ABRI's accountability<\/p>\n
The current political discourse on the military's
\nsociopolitical role has rarely touched on the question of
\naccountability. Who is the Armed Forces (ABRI) responsible to
\nwhen it carries out its political role? To whom is it accountable
\nfor its actions? Accountability has never been spelled out, let
\nalone discussed, since ABRI assumed its sociopolitical role
\ndecades ago. The fact that these questions have remained
\nunanswered to date may well be at the root of the current
\nproblems associated with ABRI's involvement in politics.<\/p>\n
Here is a mighty political institution -- some would argue the
\nmost powerful and certainly best organized in the nation -- yet
\nit faces no checks and balances. There is no mechanism to make
\nABRI publicly accountable to anyone outside its own ranks for its
\nbehavior or misbehavior, unlike other political institutions.<\/p>\n
Our Constitution requires the head of state to account for his
\nor her leadership at the end of each five-year term. Elected
\npoliticians must also face the polls periodically to renew their
\nmandate from constituents. Granted, this mechanism of checks and
\nbalances was widely abused by the Soeharto regime for over three
\ndecades, but at least a system exists that theoretically gives
\nthe people the option to either reelect or replace their leaders.<\/p>\n
The same cannot be said about ABRI, to which the nation has
\nentrusted the power -- as well as the weapons -- needed not only
\nto look after its defense and security interests but to take an
\nactive part in politics through what is known as the dual
\nfunction concept.<\/p>\n
Accountability would not be such a major issue if ABRI had
\nstuck to its traditional defense and security role. Given the
\nhierarchy of command, the military's top commander is responsible
\nfor the actions of all subordinates; he in turn is accountable to
\nthe head of state, who is the commander-in-chief of the military
\nand answerable to the people.<\/p>\n
But give ABRI an institutionalized political role and the
\nquestion of accountability becomes blurred. Under the dual
\nfunction system, ABRI is given seats in both the lower and upper
\nhouses of the nation's representative bodies. On top of this,
\nmany active ABRI officers are seconded to civilian posts -- from
\nCabinet ministers and provincial governors, down to regency
\nchiefs and city mayors. Given such comprehensive political
\ninvolvement, ABRI is not accountable to anyone but itself for its
\nbehavior.<\/p>\n
We have seen time and again instances in which ABRI has
\nmanaged to duck from responsibility because of its lack of
\naccountability. A notable example is the case in which the
\nmilitary's leadership discharged Lt. Gen. Prabowo Subianto for
\nordering the kidnapping of political activists to supposedly
\nsafeguard the People's Consultative Assembly last March. Once it
\nhad taken that step, ABRI halted its investigation into the case
\nas if it did not feel obligated to find out about the fate of the
\n14 activists still missing.<\/p>\n
ABRI has also quickly closed the books on incidents that
\nshould have seen greater public accountability, such as the
\nshooting of student protesters at Trisakti University last May
\nand the reports of gross human rights violations committed during
\nmilitary operations in Aceh, East Timor and Irian Jaya. The
\nmilitary may have conducted internal investigations and taken
\nremedial or punitive actions against wrongdoers, but this is not
\nthe same as public accountability.<\/p>\n
Public accountability is a vital element in any democracy. In
\nfact, democracy cannot function without it. Our Constitution
\nalready tasks the country's highest public institutions, such as
\nthe presidency and the people's representative bodies, with this
\nburden. But ABRI, which has perhaps become even more powerful
\nthan the president at this point, has escaped this requirement.
\nBut then again, the dual function concept is not written in the
\nConstitution.<\/p>\n
The current discourse on whether ABRI's political role should
\nbe retained, scaled down or eliminated must take the question of
\naccountability into consideration. The government's proposal to
\nautomatically grant 55 of the House of Representatives' 500 seats
\nto ABRI is inconsistent with such a requirement. For the same
\nreason, ABRI's proposal to scale down its sociopolitical role
\nwhile at the same time retaining enough power to influence the
\nnation's political course is also highly contentious.<\/p>\n
We have learned the hard way through Soeharto's long
\nrepressive regime the adage \"power tends to corrupt and absolute
\npower corrupts absolutely\". No person or institution should be
\ngiven a free reign on political power without any effective
\nchecks and balances. Given this, the question of ABRI's political
\nrole is clear. Either we should get rid of it entirely, or create
\na system that ensures ABRI is held accountable for all its
\nactions -- just like other political institutions have to do.
\nABRI's political role in the form as we know it today is nothing
\nless than incompatible with democracy.<\/p>",
"url": "https:\/\/jawawa.id\/newsitem\/abris-accountability-1447893297",
"image": ""
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"sponsor": "Okusi Associates",
"sponsor_url": "https:\/\/okusiassociates.com"
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