ABRI's dual function: Interference or assistance?<\/p>\n
By J. Soedjati Djiwandono<\/p>\n
This is the second of three articles in a series on the dual-
\nfunction concept of the Indonesian Armed Forces (ABRI).<\/p>\n
JAKARTA (JP): It is conventional thinking in Indonesia that
\nthe country achieved independence through a revolution. But the
\ntruth is that it was a combination of diplomacy and armed
\nstruggle that ultimately won Indonesia' s independence.<\/p>\n
In his memoirs, the late Gen. T.B. Simatupang distinguished
\nbetween the \"first line\" (diplomacy) and \"second line\" (armed
\nstruggle) of Indonesia's struggle for independence.<\/p>\n
The choice of that twin strategy, however, was more or less
\nspontaneous, and there was a good deal of overlapping regarding
\nthe actors, for the choice of actors in either line was not based
\non professional qualifications, as is the case in peace time.<\/p>\n
At that time, Col. Simatupang took part in both. In that
\nsense, the doctrine of dwifungsi (dual function) is no more than
\na formulation, an affirmation and an institutionalization of the
\nrole of ABRI that it has played since the birth of the republic.
\nThe break from this role was a period of parliamentary democracy
\nin the 1950s. Thus, the primary basis for its claim of dual
\nfunction is historical.<\/p>\n
Such an historical claim, however, has created a problem
\nlargely overlooked in the debate on ABRI's dwifungsi. It may very
\nwell be justifiable as far as the genuine and original
\nindependence fighters were concerned.<\/p>\n
They were the core of Indonesia's Armed Forces, established
\nbasically out of formerly independent and voluntarily self-
\nproclaimed groups of fighters as a spontaneous response to the
\nproclamation of independence. For the 1945 generation of
\nIndonesian soldiers, the dual function relates to their personal
\nexperiences.<\/p>\n
At best, however, as one writer has put it, it may be
\n\"dubious\" to regard the former Indonesian troops of the Royal
\nDutch East Indies army (KNIL) that were integrated with the
\nIndonesian Armed Forces as part of the deal with the Netherlands
\nat the Round Table Conference in the Hague prior to the transfer
\nof sovereignty at the end of 1949. These were truly
\n\"professional\", not to say \"mercenary\" soldiers serving the Dutch
\ncolonial regime.<\/p>\n
A similar argument may be made with regard to the post-1945
\ngenerations of ABRI members, for whom dwifungsi has no relation
\nwith personal experiences. To them, the personal and historical
\nvalue of dwifungsi cannot possibly be applied.<\/p>\n
One might well argue, nevertheless, that if ABRI had ever been
\ninterested in establishing a military rule, the opportunity had
\ncertainly presented itself in the power vacuum immediately after
\nthe failed coup attempt in 1965, as well as on other previous
\noccasions.<\/p>\n
The first was provided by the abortive communist rebellion in
\n1948, when the struggle against the Dutch was still going on. The
\nsecond presented itself when the core civilian leadership of
\nIndonesia during the national revolution for independence,
\npresident Sukarno, vice president Mohammad Hatta and others,
\ndecided to stay in the capital of the republic of that time,
\nYogyakarta, after the Dutch troops succeeded in entering and
\noccupying the republican capital, so that they were taken
\nprisoner by the Dutch on Dec. 19, 1948.<\/p>\n
By contrast, Gen. Sudirman fled into the countryside to lead a
\nguerrilla warfare. He did not agree with the civilian leadership
\nand refused to stay in town.<\/p>\n
In fact, on returning to Yogyakarta after the Indonesian
\nleaders had been released pending the transfer of sovereignty
\nfrom the Dutch to the Federal Republic of Indonesia, Gen.
\nSudirman was reluctant to see president Sukarno, until he was
\npersuaded to do so by Col. T.B. Simatupang, then his deputy chief
\nof staff.<\/p>\n
In any event, despite his disagreement with the civilian
\nleadership, never at any time during that period did Gen.
\nSudirman attempt to take over the reign of government, thereby
\npossibly establishing a military regime, even if the opportunity
\nwas there.<\/p>\n
But then, of course, such an act would have been
\ncounterproductive. It would probably have prevented the
\nindependence of Indonesia being recognized by the international
\ncommunity.<\/p>\n
The republic would probably never have survived, at least as
\nproclaimed on Aug. 17, 1945. This was the consideration of the
\ndecision for president Sukarno and other Indonesian leaders to
\nstay in Yogyakarta, knowing full well that they would be captured
\nby the Dutch.<\/p>\n
Moreover, on various occasions, ABRI has saved the nation from
\ndisintegration in the face of other rebellions; by fanatical
\nMoslems in the early 1950s and by regional commanders in the late
\n1950s.<\/p>\n
Thus, without ABRI, Indonesia could very well have become
\neither a communist or an Islamic theocratic state, or simply
\ndisintegrated. The nation-state as proclaimed on Aug. 17, 1945,
\nwould have ceased to exist. That seems to be a sufficient basis
\nfor legitimacy -- at least for the time being.<\/p>\n
The writer is a political observer residing in Jakarta. The
\narticle is a summary from a chapter he wrote in a newly published
\nbook Civil-military relations: Building Democracy and Regional
\nSecurity in Latin America, Southern Asia, and Central Europe. The
\nbook was published by Westview Press and edited by David R.
\nMares.<\/p>",
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