Aceh: Remedial or restored-independence secession?<\/p>\n
Kusnanto Anggoro
\nSenior Researcher
\nCentre for Strategic
\nand International Studies
\n(CSIS)
\nJakarta<\/p>\n
The Free Aceh Movement (GAM) is committed to achieving
\nindependence by political means, through diplomacy and
\ninternational law. Since the early 1990s, the separatists
\nsubmitted reports to the UN, calling for the submission of
\nresolutions on Aceh's self-determination. Violent means, however,
\nappear to be at the forefront of their struggle for an ultimate
\nindependence.<\/p>\n
That is understandable, given their limited resources and
\nopportunities. Die-hard ideologists seeking independence,
\nhowever, were not initially a dominant force within GAM. Their
\nsuccess in raising a sense of nationalism among Acehnese has been
\nhelped by the continuing injustice and other authoritarian
\nmeasures of Jakarta, plus the reckless brutality of the security
\napparatus. So has political sympathy from abroad.<\/p>\n
Such a situation will likely remain the same for quite some
\ntime. Indeed, the way the government handles the problem of Aceh
\nwill determine how the international community reacts. No doubt,
\nmost criticism has been addressed to the government, simply
\nbecause the government is the stronger party. The need for a
\npolitical solution to the issue has become the chorus of the
\ninternational community.<\/p>\n
Territorial integrity remains a sacrosanct principle; this may
\nhave even been reemphasized after the end of the Cold War. State
\npractice since 1945 shows clearly the extreme reluctance of
\nstates to recognize or accept unilateral secession outside the
\ncolonial context. Most successful cases are more the exception
\nthan the rule, at least from the standpoint of international law.<\/p>\n
Separatism may result in independent states; or it may settle
\nfor internal self-government within an extensively decentralized
\nsystem. Yet, during the last 50 years, no unilateral secession
\nhas appeared successful: Senegal (1960), Singapore (1965),
\nBangladesh (1971) and Eritrea (1993) being cases in point.<\/p>\n
The key feature was that the concerned parties expressly
\nagreed to separation. Besides, except Bangladesh, the other three
\nwere also remnants of a colonial legacy.<\/p>\n
The experience of the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe and the
\nBalkans could be too specific and perhaps beyond imagination.
\nStill, all of the 22 new independent states emerging from the
\nruins of the Soviet Union did not emerge from unilateral
\nsecession.<\/p>\n
In Czechoslovakia (1993), the separation of the Czech Republic
\nand Slovakia was a straightforwardly consensual process at the
\nlevel of the governments and parliaments concerned. They became
\nseparate states after an agreement between them to dissolve the
\nCzechoslovak Federation.<\/p>\n
In the case of the Soviet Union, the former imperial entity,
\nthe Russian Federation, accepted the emergence to independence of
\nthe other republics. A more tragic experience is the successor
\nstates of the former Yugoslavia (1991-1992), which came into
\nexistence through a complex and violent process.<\/p>\n
This is the only case since 1971 in which new states have
\nemerged in a noncolonial context against the continued opposition
\nof a government claiming to represent the predecessor state.<\/p>\n
Still, neither in the former Soviet Union nor in Yugoslavia
\nhave more constituent states emerged and gained international
\nrecognition. Chechnya unilaterally seceded from the Russian
\nFederation in November 1991; and yet it is still struggling more
\nthan a decade later. Nagorny-Karabakh failed to secure
\nindependence from Azerbaijan, despite massive support from
\nArmenia.<\/p>\n
This suggests that the most likely option for Aceh's
\nseparatists would be less than full-fledged independence. Even
\nwhen they opt for political means, including those based on a
\nmajority vote of the population of a substate territory,
\ninternational law has traditionally treated it very reluctantly.
\nArticle 27 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political
\nRights justifies separatist claims only for cultural identity and
\ninternal self-government, still on the basis of respect for
\nterritorial integrity.<\/p>\n
Surely, developments in respect of the idea of internal self-
\ndetermination and self-government still occur. They are
\naccompanied by an extension of minority rights, including the
\nrights of national minorities, and an increased recognition of
\nthe rights of indigenous peoples.<\/p>\n
Nonetheless, it remains to be seen whether these developments
\nwill affect the established rules and practices with respect to
\nself-determination and the territorial integrity of states.<\/p>\n
In most cases, where the government of the state in question
\nhas maintained its opposition to the secession, such attempts
\nhave gained virtually no international support or recognition.<\/p>\n
Indeed, although the international community has criticized
\nthe conduct of Russian forces in Chechnya regarding the use of
\ndisproportionate force and alleged violations of international
\nhumanitarian law, it has also accepted that the conflict with
\nChechnya is an internal armed conflict, and that the principle of
\nterritorial integrity applies.<\/p>\n
There should be several caveats. Recognition of the
\nindependence of the Baltic States may not be based primarily on
\nthe dissolution of the Soviet Union but the suppression of
\nindependence. Meanwhile, the articulated basis for the European
\nand international response to the outbreak of violence and armed
\nconflict in Yugoslavia appeared to be inevitable dissolution of
\nYugoslavia as a matter of fact.<\/p>\n
It remains to be seen whether the people of Aceh will be
\nsuccessful in gaining the right to self-determination. Aceh
\nseparatism could be a case of \"restoring independent secession\",
\nas the Baltic states were.<\/p>\n
Three hundred years after the Dutch occupied Java, Aceh was
\nstill an internationally-recognized independent state with
\ndiplomatic relations with much of the world, including Britain
\nand the United States.<\/p>\n
Alternatively, Aceh may be a case of \"remedial secession\". It
\nhas been part of Indonesia since 1945. The emergence of armed
\nrebellion has been caused by escalating violation of democratic
\nprinciples since the 1950s, but most particularly during the
\nrepressive years of the New Order regime.<\/p>\n
The international support for Bangladesh in the 1970s was in
\npart due to the violence and repression engaged in by the
\nPakistan military regime, which made reunification unthinkable.<\/p>\n
So far the government has been able to secure international
\nsupport for its territorial integrity. Nonetheless, while the
\ninternational community is hungry for the \"responsibility to
\nprotect\", particular concern should be very much aimed at
\navoiding excessive human casualties and protecting human rights.<\/p>\n
During the first month of military rule, the international
\npublic may be satisfied with the internal disciplinary measures
\nof the armed forces, such as investigation of soldiers allegedly
\ninvolved in atrocities against civilians and\/or withdrawal of the
\nbattalion to which the soldier belongs.<\/p>\n
In the coming weeks, however, this should be complemented by
\nefforts to open more access to independent monitors. There is now
\nstronger pressure for the government to be more responsive to
\ndevelopments on the ground.<\/p>\n
The government is required to make public its longer term
\nplanning, especially that relating to synchronizing military
\noperations with other components of the \"integrated operation\" --
\nhumanitarian assistance, law enforcement and the empowerment of
\nlocal government.<\/p>\n
The writer also lectures in Strategic and Security Studies at
\nthe postgraduate studies program, Department of International
\nRelations, University of Indonesia and convenes Propatria,
\nIndonesia's Working Group for Security Sector Reform.<\/p>",
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