Analysis of Muslim student groups<\/p>\n
By Andi Rahmat<\/p>\n
JAKARTA (JP): Fears have been expressed that the current Islamic
\nstudent groups could be turned into a force to support remnants
\nof the New Order. Such fears were clear in a recent article in
\nthis newspaper by Mohammad Qodari.<\/p>\n
Islamic student movements have never been born out of some
\nhistorical coincidences. They rise as a conscious response to the
\nchallenges of life and strive to direct changes.<\/p>\n
This is why Islamic student groups such as the Indonesian
\nIslamic Students Association (KAMMI), do not usually turn into a
\nmovement laden with religious symbols while incapable of dealing
\nwith real life.<\/p>\n
Also, an Islamic student movement does not become a mere
\nmouthpiece for groups that offer concepts of reform,
\ndemocratization, community development and social political
\nchanges while making use of terms that are ill-understood and
\nuttered without thorough study.<\/p>\n
There are at least two reasons why the Islamic student
\nmovement is not a mouthpiece. First, as Qodari wrote, the rapid
\ngrowth of campus-based Islamic student movements over the past
\ndecade or two decades could only have taken place in response to
\nan extraordinary force.<\/p>\n
The movement is cultivated with full consciousness and has a
\nclearly defined, well-understood paradigm that can encourage
\nequally substantial changes in society.<\/p>\n
The movement can shape its own approach toward developments in
\nsociety, including the ongoing push for reform and democracy.
\nKAMMI, for instance, took a strong position against Soeharto's
\nNew Order since the early stage of its existence.<\/p>\n
It did not compromise itself during the B.J. Habibie
\nadministration and it does not compromise itself in relation to
\nthe neo-New Order regime of Abdurrahman Wahid.<\/p>\n
A special note on Habibie's regime: The Muslim student groups
\nthat dominated formal university student councils decided to
\nscrutinize the 1999 general election and see whether it proceeded
\ndemocratically for the sake a systematic transition in the
\ncountry.<\/p>\n
The students found they could not support Habibie and could
\nappraise his political defeat as something that did not merit
\ntheir emotional response.<\/p>\n
It is in this context that we can comprehend the Islamic
\nstudent groups' strong position against President Abdurrahman
\n"Gus Dur" Wahid's administration.<\/p>\n
It would be simplistic to say that our strong stance is an
\nexpression of Islamic student groups' dislike of Gus Dur, whom
\nQodari said was never an idol of KAMMI activists.<\/p>\n
Such a simplistic assessment of the Islamic student movement
\nignores the processes that shape the students' consciousness of
\nthe meaning of their movement.<\/p>\n
Even more ignorant is the opinion that the movement's
\nopposition to Gus Dur is related to the students' position
\nagainst Nahdlatul Ulama because in Islam, relations among Muslims
\nare ideological in nature and known as ukhuwah (brotherhood).<\/p>\n
This implies that what is seen as, sociologically speaking,
\nfriction among Muslim groups, is true in only some cases.<\/p>\n
In many other cases, this ideological relation or Muslim
\nbrotherhood will surface and become a common bond when pressure
\nagainst Muslims in general increases. In this case, KAMMI and the
\nAssociation of Indonesian Muslim Students may have similar
\noutlooks even if they have different ways of expressing their
\nstances.<\/p>\n
Muslim students oppose Gus Dur because he has failed to ensure
\ncontinued reform and democratization in Indonesia. He has now
\nbeen identified as the leader of a new regime that has the
\nappearance and smell of the old regime. He has maintained the New
\nOrder's characteristics of a corrupt, controversial and
\nfeudalistic regime.<\/p>\n
The students' six-point vision of reform -- which includes an
\nanticorruption campaign -- is the translation of Islamic concepts
\nof reform and democratization.<\/p>\n
Second, even though Islamic student groups such as KAMMI have
\ntaken a strong position against secularism, it does not mean it
\ncan tolerate the New Order as some people would have it.<\/p>\n
Equally off mark is the much-stated opinion that the New
\nOrder, through a series of policies to accommodate Islam that
\nSoeharto made during his last decade in power, had succeeded in
\ncontrolling and turning Muslims into Soeharto's power base.<\/p>\n
Those who think this have ignored the fact that the Islamic
\nstudent movement that grew on many campuses during the 1980s and
\n1990s did so together with a strengthening of their opposition of
\nSoeharto.<\/p>\n
Islam has a concept of resistance that the Muslim students
\nadopted and applied in their stance on Soeharto. This doctrine is
\nknown as bara', a declaration to sever any ties or loyalty, the
\nopposite of wala', rendering one's loyalty and willingness to be
\nled.<\/p>\n
This particular doctrine prevented us from giving any
\nconcessions toward any of the New Order's political maneuvers,
\nwhile keeping us aware that Soeharto's so-called accommodative
\npolicies were no more than any other power holders' classical
\nploy to control the Muslims' opposition.<\/p>\n
This stance has been proven time and again. In 1992 and 1997,
\nthe majority of Muslim students silently boycotted the New Order
\n"un-Islamic" elections.<\/p>\n
Not many people realize the Muslim students' position; maybe
\nbecause it has been expressed in ways that are not always easily
\nunderstood. This is why many think that the religious symbols
\nupheld in the movement are not an expression of support for
\ndemocratization, but merely an expression of sectarian sentiment.<\/p>\n
This misunderstanding would not have occurred if some people
\nhad not simplified matters and lumped Islamic groups together as
\none movement of antisecularism (and therefore
\nantidemocratization).<\/p>\n
In their 1996 book titled Islam and Democracy, J. Esposito and
\nJ. O Voll illuminated this discourse clearly.<\/p>\n
The current student movement intersects quite heavily with
\nIslamic student groups, for the two reasons cited above. Their
\nmessages of reform and democratization are not merely camouflage
\nto the revival of the New Order as some have cynically stated.<\/p>\n
The students' messages, instead, portray the original outlook
\nof the Muslim students regarding democratization; those messages
\nare not a mask to cover their fundamentalist face, as some have
\naccused.<\/p>\n
Their messages are manifestations of their awareness of the
\nneed to develop a better, democratic Indonesia.<\/p>\n
The writer chairs the Jakarta-based KAMMI student
\norganization.<\/p>",
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