After Aceh peace deal: Learning from past mistakes<\/p>\n
Kiki Syahnakri, Former Army Deputy Chief-of-staff, Jakarta<\/p>\n
All the parties involved in the recent signing of the peace
\ndeal between the Indonesian government and the Free Aceh Movement
\n(GAM) deserve sincere appreciation, especially given the
\nprotracted conflict in Aceh and the vast loss of life and
\nmaterial damage there.<\/p>\n
The question of Aceh has eroded the nation's reputation and
\ntarnished the image of its military (TNI) and police, the forces
\nassigned to maintain security, law and order to ensure national
\nintegrity and act as the vanguard of the state's sovereignty.<\/p>\n
Yet we must also criticize the policies and process toward the
\nsigning of the treaty. Prior to the signing of the peace deal
\npreconditions that would suit the government's terms were needed,
\nand there were principles in terms of security, politics and
\ndiplomacy that we had to continue to uphold.<\/p>\n
We cannot leave the framework of the unitary state of the
\nrepublic, which includes Aceh; and there must be assurances that
\nGAM also has good intentions and agrees that the solution to the
\nissue must be made within this framework.<\/p>\n
Dozens of times AGAM, GAM's military wing, has violated the
\npeace deal by intercepting members of our military\/police or
\nundertaking other forms of military action against them. Credible
\nsources have revealed that GAM held a secret meeting between Jan.
\n3 and Jan. 5 in Nisam district, North Aceh.<\/p>\n
Among the decisions reached were that GAM would lay down its
\narms only after the military had done likewise under the
\nsupervision of the United Nations; and that GAM would immediately
\nset up a civilian government in Aceh to replace the Indonesian
\ngovernment at the village and district levels.<\/p>\n
GAM also decided it would recruit young people from all parts
\nof Aceh to reinforce its troops. It would also intensify tax
\ncollection and replace personnel considered to have not lived up
\nto expectations. Then, GAM members who had surrendered and NGO
\nmembers who were not in favor of GAM must be kidnapped. Finally,
\nit was decided that GAM's administrative structure must be
\nimproved.<\/p>\n
The meeting, also attended by a number of leading ulema,
\nvoiced the resolve that once the peace deal could remain in
\nforce, \"the republic's personnel\" would be wiped out from Aceh.
\nIf this information is fully or partly correct, authorities are
\nright to say that the peace deal needs reviewing, and that
\nIndonesia would even withdraw from the deal if necessary.<\/p>\n
In East Timor, back in 1985, then independence leader Xanana
\nGusmao diverted the focus of his struggle from an armed front to
\npolitical diplomacy -- he moved from jungle to city.<\/p>\n
The independence movement Fretilin\/CNRT adopted a clandestine
\nmethod to develop resistance in the towns across East Timor and
\neven beyond. Despite heavy pressure from the TNI and the police,
\nthis method worked well and Xanana -- regardless of the
\ncomplexity of the problem as a result of Indonesia's failed
\napproaches and policies and the presence of an international
\nconspiracy -- successfully turned East Timor into a new state.<\/p>\n
East Timor was able to gain independence through clandestine
\nmethods even under strong pressure from Indonesia, so how could
\nGAM be given the golden opportunity to carry out its actions
\nopenly and freely right in front of us?<\/p>\n
A senior Indonesian diplomat has proudly claimed that we have
\nsuccessfully made GAM shift from armed resistance to diplomacy.
\nBut this is exactly what GAM desires. It would be much easier for
\nGAM to consolidate itself and mobilize support, establish
\ncommunications and so forth in the present situation.<\/p>\n
In this post-peace deal situation GAM will likely open up
\nthree fronts -- the armed front, the political front and the
\ndiplomatic front -- to increase support from the Acehnese and the
\nworld. By then, GAM will enjoy wider access to the Acehnese and
\nthe international community. The access enjoyed by the TNI and
\npolice would, on the other hand, be narrower.<\/p>\n
Also, GAM would likely mobilize popular power through appeals
\nand intimidation so that people would join rallies, instigate
\nrioting in opposition to the government and drive out of Aceh the
\nlocally stationed and dispatched security apparatus of the TNI
\nand police.<\/p>\n
Then the measures planned by the Joint Security Committee --
\nconfidence building steps, the demilitarization of GAM,
\nrehabilitation\/economic assistance and so forth -- would never be
\nrealized and peace would not be achieved.<\/p>\n
What is GAM and how must we cope with it? This is the same as
\nquestioning the problem of Aceh itself. The question of Aceh may
\nbe construed as an armed rebellion likely to reoccur. Aceh has
\nbecome a national issue placing the state (the people and
\ngovernment, including TNI) in confrontation with GAM as an armed
\nseparatist group.<\/p>\n
From the view of international humanitarian law, GAM is an
\narmed grouped undertaking an armed rebellion. It is organized
\nmilitarily and takes up arms to resist the authorities and
\nterrorize the people. It may thus be categorized as a combatant.<\/p>\n
The question of Aceh is the fruit of the government's failure
\nto implement development in an integrated manner. Hence Aceh has
\nnot seen the fruits of welfare, justice and democracy. This has
\nled to disobedience, insurgency and armed rebellion, with wide,
\nprimoridal-based support. In this process, foreign intervention
\ncannot be avoided.<\/p>\n
The only way an armed rebellion with a guerrilla pattern can
\nbe dealt with is by combining diplomacy and military operations,
\nplus integrated rehabilitation measures to \"win the hearts and
\nminds of the people\". An armed movement will fail or be weakened
\nif the people take sides with authorities.<\/p>\n
So, the combined results of cooperation and coordination
\nbetween the regional and central government, the TNI and the
\npolice, non-governmental organizations and the local community is
\na must. Mere diplomatic negotiations will not last or will even
\nbe doomed to failure; meaning our interests cannot be
\naccommodated if military activities or security operations are
\nnot employed to strengthen our bargaining position at the
\nnegotiating table.<\/p>\n
Yet if we only adopt the security approach, we will never
\narrive at a final settlement and new problems will crop up.<\/p>\n
Even if the plan drawn up by the JSC can be put into practice
\nto achieve lasting peace in Aceh within the unitary republic,
\nthis does not mean an immediate end to the problem.<\/p>\n
The aspiration nurtured by GAM for independence will gain
\nstrength again if the government fails to bring prosperity,
\njustice and democracy to the region.<\/p>\n
Let's learn from East Timor. Indonesia's funds were largely
\nspent on building infrastructure, many of which locals did not
\nneed. Schools were built without prior survey so that in some
\nplaces there are schools with very few or no students at all.<\/p>\n
Given Aceh's potential, sectors directly linked with the
\nimprovement of the standard of living such as agriculture,
\nplantations and cattle breeding, can be developed.<\/p>\n
If the funds of over Rp 6 trillion allocated for Aceh in the
\n2002 budget year is used well, it would be very effective in
\nsupporting efforts to solve the problem. This budget would not
\nfund military operations but regional development.<\/p>\n
Another lesson from East Timor is that we must work to reduce
\nand avoid issues that can be exploited and exposed by GAM and its
\nsympathizers as violations of Acehnese human rights.<\/p>\n
A truly professional military and police will thus be needed.
\nThey must master the law and be proficient in applying it. They
\nmust know exactly who they must shoot, arrest or kill.<\/p>\n
Aceh's situation following the signing of the peace pact is a
\ntest for this country to see whether we can properly manage
\nconflicts and retain our integrity -- or whether our conflict
\nmanagement will be a bad precedent that threatens the existence
\nof our nation state.<\/p>",
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