America rethinks its Southeast Asia policy<\/p>\n
Morton Abramowitz and Stephen Bosworth, Washington, D.C.<\/p>\n
The United States needs a longer-term approach to Southeast
\nAsia. This means getting a better perspective on China's role in
\nthe region. It also means serious cooperation to help improve
\ngovernance in the region, particularly to help make Indonesia and
\nVietnam dynamic, successful states. That would enormously
\nstrengthen the areas regional stability, cohesion, and
\nindependence.<\/p>\n
Since the end of the cold war the U.S. has paid attention to
\nSoutheast Asia mostly when there is trouble. America's initial
\nlack of attention to the region contributed to the financial
\ncrisis of 1997 which went on to ravage much of Asia and threaten
\nglobal economic stability. The U.S. is still paying the costs of
\nthat episode in Asian public opinion.<\/p>\n
Only after 9\/11 did the United States discover jihadism in
\nthe area. The disastrous tsunami once again rekindled American
\nattention and U.S. assistance was prompt, large, and enormously
\nwelcomed. While the U.S. ability to respond to crises in
\nSoutheast Asia is important, it is not an alternative to a
\ncoherent policy.<\/p>\n
The current U.S. approach to the area has been spasmodic: some
\ncounter-terrorism effort here, a bit of development financing
\nthere, an occasional presidential visit, and frequent statements
\nabout the glories of ASEAN, while pursuing a few bilateral free
\ntrade agreements on the side. Increasingly some now argue that
\ngrowing Chinese influence in the region threatens American
\ninterests and that the U.S. should somehow be doing more. The
\nPentagon is more fixated on China's growing military capabilities
\nand its impact on Taiwan and Asian security in general.<\/p>\n
U.S. policy is not commensurate with its interests in a
\nchanging Southeast Asia, an area of half a billion people.
\nCentral among them is commerce. In 2003 U.S. total trade with
\nASEAN was US$130 billion and investment reached some $90 billion.<\/p>\n
The large Muslim population of the region is another focal
\npoint of American interest. The pockets of Islamic extremism are
\nstill small, but they have produced acts of violence and
\ninterwoven networks of terrorism. The U.S. has a fundamental
\ninterest in stable effective states in Southeast Asia that can
\nstop extremist violence and generally strengthen the region.<\/p>\n
Part of the difficulty in coming up with a cogent approach to
\nthe region is that the region is such a mixed bag. Thailand,
\nSingapore, and Malaysia have become dynamic and largely
\nsuccessful states. Indonesia and the Philippines have struggled
\nto establish effective governments. Vietnam is on the ascent but
\nhas a long way to go and needs plenty of external support. Burma,
\nLaos, and Cambodia remain more or less trapped in backwardness.<\/p>\n
Given the varied nature of the region it is not surprising
\nthat outside governments view ASEAN, the area's one big
\ninstitutional creation, as a central point of engagement. In its
\nnearly four decades of existence ASEAN has reduced the likelihood
\nof conflict among its members and created a growing web of
\neconomic and security cooperation. ASEAN has become a cornerstone
\nfor wider Asian economic cooperation, including China, Japan and
\nSouth Korea.<\/p>\n
Much has been made of China's growing involvement in the area,
\nand the notion that the Chinese \"are cleaning the American clock\"
\nin terms of influence in the area has gained currency in some
\nAmerican quarters. That may be overdrawn but China is indeed a
\nrapidly expanding presence in the area. Trade and investment
\nflows with China are increasingly important to all the economies
\nof the area.<\/p>\n
Some countries fear Chinese productivity and dread a
\n'hollowing out' of their manufacturing sectors. But most also see
\nmajor opportunities as Chinas demand for their raw materials and
\nagricultural products grows exponentially. China is bringing new
\ndynamism to Southeast Asian economies.<\/p>\n
China, however, remains distrusted in the area, notably in
\nIndonesia and Vietnam. There are also serious abrasions including
\ncontinuing contention over claims to resources in the South China
\nSea among China, the Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia, Taiwan and
\nBrunei. Probably most important, Southeast Asian countries do not
\nwant to feel left alone with China.<\/p>\n
In fact, the U.S. remains a significant if receding presence
\nin the area. America's open markets and investment remain
\nimportant to economic progress. Southeast Asian countries respect
\nU.S. military might, though some fear the U.S. may be too quick
\nto use it. The American image in this heavily Islamic area is
\nproblematic. There is much criticism of the United States'
\nallegedly unquestioning support of Israel and in particular the
\nU.S. invasion of Iraq. Yet most countries are still prepared to
\ncooperate with the U.S.<\/p>\n
Advancing American interests in Southeast Asia requires more
\nthan simply wooing ASEAN, although that is desirable and
\ninexpensive. To deal with terrorism, the U.S. government needs to
\nfurther enhance intelligence and law enforcement cooperation and
\nin some cases military to military cooperation with states of the
\narea. To foster economic growth and commerce, the private sector
\nrequires a framework of good working relations among governments.<\/p>\n
Moreover what the United States needs to recognize clearly is
\nthat all its interests -- counter-terrorism especially and any
\nconcerns about China -- are best served by the evolution of
\nstrong, effective governments in the region. Over the longer term
\nthe best antidotes to jihadism are good governance, education,
\nand economic progress.<\/p>\n
If ASEAN is to prosper it requires strong member countries,
\nparticularly the larger ones that have real weight in the region
\nand have both the fiber not to be intimidated by China but also
\nthe realism to deal cooperatively with Beijing.<\/p>\n
Two countries especially important in this regard--Indonesia
\nand Vietnam--deserve concerted U.S. attention and more support:
\nthe former if only because it is the world's largest and most
\nsecular oriented Muslim country, and Vietnam because of its size,
\nlocation and potential.<\/p>\n
Indonesia has had a series of weak governments since the fall
\nof Soeharto in 1998, and it is not clear whether last year's
\nimpressive election will change that. The new government's
\nability to deal with the tsunami's devastation is an important
\ntest of its effectiveness. So will their handling of Aceh
\nrebellion. U.S. relations are still troubled over the past
\nconduct of Indonesia's military. All that needs sorting out and
\nthe U.S.-Indonesian relationship needs to move on, resumption of
\nthe IMET program is a start.<\/p>\n
Vietnam's eighty million people are coming out of their shell
\nand want to be part of the world. That should help change its
\nauthoritarian and repressive government, which recognizes the
\nneed for domestic change but moves cautiously.<\/p>\n
Despite all the problems of governance in both countries the
\nUnited States, as well as major Asian allies like Japan, should
\nseriously commit itself to finding cooperative ways to assist
\nthem in expanding economic growth and producing modern,
\neffective, and open states.<\/p>\n
Morton Abramowitz is Senior Fellow at The Century Foundation
\nand Stephen Bosworth is Dean of The Fletcher School at Tufts
\nUniversity. Both served as American ambassadors in East Asia and
\nare preparing a book on America and East Asia.<\/p>",
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