Ali Alatas looks back on 11 years of Indonesia's foreign policy<\/p>\n
Ali Alatas, Indonesia's longest serving foreign minister,
\noversaw the country's foreign policy at the height of its
\nactivism. In the last days of his tenure last month, he spoke to
\nThe Jakarta Post reporters Meidyatama Suryodiningrat and
\nKornelius Purba about his experiences, the future and, of course,
\nthe pebble in his shoe -- East Timor. Alatas formally hands over
\nhis post to Alwi Shihab Tuesday.<\/p>\n
JAKARTA (JP): Charmingly eloquent and meticulous in his every
\nmove, Ali Alatas loyally served at the forefront of Indonesian
\ndiplomacy for well over two decades.<\/p>\n
One of the best known Indonesians both at home and abroad, he
\nserved as foreign minister beginning with the Fifth Development
\nCabinet in 1988. He was officially replaced last Friday by Alwi
\nShihab.<\/p>\n
As he exits the arena of Indonesian diplomacy, he leaves an
\nenduring example for his successors to follow.<\/p>\n
Only days before the election of a new government, Alatas
\ncoyly indicated his impending desire to \"gracefully retire\".<\/p>\n
\"I believe this is a good time to think about not exactly
\nretirement, but to do something else that will benefit to me and
\nhopefully also to Indonesian society,\" he said.<\/p>\n
For most, the first thing that comes to mind for such a
\ndistinguished, accomplished man would be a memoir. Alatas loathes
\nthe suggestion.<\/p>\n
\"Frankly, I don't like the idea of writing a memoir. I never
\nlike the idea of presenting to the public what I did when I was
\nstill six years old, or what I did when I was 15 years old.\" He
\nadded it was \"the highest arrogance to think that people are
\ninterested in this kind of nonsense\".<\/p>\n
Such exercises, he said, were only for \"very important
\npeople\".<\/p>\n
He believed he could provide a valuable contribution by
\nrecounting his experiences in negotiating a solution to the
\nCambodian strife, the unrest in the southern Philippines and of
\ncourse East Timor.<\/p>\n
A born and bred Jakartan, Alatas initially wanted to be a
\nlawyer. However, his first start was in journalism in the early
\n1950s.<\/p>\n
He graduated from the Foreign Affairs Academy in 1954 and two
\nyears later earned a law degree from the University of Indonesia.<\/p>\n
Those who know Alex, his nickname, can testify to his work
\nethic and achievements. A heart attack several years ago forced
\nhim to slow his pace somewhat, but did nothing to affect his
\nvigor.<\/p>\n
Always careful to choose his words, Alatas is known for being
\nmethodical in his craft; he can sometimes be seen dissecting
\ntexts in a lawyer-like fashion.<\/p>\n
Not surprisingly he seemed to go against the age-old adage
\nthat the task of a diplomat is to lie for his country.<\/p>\n
\"I see it as our task not only as a foreign minister but as
\nthe ministry as a whole to be able to explain to the outside
\nworld the true proportion of an issue, the facts of an issue, and
\nto point out a misrepresentation.<\/p>\n
\"If there is misrepresentation, not to lie, or not to say that
\nsomething is white or black. I never believe in making such kind
\nof statements because you will be caught at one point,\" he said.<\/p>\n
It was during his tenure that Indonesia reached the peak of
\nits diplomatic activeness, with the resumption of diplomatic ties
\nwith China, the Cambodia issue and resolving the conflict in
\nsouthern Philippines a few of the highlights.<\/p>\n
Barely a week into his tenure, Alatas was already making
\nhistoric steps to thaw frosty ties with Beijing which were
\nsevered since the late 1960s.<\/p>\n
Indonesia at the time was to host the 1988 ESCAP annual
\nmeeting which was also attended by the Chinese deputy foreign
\nminister.<\/p>\n
With the full permission of then president Soeharto, he seized
\nthe opportunity to break diplomatic ground.<\/p>\n
\"Two of my predecessors had tried to resolve it, Pak Adam
\nMalik, Pak Mochtar, they never got anywhere. But I was lucky that
\njust a few days before, I think, Pak Harto made a statement about
\nChina that many people saw as an opening. So I seized this
\nopportunity,\" Alatas recounted.<\/p>\n
Another topic close to Alatas' heart is the resolution of
\nhostilities in Cambodia.<\/p>\n
Alatas took over the initiative started by his predecessor
\nMochtar Kusumaatmadja. He developed Mochtar's initiatives into
\nthe Jakarta Informal Meetings which were the precursor of the
\nParis peace talks.<\/p>\n
The methods of including both a major international power and
\na regional developing state as peacemaker became a diplomatic
\nhallmark.<\/p>\n
\"When it became bigger, France came into the picture, and
\nwanted to resolve the problem too,\" Alatas recalled with a smile.<\/p>\n
While he could proudly run off a list of his and Indonesia's
\nfinest hours in the past decade, it was not difficult to guess
\nwhich problem he considered the most frustrating.<\/p>\n
\"By all means it is a solution to the East Timor problem.
