... and stalls its stride to modernity<\/p>\n
Later on, the Islamic-based political parties set up an
\n"Islamic caucus" to promote unity among the Islamic parties,
\nwhich seemed as remote as ever. Even the two largest Islamic
\norganizations, the NU and the Muhammadiyah, are never united
\nbeyond occasional appearances. They are mostly at odds with each
\nother in many respects, religious or otherwise. The NU-based PKB
\nitself has been split into two wings.<\/p>\n
Need for coalition?<\/p>\n
With the general election just a around the corner, no single
\npolitical party seems sure of its potential to win a single
\nmajority, a prospect no better than the 1999 election. The
\nelectoral law is thus a compromise between PDI Perjuangan and
\nGolkar. The Golkar first proposed that a presidential candidate
\nshould be a university graduate, which would prevent Megawati's
\nnomination for the presidency.<\/p>\n
On the one hand, the PDI Perjuangan's first proposal was that
\nno one found guilty of a crime with a sentence of three years
\nimprisonment should be nominated to the presidency, clearly aimed
\nat preventing Akbar Tandjung from presidential nomination.<\/p>\n
Finally they reached a compromise: A presidential candidate
\nshould at least be a senior high school graduate, thus making the
\nway open to Megawati's nomination. At the same time, the PDI
\nPerjuangan agreed to a condition that one with a sentence of
\nthree years imprisonment could be a presidential candidate, which
\nwould then pave the way for Akbar's presidential candidacy.<\/p>\n
Indeed, for certain reasons, the Golkar seems willing to go
\nahead with Megawati with a position of second fiddle in case
\nMegawati turns out to be a formidable rival candidate for
\nPresident. Short of winning a single majority, PDI Perjuangan's
\nchoice of coalition would be either the Golkar party, or a major
\nMuslim party. The United Development Party (PPP) is clearly a
\nparty with strong Muslim support and aspiration. But it has been
\nsplit between the Hamzah Has faction and the PPP Reformasi under
\nZainuddin M.Z.<\/p>\n
In case of the need for a Muslim partner, therefore, the other
\noption would be with the PKB, not the PPP. Thus, despite a split
\nin the PKB, Taufik Kiemas, husband of President Megawati and a
\nchairman of PDI Perjuangan, has recently met with Alwi Shihab,
\nleader of one wing of PKB, presumably with the thought of a
\npossible "coalition" with PDI Perjuangan if need be in support of
\nMegawati's presidency. Despite its Islamic-base, the PKB is more
\nnationalist than Islamic in orientation. Moreover, the Alwi
\nShihab wing is closer to former president Abdurahman Wahid (Gus
\nDur), who remains a political as well as religious figure of
\nstature in the country. It seems doubtful, nevertheless, if Gus
\nDur would ever support Megawati.<\/p>\n
Different strategy<\/p>\n
Basically, the post-2004 election ideological alignment of
\nIndonesian politics is likely to remain an antagonism of
\nNationalism versus Islam. However, even the issue of Islamic
\nsyaria, which some Islamic parties would like to see re-inserted
\nin the 1945 Constitution through an amendment to Article 29 on
\nreligion, has failed to unite the Islamic parties or the Muslim
\ncommunity.<\/p>\n
It is important to note, moreover, that in spite of reformasi,
\nit remains a taboo to change the Preamble of the 1945
\nConstitution, which embodies the Pancasila ideology as has been
\nformulated since the Proclamation of Independence. The Islamic
\nparties, therefore, have tried to resort to an indirect method.
\nWithout any mention of the syaria, they have resorted to a trick
\nwith considerable success. This is what they are likely to
\ncontinue to do in years to come. Failing to have the syaria re-
\ninserted into the constitution, they may continue to imbue
\nlegislation with the spirit of the syaria, if without once making
\nmention of the "syaria" itself.<\/p>\n
In fact, under Soeharto's New Order, the pattern of decision-
\nmaking in the legislative bodies, invariably took the form of
\n"deliberations towards unanimity" (mufakat) And the Islamic
\nparties already succeeded in having the marriage law of 1979
\npassed by mufakat, while the minority parties avoided being
\naccused of practicing "tyranny by minority" by openly opposing
\nthe move. At the same time, while implicitly imposing the
\nprofession of a religion, which was against religious freedom,
\nwithout mentioning the word "syaria", the marriage bill looked
\ninnocuous, and the Islamic parties in effect exploited the fear
\nas well as naivety of the "nationalist" parties. The same was
\ntrue of the law on the national system of education of 1988,
\nwhich made religious education in schools compulsory.<\/p>\n
The latest pattern of decision-making in the legislature, in
\nthis era of reform, is the "no-voting" method. This is not the
\nsame as Soeharto's style of unanimity. It is one in which a
\nconsensus is assumed to have been reached during the "lobby",
\nthus outside formal sessions, among the different factions in the
\nHouse - not the individual House members.<\/p>\n
Thus the House speaker simply asks with disgusting nonchalance
\nif the members present could agree on the enactment of the bill
\nunder discussion, and the members responded almost in unison,
\n"agree", without the speaker in the least bothering to check if a
\nmajority of those present votes for the bill and how many, if
\nany, against.<\/p>\n
That was the case of the controversial new law on the national
\nsystem of education. It was the most dishonest way of decision-
\nmaking, especially in the light of such a strategically important
\nlegislation.<\/p>\n
It was definitely not a decision based on unanimity, for the
\nentire faction of the PDIP, the largest in the House, did not
\neven attend the session. At least one faction, no matter how
\nsmall, the faction of National Unity of Indonesia, did express
\nopposition to the enactment of the law and proposed a
\npostponement.<\/p>\n
Secondly, it was doubtful if it was a valid decision, for the
\nfinal session was considered to have met the quorum required,
\nwhich was not based on the actual number of members attending
\nthat final session, but reportedly on the quorum reached at the
\nfirst of the series of general sessions when it was first
\nconvened.<\/p>\n
Thirdly, because there was neither voting nor unanimity, there
\nwas no record on the members' respective performance, so that in
\neffect the members are not accountable to the people. But under
\nthe present system, House members are responsible to their
\nparties, which they represent, rather than the people, in spite
\nof their designation.<\/p>\n
Finally, it was an unjust procedure of decision-making in view
\nof the controversy of the bill. To force its enactment would
\namount to a tyranny by the majority, especially because the
\ncontroversial issues relate to state intervention in matters of
\nhuman rights, particularly freedom of religion, and thus in human
\nconscience. Otherwise a majority decision through a democratic
\nmechanism would be valid and legitimate, not a tyranny by the
\nmajority.<\/p>\n
That, however, may well be the coming pattern of decision-
\nmaking in the legislative bodies: the inclusion of the spirit of
\nthe Islamic syaria, if without an explicit mention of it. The
\nplan to revise the criminal code based on Islamic law, if not
\nexplicitly stated, is a sign of gloomy things to come. While the
\nworld is progressing fast towards modernity, Indonesia is going
\nfor centuries' backwards. -- J. Soedjati Djiwandono<\/p>",
"url": "https:\/\/jawawa.id\/newsitem\/and-stalls-its-stride-to-modernity-1447893297",
"image": ""
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"sponsor": "Okusi Associates",
"sponsor_url": "https:\/\/okusiassociates.com"
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