Aceh: An extremely fragile peace agreement<\/p>\n
International Crisis Group, Brussel\/Jakarta<\/p>\n
On Dec. 9, 2002, an agreement on cessation of hostilities in
\nAceh was concluded in Geneva, bringing hope that an end to the
\n26-year-old conflict between Indonesian government forces and
\nguerrillas of the proindependence Free Aceh Movement (GAM) was in
\nsight. Since then there have been many positive developments,
\nmost strikingly, a dramatic drop in the level of violence.<\/p>\n
The agreement, however, is not a peace settlement. It is
\nrather a framework for negotiating a resolution of the conflict,
\nand it remains extremely fragile. The first two months were
\nsupposed to be the confidence-building phase of the accord, but
\nfar from generating confidence, they may have actually reinforced
\neach side's wariness of the other's long-term intentions.<\/p>\n
On Feb. 9, 2003, the two sides moved into a five-month
\nimplementation phase with major differences unresolved. These
\ninclude how the Indonesian military will relocate as GAM places
\nan increasing percentage of its weapons in designated locations.
\nThe leadership of GAM may have accepted the concept of autonomy
\nas a starting point for discussions but not as a political end,
\nand there remains little incentive for the guerrilla group to
\nreinvent itself as a political party working within the
\nIndonesian electoral system.<\/p>\n
The Indonesian Army is not likely to sit quietly indefinitely
\nif the reduction of violence leads, as appears to be the case, to
\nmore organizing in support of independence, whether or not that
\norganizing constitutes a formal violation of the agreement. The
\nprovincial government of Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam (NAD) also
\nconstitutes an obstacle to lasting peace because it has such low
\ncredibility and is so widely seen as corrupt. As long as it is
\nseen to embody \"autonomy\", as granted to Aceh under an August
\n2001 law, many Acehnese will continue to see independence as a
\ndesirable alternative.<\/p>\n
The Dec. 9 agreement, brokered by the Geneva-based non-
\ngovernmental organization, the Henry Dunant Centre (HDC), was the
\noutcome of three years of tortuous negotiations and interim
\nefforts to end the violence that worked briefly and then
\ncollapsed.<\/p>\n
This agreement is different from all those that preceded it.
\nIt has international monitors in place. Its structure for
\ninvestigation and reporting of violations is already far more
\ntransparent than those in the previous accords. It is backed at
\nthe highest levels of the Indonesian government and by a broad
\nrange of international donors.<\/p>\n
It is the best -- and maybe the last -- chance that the 4.4
\nmillion people of Aceh have for a negotiated peace. It may also
\nbe their best chance to get international backing for local
\ngovernment reform and substantial post-conflict reconstruction
\naid.<\/p>\n
The consequences of failure would be grim, and intensified
\nmilitary operations would be all but inevitable. The outpouring
\nof enthusiasm that the agreement has generated across Aceh should
\nbe reason enough to for all parties involved to do their utmost
\nto ensure its success.<\/p>\n
Recommendations<\/p>\n
The most important recommendation to both sides is to see the
\ncurrent five-month implementation phase of the agreement through
\nto completion while refraining from actions that violate the
\nletter or spirit of the agreement.<\/p>\n
There are more recommendations below to the government than to
\nGAM. This should not be read as an indication that the government
\nhas greater responsibility but rather as an indication of how
\nimportant the issue of local governance has become. In many areas
\nof Aceh, the populace has simply lost all faith in government.<\/p>\n
That faith will not be restored by an autonomy law, and an
\nincrease in funds going into provincial and district budgets does
\nnot necessarily translate into an improved standard of living for
\nordinary Acehnese.<\/p>\n
To the government of Indonesia<\/p>\n
* Offer GAM more realistic incentives to take part in the
\npolitical process, including by supporting the necessary legal
\nchanges that would allow for local political parties in Aceh.<\/p>\n
* Support fully the process outlined in the Dec. 9, 2002
\nagreement for investigating reported violations.<\/p>\n
* Improve local governance by:<\/p>\n
(a)supporting efforts to strengthen the fiscal transparency of
\nthe NAD government;<\/p>\n
(b)having an independent board review the allocation of
\ncontracts for publicly-financed projects in Aceh as well as the
\nrelationship between expenditure authorized and quality of work;<\/p>\n
(c)ensuring that allegations of corruption by provincial and