\nAlthough it was an international problem, but it was our problem
\nin our national sphere,\" he said of the issue often described as
\nthe pebble in his shoe.<\/p>\n
Perhaps East Timor was more of an albatross.<\/p>\n
As foreign minister, Alatas has had to almost single-handedly
\nshoulder the duty of towing the government line in the former
\nPortuguese province and defending it against international
\ncondemnation.<\/p>\n
While his patience is renowned, it is understandable that he
\nmay at times have launched tirades against Indonesia's
\ndetractors.<\/p>\n
While he refused to point fingers, it was obvious that much of
\nthe angst stemmed from the fact that developments within East
\nTimor itself were beyond the power of the foreign ministry.<\/p>\n
\"I must admit that sometimes I became very frustrated at the
\nslow pace in which we could move and the setbacks that sometimes
\nhappened, completely out of the control of the department of
\nforeign affairs ... Being an issue that proceeded in the national
\ncontext, other people decide what is happening in East Timor, not
\nthe foreign ministry.\"<\/p>\n
Slowly but surely, Alatas used his diplomatic savvy to turn
\nopposition against Indonesia's integration of the territory into
\nacceptance.<\/p>\n
No resolutions against East Timor were passed during his
\ntenure and international organizations such as the Non-Aligned
\nMovement all but left the issue on the back burner.<\/p>\n
\"Our negotiations actually were showing signs of, if not total
\nsuccess, were showing signs of going toward a solution,\" he said.<\/p>\n
Both in 1986 and 1991 during tripartite talks it was Portugal
\nwhich backpedaled when it repeatedly rejected new initiatives by
\nthe UN secretary-general.<\/p>\n
\"We were on top of the situation, not Portugal, at that time.
\nWe at that time could show to the world, look we wanted to solve
\nthe problem. Who is afraid of the solution? Portugal!\"<\/p>\n
Then came the tragic Santa Cruz incident on Nov. 12, 1991.<\/p>\n
\"From that time, the East Timor issue became a human rights
\nissue, rather than a political issue ... Now it became a human
\nrights problem, a humanitarian problem, a problem the world
\nperceived as the cruel attitude of the Indonesian nation against
\na small people who want independence,\" Alatas said.<\/p>\n
\"It was not only a setback, it turned to an issue that was
\nquite attractive to our enemies, to our opponents who were making
\nthe most of it. I think since 1991 onward, our efforts went down
\nprogressively.<\/p>\n
\"And we even had the bizarre experience of having to see a man
\nlike Ramos Horta win the Nobel Peace Prize while he has never
\npropagated peace.\"<\/p>\n
One can only guess his inner thoughts when President B.J.
