Accountability as reform agenda<\/p>\n
Menggapai Kedaulatan untuk Rakyat (Attaining Sovereignty for the
\nPeople); By Prof. Miriam Budiardjo; Mizan, Bandung, November 1998;
\nxvi and 246 pages.<\/p>\n
YOGYAKARTA (JP): Professor Miriam Budiardjo assumes most of
\nthe problems we are now facing could have been avoided if the
\nsupervision and control over existing governmental institutions
\nhad functioned properly. If the People's Consultative Assembly
\n(MPR) and the House of Representatives (DPR), in accordance with
\ntheir duties, had more effectively asked for the government's
\naccountability, the monetary crisis and the crisis of confidence
\nwe are now facing need not have taken place. Based on this
\nbelief, she focuses her analysis on the need for the government
\nto be held accountable.<\/p>\n
Accountability is the grounds upon which a mandatory governs
\nthose who have issued the mandate. In the theory of traditional
\npolitics, the people authorize some person or persons to govern
\nthem, while the government is accountable to the people. This is
\ncalled people's sovereignty. Accountability can be interpreted as
\npolitical justification with sanctions. In the parliamentary
\nsystem, the sanctions are direct because they can lead to the
\ndismissal of the executive at any time if the mandatory fails to
\nimplement those policies which have been agreed upon.<\/p>\n
The matter of accountability was clearly formulated in the
\n1945 Constitution and it was once implemented in our political
\nlife. This accountability worked for three reasons: the president
\nwas accountable to the MPR; the president had to heed the voice
\nof the DPR; and the DPR had the authority to call a special
\nsession of the MPR to demand the president's accountability.<\/p>\n
At some point in the Old Order regime, the MPR was used to
\nconsolidate the ideology of manipol usdek (manifesto of political
\nreorganization) and proclaim Sukarno president for life. The DPR
\nwas divested of various rights and authority. At the beginning of
\nthe New Order regime, DPR Pancasila (November 1966 to August
\n1970) managed to alter the political situation to such an extent
\nthat it was able to summon president Sukarno to give his
\naccountability in front of the MPR, resulting in Sukarno's
\ndismissal.<\/p>\n
According to Miriam, during the New Order era the MPR could
\nnot effectively demand the accountability of the president
\nbecause this accountability was only given every five years, when
\nnewly elected MPR members were installed. The president's
\naccountability speech at these times gave the impression of being
\na mere formality. Accountability was also not effective because
\nthe DPR was under the \"influence\" of the executive. This
\nsituation was the result of conditions which were not politically
\nrational.<\/p>\n
First, the MPR only assembled once every five years. This was
\nin accordance with the Constitution, which states that the MPR
\nand the DPR must meet at least once every five years. The DPR
\nheld sessions throughout the year.<\/p>\n
Miriam suggests the MPR convene once a year or once every two
\nyears. An ideal situation would be for the MPR to meet in August
\nfollowing the annual state address.<\/p>\n
The second condition was the imbalance between elected and
\nappointed assembly members. In the 1997 elections, 66.6 percent
\nof the MPR's 1,000 total members were appointed. This situation
\nclearly benefited the executive, who appointed the members.<\/p>\n
The author suggest reducing the number of MPR members in order
\nto make the assembly more efficient in analyzing material and to
\nimprove its accountability. This would also make the DPR better
\nable to supervise the president, while the president would be
\nable to continuously hear the voice of the DPR as the people.<\/p>\n
Third, the DPR did not employ its full range of powers and
\nrights, including its right of initiative (to draft a bill). As a
\nresult, during the New Order regime the DPR's right of initiative
\nbecame virtually useless.<\/p>\n
The use of the right of budget was also sterile during the New
\nOrder because the DPR's authority vanished under the executive's
\ninfluence, even though the DPR theoretically has more power than
\nthe executive. Also, the DPR's rights of interpellation and
\ninquiry were not used to their maximum. The use of these rights
\nwould have made the DPR more credible and legitimate in conveying
\nthe people's aspirations.<\/p>\n
We agree that above all, there is the need for transparency in
\nthe government's accountability to the people because
\naccountability can control the implementation of power and
\nprevent power from being abused. And it is through transparent
\naccountability that the people know if the mandate entrusted to
\nthe government has been implemented or not.<\/p>\n
This book, with its recommendations for improvements in the
\npolitical condition and effectiveness of state institutions
\nduring the drastically altered political conditions of the post-
\nNew Order era, should become a reference for more democratic and
\nrational future political development in line with the people's
\nsovereignty.<\/p>\n
-- Munawar AM<\/p>", "url": "https:\/\/jawawa.id\/newsitem\/accountability-as-reform-agenda-1447893297", "image": "" }, "sponsor": "Okusi Associates", "sponsor_url": "https:\/\/okusiassociates.com" }