffering, a deep sense of injustice, pride and resentment, has
\naccumulated for decades.<\/p>\n
It linked up what used to be an unpopular separatist rebellion
\nsince 1976 with the growing local grievances that came into the
\nopen amidst the momentum of reform. Significantly this coincided
\nwith, among other things, the return of hundreds of Libyan-
\ntrained GAM (Free Aceh Movement) rebel cadres via Malaysia.<\/p>\n
When the pendulum swung throughout 1998 to 2000, the Acehnese
\nwindow of change reminds one of the Prague Spring of 1968 -- a
\nliberal face of the surviving Soeharto's New Order, a kind of
\nshort-lived Dubcek's \"human face of communism\", yet with \"the
\nblossoming of a thousand flowers\".<\/p>\n
The local civil society, independent of GAM but increasingly
\ncritical of Jakarta, and GAM itself, had greatly profited from
\nthis new freedom. Thus, the Nov. 8, 1999 pro-referendum mass
\nrally and GAM's anniversary on Dec. 4 that year became historic
\nand momentous events.<\/p>\n
One villager in Pidie summed up the sentiment: \"We used to
\nhate the GPK (GAM rebels) because their presence provoked army
\nsweeps and tortures. Now we don't care about them, but we want
\nindependence.\" It was also seen as a return to a civilized life.
\n\"Before, it was time of jahiliyah (pre-Islamic barbarism),\"
\nanother villager said, referring to DOM, Jakarta's military
\ncampaign from 1989 to 1998.<\/p>\n
The DOM-atrocities may have ended, but the pain remains. The
\nAceh Spring, too, soon ended as the civil society and the common
\npeople were caught between the warring parties. It must remain
\nincomprehensible to the Acehnese that those responsible for past
\natrocities, mainly army officers, remain free, while former
\npresident Abdurrahman Wahid's promise of a referendum and
\npresident Megawati's \"no more drop of blood\" pledge remain
\nunfulfilled. Now, while they welcome last year's truce, peace is
\nshort-lived.<\/p>\n
In addition to a few thousand armed guerrillas, GAM's
\nsupporters are most likely victims of past atrocities and their
\nrelatives; only a few seem to support GAM's ideology based on
\nhistoric claims; while the third category consists of a mix of
\nthem and criminal elements. However, they reportedly control
\ndistricts along the eastern coast and pockets elsewhere.<\/p>\n
A peace effort will only be credible if, in addition to
\nbringing those responsible for both sides' atrocities to justice,
\nit can halt the criminal extortions of the people by both GAM and
\nthe Indonesian army and police that has sustained violence for
\nyears.<\/p>\n
Meanwhile, Jakarta regaining Acehnese hearts and minds will
\ntake a long time. When the Indonesians faced the Dutch in the
\n1940s and the East Timorese in the 1990s, in both cases the
\ncolonial army was militarily superior, but politically very weak,
\nso time was on the side of the guerrillas.<\/p>\n
With a new offensive in Aceh, Jakarta may risk a similar
\nsituation; indeed, with his numerous visits to Aceh before last
\nyear's truce, the top political chief, Gen. (ret) Susilo Bambang
\nYudhoyono, appeared to perform the same role as then Gen. Benny
\nin Dili.<\/p>\n
For, already since 1999, local administrative and judicial
\nfunctions in many parts of Aceh were paralyzed and taken over by
\nthe rebels. GAM has been able to use the peace process to
\nintensify its own campaign, which hurt Jakarta, while Jakarta
\nwanted but failed to seize GAM's weapons and cut its \"fiscal\"
\nsources. Clearly, these failures pushed Jakarta to prepare for
\nwar and issue an ultimatum that led both sides to turn the last-
\nditch peace effort in Tokyo into a purely diplomatic show.<\/p>\n
Jakarta could win the battles, but risks a war of attrition --
\nlike in Sri Lanka and Northern Ireland in the 1980s. The more
\npressing problem seems to be that its army has prepared an all
\nout war, but lacks a tradition to negotiate a deal with its
\nenemies -- with one remarkable exception when Gen. M. Jusuf sent
\nLt. Col. Poerwanto to meet the guerrilla leader Xanana Gusmao
\nnear Viqueque in 1983.<\/p>\n
The Indonesian army should learn from its own experience when
\nfighting the Dutch as guerrillas and facing the East Timorese as
\ncolonizer: Any guerrilla war inevitably risks civilian victims as
\nthe guerrilla's can easily mix with innocent villagers -- like
\nfish with water. The recent alleged killings of civilians in Cot
\nRaboe (Bireuen) and Jambo Keupok (South Aceh) may be bad omens.<\/p>\n
Worse would be if the army decides to wage a \"fence of legs\"
\n(pagar betis) warfare using the U.S. made OV-10F Bronco counter-
\ninsurgency warplanes, as has reportedly been prepared (Tempo
\nInteraktif, Apr. 27).<\/p>\n
A similar strategy had been applied in East Timor to fan out
\nthe jungles and villages and track the guerrillas. This massive
\nonslaught, following the 1975 invasion, took place in the
\nMatebian Mountain in the central part of East Timor from 1977 to
\n1978 when hundreds of thousands of villagers who joined the
\nguerrillas, were being chased and attacked. The siege that took
\nnine months was compounded by massacres, bad harvests, hunger and
\ndisease, and degenerated into an annihilation war that caused
\nthousands of deaths.<\/p>\n
Such a worst-case nightmare must be avoided.<\/p>", "url": "https:\/\/jawawa.id\/newsitem\/another-timor-massacre-must-be-avoided-1447893297", "image": "" }, "sponsor": "Okusi Associates", "sponsor_url": "https:\/\/okusiassociates.com" }