\nHabibie made an about-turn in January and hastily decided to
\nallow a ballot which gave East Timor the option to separate.<\/p>\n
There continues to be much speculation about why the
\ngovernment in the end opted for such a drastic shift and whether
\nAlatas was fully consulted prior to it being brought to the
\nCabinet.<\/p>\n
Loyal bureaucrat that he is, Alatas refused to show, in public
\nat least, disappointment over the decision.<\/p>\n
\"We came up with the proposal that was, in itself, already
\nquite revolutionary because in the past I never could get the
\nidea accepted by Pak Harto, namely the middle-way solution (wide-
\nranging autonomy).\"<\/p>\n
He recited how the proposal for wide-ranging autonomy in mid-
\n1998 was initially well-received and even drew praise from the UN
\nsecretary-general.<\/p>\n
\"We started negotiations, but then we were attacked, we were
\ncriticized by East Timorese who are against us, also by certain
\nNGOs and certain governments, saying your proposal is not enough,
\nthey will never accept it.<\/p>\n
\"Or they'd say that it is only acceptable if after five years
\nto 10 years you still give them a referendum. You give them your
\nwide-ranging autonomy, you give them all these things, you
\ncontinue to pay for them, and after five to 10 years they'd still
\nhave the opportunity to say goodbye and thank you very much.<\/p>\n
\"It was no wonder that Pak Habibie then said that maybe we
\nneed an alternative. If our proposal is indeed unacceptable, I am
\nnot going to give alternatives in which they ask five to 10 years
\nand then a referendum. Our proposal was that if they reject it,
\nthen let's pack and leave. Everybody was shocked, but that was
\nthe idea of the best solution.\"<\/p>\n
In the end the monumental decision was possibly taken in
\nhaste, from sheer frustration by those unaccustomed to the strain
\nof international acrimony.<\/p>\n
\"The outside world should have had the wisdom at that time not
\nto continue Indonesia-bashing. They continued to heckle us, to
\nsay this is not enough, too little too late and so on. We became
\nvery frustrated, you know, especially those who are not used to
\nfacing East Timor. I was used to facing East Timor in the last 23
\nyears.<\/p>\n
\"You may have criticism of the proposal being too premature,
\ntoo fast. Don't ask my personal opinion on that. In the end it
\nbecame the position of the Cabinet, the whole Cabinet.\"<\/p>\n
When asked whether he initially advised the president against
\nthe idea, Alatas responded: \"Well, I have advised, among other
\nthings, OK we can solve it, but isn't it premature? ... But after
\nthat in a very democratic manner we discussed that in the Cabinet
\nand it became a Cabinet issue.\"<\/p>\n
Alatas also shed some light on the letter sent by Australian
\nPrime Minister John Howard in December 1998 in which Australia
\nfor the first time formally expressed its readiness to accept an
\nindependent East Timor.<\/p>\n
\"The role is that it maybe made Pak Habibie irritated, that is
\nthe role. The Australians think that the letter was good,
\nsomething that worked in the right direction, but totally
\ndifferent. It made Pak Habibie mad, it made Pak Habibie angry,
\nbecause it came from Australia. Why should Australia get
\ninvolved?\"<\/p>\n
According to Alatas, the overwhelming defeat in the Aug. 30
\npopular consultation and the ensuing violence came as a shock to
\nthe government.<\/p>\n
\"Up to the balloting, the report we got from our own people,
\nof the prointegration people, including Lopez da Cruz, and so on,
\nis that we were going to win.\"<\/p>\n
Alatas admitted that he had some doubts about the positive
\nreports.<\/p>\n
\"We told them already at that time 'are you sure?' Because I
\nsaid, for example, to them, how can you win if you continue
\nintimidating the people? Eurico Guterres and so on, I said, you
\nsee, if you continue to intimidate them, they will hate you. In
\nfront of you they may be afraid, they will bow their head, and if
\nyou say raise a red-and-white Indonesian flag they will do it.
\nHowever, once in the booth, they will go against you, I told
\nthem.\"<\/p>\n
Once the result was announced, it \"shocked us\", Alatas
\nadmitted.<\/p>\n
\"They always reported that we were going to win. So they too
\nwere shocked, maybe ashamed. They claimed there are a lot of
\nviolations (during the ballot). There were violations but not to
\nthe point that you can change 78 to 22 percent.\"<\/p>\n
Things only got worse for Indonesia as the violence erupted.<\/p>\n
\"It shocked the world, it shocked us too frankly. Because
\ncertainly at the department of foreign affairs, we were shocked.
