Aceh: Peaceful solution or force<\/p>\n
By Desra Percaya<\/p>\n
JAKARTA (JP): Decades of ideological confrontation between the
\nEast and the West have brought about transformation in our
\nconcept of conflict, the main aspect being a change of dimension
\nfrom international (inter-state) conflict to internal conflict.<\/p>\n
The latter is increasingly dominating the landscape of
\nconflict. Its sources are basically rooted in the denial of
\nfundamental human needs for security, a distinctive identity, the
\nrecognition of that identity by others, and effective and
\nlegitimate participation in social, economic, and political
\nsystems.<\/p>\n
This type of conflict is found mainly in states with multi-
\nethnic characteristics. Consequently, the impact of this is much
\nworse in developing countries as they are still in the process of
\nnation-building.<\/p>\n
Instead of achieving a strong and solid nation, there are many
\nexamples of states that have become dominated by authoritarian
\nregimes hiding under the umbrella of ideological competition in
\ninternational politics.<\/p>\n
Once this global rivalry disappears, the strategic importance
\nthen significantly decreases, and domestic cleavages gradually
\nchallenge the concept of state and easily erupt into violent
\ndomestic conflicts. Indonesia is undoubtedly no exception to this
\ndescription.<\/p>\n
There is no question that the prevailing conflicts in
\nIndonesia are complex and multi-dimensional. They are usually
\nclassified as either horizontal or vertical conflicts.<\/p>\n
The first generally relates to conflicts among Indonesians
\narising from differences in the population, while the latter
\nusually has the dominant feature of the presence of a strong
\n\"opposition\" to the central government.<\/p>\n
However, the scale of antagonism is much greater when vertical
\nconflict is injected with the sentiments of horizontal
\ndifferences. This has been the case in Aceh.<\/p>\n
Indeed, the transformation process from an authoritarian
\nregime towards a more democratic one has limited the ability of
\nthe government in redressing this particular conflict. Further
\nfactors contributing to the worsening situation have been the
\ncollapse of the Indonesian economy and political bickering among
\nelite leaders.<\/p>\n
Generally, the tension in Aceh has been attributed to state
\ninjustices, the security approach and violations of human rights
\nthat have gone on for decades.<\/p>\n
This culminated in the Acehnese demand for independence from
\nIndonesia. They formed armed groups with the declared objective
\nof creating a new state by using force. They exploited racial and
\nethnic sentiments, causing a massive impact as a great number of
\nAcehnese found the motion an irresistible offer.<\/p>\n
Unfortunately, the offer is made at the expense of others.<\/p>\n
One of the most obvious but less highlighted examples of this
\nstrategy, has been the widespread hatred instigated by Hasan di
\nTiro's faction in an attempt to deliberately portray Jakarta as
\n\"Javanese colonialism\".<\/p>\n
This has resulted in a huge movement of people, or innocent
\ninternally displaced persons with distinct race and culture,
\nmostly Javanese migrants. They are now fleeing Aceh because of
\nunbearable intimidation and inhuman treatment.<\/p>\n
Are we turning a blind eye to the phenomenon of \"mini ethnic
\ncleansing\" in Aceh? Should the insurgent movement be allowed to
\nsucceed in achieving its political objective of separating from
\nIndonesia at the expense of racial superiority?<\/p>\n
If Aceh becomes an independent state, are the insurgents
\nprepared to bear the negative and far-reaching consequences of
\nthe possible flow of innocent Acehnese being forced to return to
\nthe province? No one dares to imagine such a possibility
\noccurring, but all of us must learn from the experience in the
\nformer Yugoslavia.<\/p>\n
As can be seen, the danger of separatism looms large in
\nIndonesia, with devastating consequences! What, then, are the
\noptions?<\/p>\n
Following the scapegoat theory, a government might easily
\nprovoke a conflict with other countries so as to divert the
\nattention of the population and to prevent the state from being
\ntorn apart.<\/p>\n
According to Georg Simmel (1964), war with the outside is
\nsometimes the last chance for a state riddled with internal
\nconflict to overcome these antagonisms, the alternative being to
\nbreak up indefinitely.<\/p>\n
With current capabilities, particularly in economic and
\nmilitary fields, and the situation in international politics,
\nthis option can be ruled out, although efforts to portray the
\npresence of an external enemy are occasionally aired.<\/p>\n
Instead, President Abdurrahman Wahid has chosen to garner
\nstrong international support for the maintenance of territorial
\nintegrity and sovereignty of the unitary state of Indonesia.<\/p>\n
His visits abroad have already secured support from many
\ncountries, and they also act as a reminder to the separatist
\nmovement seeking separation, especially when violence and racial
\nhatred are involved.<\/p>\n
At least, international support is a starting point for the
\ngovernment to find a comprehensive and lasting solution to the
\nvarious conflicts, and it is up to it to make maximum use of this
\nsupport.<\/p>\n
However, one should not take it for granted that such support
\nwill always be there, since the concept is rather dynamic and
\ncould easily change depending on many factors, particularly the
\nactions adopted by the Indonesian government to redress the
\nissue.<\/p>\n
While the government's policy in finding solutions is being
\nclosely watched, citizens and non-governmental organizations in
\nmany countries have a part to play, because pressure from
\nconstituencies might change the position of their respective
\ngovernments.<\/p>\n
While it may come as a surprise to many, the dialog and
\nhumanitarian approach to resolving conflicts, such as in the
\nsigning of the Humanitarian Pause, has been applauded and
\nwelcomed by many countries, as well as the people of Aceh.<\/p>\n
However, although the use of force is no longer a popular
\noption, it can never be ruled out entirely as states are entitled
\nto defend their territorial integrity and sovereignty.<\/p>\n
As an alternative, it must be considered seriously, cautiously
\nand diligently, especially when dialog reaches an impasse, all
\nother possible ways have been explored, demands are just too
\nunrealistic, and none of the parties are willing to compromise.<\/p>\n
Once again, the use of force by the government must be seen
\nonly as a last resort and it must be implemented with strict,
\nclear and transparent rules of engagement, respect for human
\nrights, and minimum consequences for innocent civilians.<\/p>\n
In the final analysis, peaceful settlement is, by any
\nstandard, less costly than the use of force. Unfortunately,
\nhowever, the nature of human beings tends to be less patient and
\nappreciative of the lengthy process of negotiation.<\/p>\n
The writer works at the International Organizations
\nDirectorate of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.<\/p>",
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