Aceh reflects new thinking in Asia<\/p>\n
Anthony Reid, The Straits Times, Asia News Network\/Singapore<\/p>\n
The Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between the Indonesian
\ngovernment and the Free Aceh Movement (GAM), signed in Helsinki
\non Aug 15, marks a refreshing innovation for Indonesia and for
\nnationalist thinking in Asia.<\/p>\n
If the terms are successfully implemented, it will represent a
\nvictory for pragmatic common sense, and for democratic
\ninclusiveness, over the "unitary state" mentality which has
\ndominated Indonesian politics since 1945.<\/p>\n
Since its foundation in 1945, the Indonesian state has been
\npremised on a single sovereignty and source of legitimacy -- "one
\nstate, one nation (bangsa), one language". Because the Dutch
\nstrategy to oppose the revolutionary Republic of Indonesia was a
\ncomplex federal one, any attempts to qualify a single Indonesian
\nsovereignty had a ring of treachery for the revolutionaries. The
\nIndonesians who supported anything like federalism were silenced
\nthrough the period of revolutionary populism under Sukarno and of
\nthe military-dominated bureaucracy under Soeharto.<\/p>\n
In the exhilarating democratic climate since Soeharto's fall
\nin 1998, new flexibility seemed possible.<\/p>\n
The referendum permitted to East Timor was a dramatic product
\nof that democratic flexibility, but its outcome unfortunately
\nappeared to confirm the logic of a single sovereignty.<\/p>\n
East Timor was either 100 percent in the unitary state and
\nsubject to the domination of a centralized military, or it was
\n100 percent out and obliged to construct all of its own expensive
\nautonomies in language, education, finance and so forth. This
\nconfirmed for many Indonesians that sovereignty was indivisible.
\nThe former Indonesian province of East Timor is now the Republic
\nof Timor Leste.<\/p>\n
Aceh had to remain 100 percent in because the only alternative
\nwas 100 percent out, threatening the eventual break-up of
\nIndonesia.<\/p>\n
Elsewhere in the world, where sovereignties have evolved
\nthrough pragmatic compromise rather than rationalistic
\nrevolution, some variations on single sovereignty have been
\npossible.<\/p>\n
Significantly, it is Britain, with the longest experience of
\nthe democratic nation-state, which has preserved the fullest
\nexample of an asymmetrical state. Its four nations, England,
\nScotland, Wales and Northern Ireland, each have a different and
\nunique relationship with British sovereignty. Scotland has its
\nown currency, Parliament, established church and international
\nfootball team, and Scots have no difficulty considering their
\nnationality Scottish while carrying a British passport.<\/p>\n
Canada has also proceeded far along the route of accepting one
\nunique place for the Quebec nation and another for indigenous
\nnations within the Canadian state.<\/p>\n
As the Cold War post-colonial dogmas of indivisible absolute
\nsovereignty looked less secure in a globalising unipolar world,
\nthere has been much new analysis of what Michael Keating
\n(Plurinational Democracy: Stateless Nations In A Post-Sovereignty
\nWorld, 2001) calls "asymmetrical government" for "plurinational"
\nstates.<\/p>\n
The Catalans and Basques in Spain, the Flemings in Belgium and
\nthe Kurds in Iraq are among the "nations" whose situation has
\nprompted lively new thinking, drawing on older literatures about
\nthe nature of sovereignty. Keating argues persuasively that "we
\nneed to separate the concepts of nation, state and sovereignty,
\nso often conflated in political analysis"; that "people can well
\nhave multiple national identities"; and that "if national
\ncommunities are asymmetrical, then asymmetrical Constitutions can
\nbe defended on liberal and democratic grounds".<\/p>\n
Surprisingly, little of this advanced thinking about
\nsovereignty has been brought into the debates in Asia, although
\none would have thought the relations between Beijing, Hong Kong
\nand Taipei would call for it.<\/p>\n
In reality, Asia has an even richer diversity than Europe of
\npre-modern multinational states and sovereignties, as well as
\ncontemporary examples in Malaysia and India of both plurinational
\nand asymmetrical Constitutions. Sarawak has different
\nconstitutional rights than Negri Sembilan, the sovereignty of the
\nsultans coexists with that of the state, and most Malaysians
\nbelieve their nation (bangsa) is Malay, Chinese, Iban etc, in
\naddition to Malaysian.<\/p>\n
As in the British case, these seemingly anomalous arrangements
\nhave evolved through pragmatic compromise between the needs of
\ndifferent nations. Although they have been relatively little
\nanalyzed by the theorists, they have proved more compatible with
\ndemocratic freedoms than the "rational" single sovereignties of
\nthe post-revolutionary Asian states.<\/p>\n
So, what chance the Aceh agreement?<\/p>\n
The eight-page MOU is encouragingly pragmatic rather than
\ndeclamatory, even if many of its terms cry out for clearer
\ndefinition. It consistently refers to "Aceh" without clarifying
\nwhether it is a province, a nation or a state. "Aceh has the
\nright to use regional symbols including a flag, crest and a
\nhymn", "Aceh has the right to raise funds with external loans",
\nto raise taxes, to have unhindered access to foreign countries,
\netc.<\/p>\n
President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono seemed ready to be flexible
\non the symbolic issues of intense emotional importance to both
\nsides, while bargaining hard about practical security issues.<\/p>\n
Most intriguingly, there is provision for a kind of head of
\nstate, a Wali Nanggroe (the title GAM leader Hasan Tiro has
\nsometimes adopted), "with all its ceremonial attributes and
\nentitlements".<\/p>\n
In return for committing themselves to "a fair and democratic
\nprocess within the unitary state and Constitution of the Republic
\nof Indonesia", GAM has potentially acquired most attributes of
\n"nation" that they sought.<\/p>\n
Immense difficulties of distrust and vested interest on the
\nground may well still make this agreement impossible. The
\nIndonesian military will remain in place under the agreement,
\nwith a reduced force of 14,700 men (and 9,100 "organic" police),
\nand will be the only armed force under the terms of the
\nagreement. If the soldiers on the ground wish to wreck the
\nagreement, they have the capacity to do so.<\/p>\n
For its part, GAM was probably persuaded to commit to the
\npeace in the belief its allies could win the promised elections
\nfor officials in April 2006 and for the legislature in 2009. The
\nreal test will be how fair and transparent these elections can
\nbe, and how far a defeated side will accept them even if that
\ncould be achieved.<\/p>\n
The international community, and particularly the ASEAN
\ncountries participating in the Aceh Monitoring Mission, should be
\nin no doubt of the importance of this enterprise.<\/p>\n
If the agreement proceeds well, it will be a model for
\ndefusing other trouble spots around the region, and for
\nbroadening the understanding of democracy and sovereignty in the
\nregion. If it goes badly, it will set these issues back for
\neverybody, and confirm the intransigence on all sides.<\/p>\n
The writer is director of the Asia Research Institute at the
\nNational University of Singapore and author of An Indonesian
\nFrontier: Acehnese And Other Histories Of Sumatra (Singapore
\nUniversity Press, 2004).<\/p>",
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