\nWhy should they come like that, and why it was not stopped
\nimmediately?\"<\/p>\n
Reflecting Indonesia's current plight in which so much
\ninternational ire has been directed its way, Alatas remarked that
\nit was a victim of a combination of bad publicity and the
\ncountry's own doing.<\/p>\n
\"Frankly speaking, much of the negative reporting and the
\nnegative image we have received the last few weeks, in the last
\nfew months, much of it, was caused by our own actions, was caused
\nby some of the things we did.\"<\/p>\n
He was also quick to add that Indonesia's purported terrible
\nactions were woven in untruths.<\/p>\n
\"Many of the things have been exaggerated, that has been shown
\nnow. Even the most critical Western press are now acknowledging
\nthat there has been too much exaggeration.<\/p>\n
\"It created some image, and that is why instead of being
\nrecognized for the positive things that we did, in a search of a
\ndemocratic and just solution to East Timor problems, we have been
\ncriticized.\"<\/p>\n
With Alatas no longer at the helm of Indonesia's foreign
\npolicy, it is not too much to expect that he would now become
\nits' most astute observer. But again he humbly showed reluctance
\nat the prospect of preaching to the new government.<\/p>\n
His fundamental hope was for Indonesia to remain faithful to
\nthe founding principles which have guided national foreign policy
\nthus far.<\/p>\n
\"I do not arrogate myself to tell the next government what the
\nforeign policy should be. However all I can say is that our
\nforeign policy has always being governed by certain basic
\nprinciples,\" he said.<\/p>\n
\"Our foreign policy is always a principled foreign policy, and
\nnot an expeditious one, not a quality of expedience tending with
\nthe wind or just for the sake of short-term gain, sacrificing
\nbasic principles. And I hope that our foreign policy will
\ncontinue to be a principled one.<\/p>\n
\"For example, our policy on Israel, is a policy which is based
\non principle. It is nothing against the Israeli people, we have
\nnothing against the Jewish state, we are willing to have certain
\nlimited contact with them, but as far as diplomatic relations
\nwith it is concerned, it is based on the principle that they
\nfirst have to undo what they are doing to the Palestinians and to
\nthe Arabs, and that is part of our anticolonialist policy, as
\nstipulated in the 1945 Constitution.<\/p>\n
\"So to any new government, all I can hope is that we will
\nremain to be a country known to be a principled foreign policy
\nrather than for foreign policy based on expedience and short term
\ngain. But for the rest, I cannot arrogate to tell them what to
\ndo.\"<\/p>\n
He leaves his post amid soured relations between Indonesia and
\nAustralia.<\/p>\n
\"We have come full circle, and we are back at square one,\" he
\nsaid.<\/p>\n
He recounted that when he came into office in 1988, one of his
\nfirst tasks was to improve the strained relations between the two
\ncountries.<\/p>\n
\"We came very far, but now we are back to the same point, at
\nthe very low relationship.\"<\/p>\n
He remained optimistic that once the dust settled, both
\ncountries would realize that they have long-term interests and
\nthat preserving the relationship was mutually beneficial.<\/p>\n
\"However, I don't know how long it will take. Unfortunately,
\nsome of the things that I thought we had achieved turned out to
\nbe artificial, like I thought Australia, and the Australian
\ngovernment, were sincere in positioning themselves closer to Asia
\nrather than seeing themselves as a European outpost in an Asian
\nenvironment.\"<\/p>\n
Touching on future relations with East Timor now that the
\nformer Indonesian province is on its way to statehood, Alatas
\nexpressed hope that it they would be harmonious.<\/p>\n
\"But let me say without any pretension or arrogance that it
\nwill in the first place depend on East Timor realizing, rather
\nthan Indonesia, that it should maintain a good relationship
\nbecause otherwise if by their statement, if by their policy, they
\nthink they can ignore Indonesia, then it will be very difficult
\nrelationship because of proximity,\" he warned.<\/p>\n
When asked about the prospect of the 10-member Association of
\nSoutheast Asian Nations (ASEAN) embracing an independent East
\nTimor as a member, Alatas retorted that it should be the other
\nway round.<\/p>\n
\"It is not for ASEAN to embrace East Timor but for East Timor
\nto think what it should do about ASEAN, what its positioning
\nshould be to ASEAN.\"<\/p>\n
Retracing the diplomatic career of a man like Alatas, one
\nsometimes cannot help but feel sorry that such distinction is
\ntainted by a single issue which was not of his own doing.<\/p>\n
Through the endless unavailing negotiations and countless
\ninternational recriminations, Alatas kept his composure. He
\nattributed his cool exterior to years of diplomatic training.<\/p>\n
While he professed not to bear grudges against his diplomatic
\nopponents and critics, a tingling question remains.<\/p>\n
What would his greeting be if Ramos Horta visited as East
\nTimor's foreign minister?<\/p>\n
With a quick smile and his famed diplomatic skills in full
\nforce, Alatas replied: \"Practically speaking, it would not come
\nto that because I won't be foreign minister.\"<\/p>",
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