Aceh's forgotten victims<\/p>\n
Brad Adams, New York<\/p>\n
On Dec. 25, 2004, eighteen people were reported killed in Aceh
\nduring clashes between the Indonesian military and the Free Aceh
\nMovement (GAM). This brought the official number of fatalities
\nsince martial law and full scale military operations were
\ndeclared in the province in May 2003 to 2,300.<\/p>\n
In that same period, between 125,000-150,000 had become
\ninternally displaced persons (IDPs), living in deplorable
\nconditions beyond the reach of international aid workers, as
\naccess to Aceh for international humanitarian and human rights
\nworkers had been forbidden by government authorities, who wanted
\nto prosecute their war in the dark.<\/p>\n
Twenty-four hours later the eighteen killings, the huge number
\nof \"conflict IDPs,\" and the conflict itself had been almost
\ncompletely forgotten. It is time to wake up to the full reality
\nof Aceh.<\/p>\n
The Dec. 26 earthquake and tsunami and the massive human loss
\nand physical devastation it has wrought on Aceh has rightly been
\nat the forefront of Indonesian and, indeed, world concern. Over
\n127,000 people were killed in the space of minutes, with another
\n37,000 still missing, presumed dead. Over 500,000 people were
\ndisplaced by the disaster, many of whom continue to rely on help
\nfrom outside the province (and the country) for basic
\nnecessities.<\/p>\n
Subsequent earthquakes and aftershocks, including the March 28
\nquake on Nias island which killed at least 905 people and
\ndisplaced almost 107,000 people, continue to affect and
\ntraumatize the people of Aceh and North Sumatra. It will take
\nyears for Aceh to recover from the physical, emotional, and human
\ntoll of the earthquake and tsunami.<\/p>\n
However, while international sympathy and attention have
\nfocused sharply on aid and reconstruction for tsunami and
\nearthquake victims, collective amnesia and indifference
\ncharacterize the reaction to civilian suffering from the three-
\ndecades-old conflict that continues to devastate much of Aceh.
\nWhile the government and GAM are scheduled to have their fourth
\nround of peace talks in Helsinki in late May, in Aceh the
\nkillings continue.<\/p>\n
Since the tsunami struck at least 260 more people have been
\nkilled in ongoing fighting between Indonesian security forces and
\nGAM. This is hardly reported or commented on. Human Rights Watch
\nand others have extensively documented the abuses perpetrated in
\nthe conflict for many years, including extrajudicial killings,
\ntorture, arbitrary arrests, extortion, and forced displacement.<\/p>\n
Both the Indonesian military and GAM have targeted civilians,
\nwho have always borne the brunt of the violence. The end last
\nweek of the civilian state of emergency is welcome, but only if
\nit leads to improved behavior by the Indonesian military.
\nOtherwise, it will be seen by Acehnese as just another cosmetic
\ngesture that fails to deal with the main problem: The brutal
\nbehavior of Indonesian soldiers and their lack of accountability
\nfor abuses.<\/p>\n
While the Indonesian government has been congratulated for
\nallowing largely unfettered access to tsunami hit areas of Aceh,
\nsince it resumed military operations in May 2003 access to
\nconflict areas for humanitarian workers, journalists, and human
\nrights monitors has been almost completely cut off. The large
\nmajority of the province remains closed to humanitarian workers
\nand human rights monitoring.<\/p>\n
And it is in these parts of the province that the conflict
\ncontinues, largely hidden from view, and without scrutiny. The
\nhandful of foreign journalists who ventured into Aceh's
\nhinterland in January and February to cover conflict related
\nstories were met with resistance, obstruction, and, in some
\ncases, detention and interrogation from Indonesian security
\nforces.<\/p>\n
Prior to the tsunami, conflict IDPs had taken up residence in
\ngovernment camps, mosques, and spontaneous shelters inside Aceh
\nand North Sumatra. During this period the international aid
\ncommunity, including the UN, had been persistently trying to gain
\naccess to the province to provide the same kind of assistance it
\nis now offering to tsunami victims. The Indonesian government
\nrefused.<\/p>\n
Now largely forgotten, these IDPs remain in urgent need of
\nassistance and support. Yet they are off the radar and agenda of
\nthe Indonesian government and the thousands of humanitarian
\nworkers in Aceh now delivering assistance to tsunami survivors.<\/p>\n
The tsunami has presented the international community with an
\nunprecedented opportunity to make a real difference for all of
\nAceh. It is almost entirely foreign money that will reconstruct
\nand rehabilitate Aceh. Donors should condition assistance on full
\naccess to the whole province and the ability to assist conflict
\nIDPs -- who are longer suffering and no less deserving of
\nassistance.<\/p>\n
It is critical that donors fully understand that the
\nIndonesian military is a party to a vicious war in Aceh. While
\nthe military performed commendably in the weeks after the
\ntsunami, providing urgently needed logistical support to the aid
\neffort at the same time its soldiers had to deal with the loss of
\nmany of their colleagues from the tsunami, its brutal human
\nrights record -- and the lack of serious reform by the government
\nof President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono -- means that most Acehnese
\ndo not see it as a neutral or benevolent institution.<\/p>\n
Indonesian aid workers are also concerned that the military
\nwill try to use its financial and political influence to control
\nreconstruction contracts in the province. The military has
\nalready inserted itself into several areas of the relief effort
\nin Aceh, responsible in some areas for the distribution of
\ngovernment aid and engaged in management of some of the
\nspontaneous IDP camps, set up by an estimated 400,000 IDPs
\nthroughout Aceh. In some towns they are the main coordinating
\nbody for both international and domestic aid.<\/p>\n
The military should no longer play a major role in post-
\ntsunami reconstruction. The aid community, with a long record of
\nsuccessfully dealing with tragedies around the world, can now
\nmeet virtually all logistical needs. Given the well-documented
\nrecord of massive corruption in the Indonesian military, donors
\nshould insist that there be no further military participation in
\nthe reconstruction of Aceh -- including through military-linked
\nbusinesses or the provision of security services.<\/p>\n
They should set up a process to pro-actively vet companies for
\nmilitary ties before assigning contracts. If the international
\ncommunity now acquiesces to the efforts by the Indonesian
\nmilitary to control aid and restrict access again in Aceh, it
\nwill set back efforts to strengthen the capacity of civilian
\ninstitutions in Aceh, both government and civil society.<\/p>\n
UN and World Bank aid officials readily acknowledge that real
\ndevelopment in Aceh cannot take place in the middle of war. But
\nso long as war rages, the Indonesian government and donors need
\nto demonstrate the political will necessary to meet the
\nhumanitarian needs of all Acehnese. Without this the coast may
\nstart to recover, but much of the rest of Aceh will remain in
\ncrisis, forgotten, and ravaged by war.<\/p>\n
The writer is Asia director for the New York-based Human
\nRights Watch.<\/p>",
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