\ndistrict officials are promptly investigated, and where
\nappropriate, prosecuted, by individuals who themselves have no
\npolitical or economic ties to those being investigated; and<\/p>\n
(d)supporting the assessment by a credible international
\naccounting firm of accounting practices by provincial and
\ndistrict governments and how these could be improved.<\/p>\n
* Support a carefully designed public opinion survey in sample
\nvillages across Aceh of how Acehnese believe their lives could be
\nimproved and what their priorities are for themselves and their
\nchildren, and use the results to design public policies that
\nrespond to local aspirations.<\/p>\n
* Develop a plan to restore credibility in the justice system
\nin Aceh, including:<\/p>\n
(a) ensuring that the establishment of new religious courts
\ndoes not further weaken the legal system by creating confusion
\nabout overlapping jurisdictions;<\/p>\n
(b) giving high priority to the administration of justice
\nwithin the peace zones; and<\/p>\n
(c) understanding why local or traditional methods of justice
\nare seen as more effective than anything on offer from the state.<\/p>\n
* End illegal levies along roads by:<\/p>\n
(a) having the national army and police headquarters in
\nJakarta make this a priority, with spot inspections using the
\nkind of commercial vehicles that are normally the target of
\ndemands for money; and<\/p>\n
(b) enforce strict discipline from headquarters on police and
\nsoldiers who extort money.<\/p>\n
* Encourage the local parliament in Aceh to give high priority
\nto the draft regulation, qanun, on direct election of local
\nofficials, including regents and mayors.<\/p>\n
* Channel all central government aid and humanitarian
\nassistance through a special body committed to complete
\ntransparency and public accountability.<\/p>\n
* Have a senior government official from Jakarta chair a
\ndiscussion among law faculty, nongovernmental organizations, the
\nlocal press, military and police on freedom of expression and
\nassembly, so that mutually acceptable definitions are worked out
\nfor how those freedoms can be exercised in Aceh.<\/p>\n
To GAM:<\/p>\n
* Refrain from proindependence rallies and other activities
\nthat suggest to the government that GAM is using the cessation of
\nhostilities to consolidate political and military support.<\/p>\n
* Give serious attention to how the January 2001 discussions,
\nat the time of the \"Provisional Understanding\" on the democratic
\nprocess, could be translated into a concrete program for
\ntransforming GAM into a political party in a way that would not
\ninvolve a referendum but also would not indelibly alter GAM's
\nidentity.<\/p>\n
* End extortion of the local populace by GAM members.<\/p>\n
* Support fully the process outlined in the Dec. 9, 2002
\nagreement for investigating reported violations.<\/p>\n
To International Donors:<\/p>\n
* Fund immediate reinforcement of the HDC media and public
\nrelations unit to enable a much more direct, widespread, and
\nunbiased dissemination of the contents of the agreement, in the
\nAcehnese language and in a manner likely to draw a wide audience.<\/p>\n
* Produce immediate peace dividends in communities affected by
\nconflict through high-visibility projects that help shore up the
\nagreement.<\/p>\n
* Support local efforts to promote fiscal transparency by:<\/p>\n
(a) helping journalists find information on the Rp 700 billion
\n(approximately US$79 million) allocated for education by the
\nprovincial government; and<\/p>\n
(b) reinforcing pressure on Jakarta and the local government
\nto ensure independent and credible auditing of the latter's
\nexpenditures.<\/p>\n
* Look for ways to absorb GAM fighters into the labour force
\nwithout creating wage distortions.<\/p>\n
* Prepare plans to help with the direct elections of local
\nofficials, if and when the provincial regulation on direct
\nelections is adopted.<\/p>\n
* Avoid, as almost all donors already are, channeling
\nassistance through the provincial government.<\/p>\n
* Monitor project implementation by creating a small multi-
\ndonor office in Aceh that can also easily provide information on
\ndonor assistance to Acehnese organizations.<\/p>\n
* Consider reviewing project implementation on a regular
\nbasis, to see how well the donor effort is strengthening the
\npeace, and make adjustments accordingly.<\/p>\n
The above article is an excerpt of the executive summary of
\nThe International Crisis Group (ICG) report on Aceh, issued on
\nFeb. 27. Full text is available at www.crisisweb.org<\/p>",
"url": "https:\/\/jawawa.id\/newsitem\/aceh-an-extremely-fragile-peace-agreement-1447893297",
"image": ""
},
"sponsor": "Okusi Associates",
"sponsor_url": "https:\/\/okusiassociates.com"
}