{
    "success": true,
    "data": {
        "id": 1348519,
        "msgid": "aceh-exit-strategy-and-post-conflict-peace-building-1447893297",
        "date": "2003-10-24 00:00:00",
        "title": "Aceh exit strategy and post-conflict peace building",
        "author": null,
        "source": "JP",
        "tags": null,
        "topic": null,
        "summary": "Aceh exit strategy and post-conflict peace building Teuku Faizasyah, Ph.D. Candidate, Diplomatic History and Conflict Resolution, University of Waikato, Hamilton, New Zealand The integrated operation to restore order in Aceh is approaching six months and the central government appears resolute about accomplishing its end objective of cleansing Aceh of the rebellious Free Aceh Movement (GAM) -- both the armed wing and the sympathizers.",
        "content": "<p>Aceh exit strategy and post-conflict peace building<\/p>\n<p>Teuku Faizasyah, Ph.D. Candidate, Diplomatic History<br>\nand Conflict Resolution, University of Waikato, Hamilton,<br>\nNew Zealand<\/p>\n<p>The integrated operation to restore order in Aceh is<br>\napproaching six months and the central government appears<br>\nresolute about accomplishing its end objective of cleansing Aceh<br>\nof the rebellious Free Aceh Movement (GAM) -- both the armed wing<br>\nand the sympathizers. Some Acehnese have reportedly asked for an<br>\nextension of the presence of the Indonesian Military (TNI)<br>\nincluding the military campaign.<\/p>\n<p>As the time frame of the operations remains unclear (The TNI<br>\nhas suggested that the martial law status is still needed to<br>\nsecure next year's planned general elections) the question is<br>\nwhether the government has really considered an exit strategy in<br>\nterms of the military operations, and at the same time, a<br>\nstrategy for peace building in post-conflict Aceh.<\/p>\n<p>Serious consideration of an exit strategy and a strategy on<br>\npeace building would mean the realization that the military<br>\noption is no longer necessary nor is it tenable.<\/p>\n<p>This realization could also stem from optimism that the<br>\nmilitary has accomplished its objective. Alternatively, there may<br>\nsimply be growing awareness that to continue with the military<br>\noperation is very costly, destructive and unpopular.<\/p>\n<p>Therefore, an exit strategy requires a clear indication --<br>\nespecially on the part of the government who launched the<br>\n\"integrated operation\" -- on when they plan to scale down the<br>\nmilitary campaign and to end it at some point. A timeframe is<br>\nessential and could function as a means of assessing the efficacy<br>\nof the integrated operation.<\/p>\n<p>Equally important, the government needs to make clear their<br>\nplan for the post-conflict era. Peace building in the post<br>\nconflict situation should deal with security-related issues<br>\ncomprehensively. It is not simply about how to establish peace<br>\nand security in physical terms, but it is also about how to<br>\ncreate a sense of peace for the Acehnese people.<\/p>\n<p>The success of the government to \"demilitarize the minds\" of<br>\nthe local Acehnese would guarantee more predictability in the<br>\narea. \"Demilitarizing the minds\" refers to a condition wherein<br>\nthe locals would reject armed rebellion and separatism as a<br>\nsolution to, or remedy for, their long years of frustration.<br>\nHence, the key phrase should be \"winning their hearts and minds\".<\/p>\n<p>This requires a well-planned program. And in this case, the<br>\ntarget audience needs to be both non-GAM and GAM. Ideally,<br>\nembracing GAM and their sympathizers should not be regarded as a<br>\nbetrayal of the goal of securing the unity of the republic. It<br>\nshould be seen as wisdom on the part of the government and their<br>\nwillingness to give the rebels a second chance to return to the<br>\nfold of the republic.<\/p>\n<p>It is thus important that the government not overtly emphasize<br>\nthe success of the military operation. In fact, it is politically<br>\nincorrect to emphasize the success of the military battles merely<br>\nbased on the number of rebels killed. Such emphasis would only<br>\ngenerate sadness among the Acehnese witnessing the number of body<br>\nbags among their own people.<\/p>\n<p>At present, the number of rebels killed is approaching 1,000,<br>\naccording to official figures. Assuming that each rebel has three<br>\nclose relatives, then there would be at least 3,000 Acehnese who<br>\nhave had to come to terms with a close relative's violent death.<br>\nBereavement will take time to subside and could easily lead to<br>\nfrustration and animosity. Therefore, the government and the<br>\nsociety at large have an urgent task of consoling the bereaved.<\/p>\n<p>We also need to give extra attention to the orphans -- the<br>\nfirst victims of any war. Perhaps, we need to encourage foster<br>\nparenting programs or adoption at the national level. By giving<br>\nAceh's future generation an opportunity to live outside the<br>\ntrouble province, our best hope is that they would grow up in a<br>\nmore secure environment.<\/p>\n<p>Growing up away from the accumulated hatred in Aceh could help<br>\nthose youngsters deal more easily with the trauma of the war and<br>\nlosing their mothers and fathers.<\/p>\n<p>Considering how to embrace and care for the victims of the war<br>\nin Aceh is the responsibility of all Indonesians. The government<br>\nshould be able to initiate a nation-wide effort for peace<br>\nbuilding in Aceh and set in motion such a process by making clear<br>\nthe timeframe for the military operation.<\/p>",
        "url": "https:\/\/jawawa.id\/newsitem\/aceh-exit-strategy-and-post-conflict-peace-building-1447893297",
        "image": ""
    },
    "sponsor": "Okusi Associates",
    "sponsor_url": "https:\/\/okusiassociates.com"
}