Aceh 2004: Zero prospects for peace<\/p>\n
Aguswandi, Researcher, Tapol, London<\/p>\n
The new year has arrived but Aceh is as gloomy as ever. There
\nis no sign of any significant change to the situation in \"Mecca's
\nveranda\" in the forthcoming year. It is very obvious that all
\nthe unpleasantness (violence and suffering) will continue as
\nbefore. The Acehnese started 2004 with news of 11 deaths from a
\nNew Year's Eve bomb blast. This followed closely the killing of
\none of Indonesia's best journalists, Ersa Siregar.<\/p>\n
All of this can be traced back to the time last year when
\nPresident Megawati Soekarnoputri decided to impose martial law on
\nAceh, on May 19, 2003. Suddenly the Acehnese woke up to find
\nthemselves in the middle of Indonesia's largest war since the
\ntime of Soeharto's New Order. The situation is now similar to
\nthat five years ago when Aceh was a military operations area,
\nknown as DOM. Many Acehnese who fled Aceh say the current
\nsituation is even worse than when DOM was in force.<\/p>\n
The decision to begin the new military operation was not
\nunpredictable. What many cannot understand is the readiness of
\nthe supposed civilian government to hand a blank cheque to the
\nmilitary in Aceh. Megawati is not Soeharto, yet she is the only
\ncivilian president in the post-Soeharto era to have handed Aceh
\nback to the Indonesian Military (TNI). She is the most
\nmilitaristic president since Soeharto in terms of her policy
\ntoward Aceh. This is in contrast to Abdurrahman \"Gus Dur\" Wahid,
\nwho was prepared to search for political solutions. His decision
\nto open dialog with the Acehnese and GAM transformed the conflict
\nfrom a militaristic one to a political one.<\/p>\n
Gus Dur's approach enabled many to talk about the root causes
\nof the conflict. It also reduced the amount of violence. The main
\ndiscourse of the conflict then focused on injustice, impunity and
\nmilitarism in Indonesia, and the centralizing tendency of the
\nnational government. It recognized the need for a constructive
\ndialog to tackle the underlying cause of the conflict. Under Gus
\nDur, the Indonesian people and the Acehnese at least had space to
\ndiscuss the roots of the problem.<\/p>\n
And then Megawati arrived. Through the imposition of martial
\nlaw in Aceh, she is becoming the person most responsible for
\ntransforming the Aceh conflict into one that is militaristic in
\ncharacter. This militarization has led to a shift in the main
\ndiscourse on the Aceh conflict. Whereas the conflict was
\nbasically political, it has now become military, in which GAM and
\nthe TNI are becoming the main actors.<\/p>\n
As a result, current news stories about Aceh simply describe
\nthe death toll, the killing of GAM members, the loyalty parades,
\nthe fantastic \"achievements\" of the military operation, the
\nheroism of soldiers. And the war is becoming, or has become,
\nself-perpetuating, with the participants fighting because they
\nhave to fight. Jakarta's soldiers have to fight because their
\ngenerals have sent them to Aceh, and GAM has to fight because it
\nsees no other option.<\/p>\n
Militarism cannot solve the Aceh problem: It cannot and will
\nnot. Indonesian militarism in Aceh has been the main reason for
\nthe collapse of Indonesian nationalism in the province and has
\nprovoked a rise in Acehnese nationalism. It is one of the main
\nreasons for the rise of separatist sentiment among the Acehnese.
\nIt is the reason why many young Acehnese choose to fight and join
\nGAM. The specter of separatism was only a specter; it became real
\nonly after Aceh was handed over to the military.<\/p>\n
Unfortunately, Jakarta is turning a blind eye to this.
\nMilitarism has been the departure point for Megawati's policy
\ntoward Aceh. Megawati is now forgetting the tears she wept during
\nthe previous general election when she promised to stop the
\nbloodshed in Aceh.<\/p>\n
In this militarized culture, the story being told is always a
\nfantastic one. The generals promised a quick victory. They said
\nit would take only a few months to deal with the small number of
\narmed separatists. But now, more than seven months have passed
\nand in military terms the operation is going nowhere. No top GAM
\ncommanders have been captured and there is no sign that the
\noperation will end soon. But the generals still insist that the
\noperation is very successful.<\/p>\n
Even if all the present members of GAM were killed and the
\nmilitary were to establish control, the problems in Aceh would
\nnot end. The underlying problem is not about a few thousand
\nlocals using guns and weapons, and who have persistently demanded
\nindependence for Aceh. It is much more than that, because it is
\nthe problem of Indonesia itself. The problem lies in the fact
\nthat Indonesia cannot offer hope to the Acehnese. The present
\nmilitary operation has even further destroyed the hope that some
\nin Aceh may still have had. The conflict in Aceh is basically the
\nproblem of politics in Indonesia -- an inability of Indonesia to
\ntransform itself into a more democratic, less militaristic state.<\/p>\n
It is unlikely that such a political transformation will occur
\nin Indonesia soon -- not even in 2004. Although this is a
\ngeneral election year, Indonesian politics are still very messy.
\nConsequently, the Aceh problem is unlikely to be resolved easily.
\nBesides, Aceh is too far away for many in Jakarta to really care
\nabout it. For Jakarta it is no big deal, and there is no hope
\nthat Aceh will become one in 2004.<\/p>\n
Currently, Aceh is a place where the death of 10 to 15 people
\nis seen as normal and acceptable. At least 1,000 people have been
\nkilled in Aceh since martial law began. Jakarta is too busy to
\naccount for these deaths; it is too busy preparing for the
\nelection. And since many of those who have died, and will die,
\nare people not regarded as potentially the important voters in
\nthe general election, they are even less relevant to many in
\nJakarta. And, I guess, no more tears will be shed for Aceh by
\npoliticians in this year's general election campaign.<\/p>\n
The writer is a . For further information on Tapol
\nvisit http:\/\/tapol.gn.apc.org<\/p>",
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