Aboeprijadi Santoso
\nRadio Nederlands
\nAmsterdam<\/p>\n
On Dec. 1 and 4, the pro-independent movements in Papua (Irian
\nJaya) and Aceh will celebrate their \"independence day\" possibly
\nwith some dismay, as Jakarta will send 50 battalions of army and
\npolice to the regions.<\/p>\n
A prospect of a just solution for the two regions seems
\nfarther away as intensified military operation is preferred over
\na dialog. A peaceful dialog for Aceh has been abandoned since the
\nmilitary campaign, Kolakops, commenced with the presidential
\ndecree last April. Talks with the pro-independence Papuan
\nPresidium Council were halted even earlier as several of its
\nleaders, including the late Theys H. Elluay, were arrested last
\nyear.<\/p>\n
Two years ago, as the greater part of the Acehnese society
\ndemanded a referendum, the Free Aceh Movement GAM on Dec. 4 went
\npublic to celebrate its \"independence\" day amidst the post-
\nSoeharto pro-reform euphoria. Many locals, traumatized by the
\nrepression in the 1990s, warned -- correctly as it turns out --
\nthat things could drastically change.<\/p>\n
Only the local militaries felt the post-Soeharto reform
\nfrustrating. As the GAM capitalized on the demand to curb human
\nrights violations, one district commander blamed the
\n\"indecisiveness of the new civilian leaders in Jakarta\" and the
\nrights activists.<\/p>\n
\"We need a comprehensive operation (to defeat the rebels)
\ninstead of half-hearted measures,\" said Col. Syarifuddin Tippe.
\nIn a sense, he may be right as then president Abdurrahman Wahid's
\npolicy of dialog and humanitarian pauses failed to produce a
\ntangible result, except the continuing war.<\/p>\n
A year later, as the military top brass restored its standing,
\nthe president, under strong pressure, issued the April decree.
\nThe Army started a military campaign, putting Syarifudin's ideas
\ninto practice, but laid the political responsibility at the
\ncivilian leaders in Jakarta.<\/p>\n
Yet this has resulted in worse outcomes. First, the GAM has
\nbeen put in defense both militarily (at least in Pidie regency)
\nand politically as GAM retreated from the public arena, lost its
\ngrip in government agencies and its negotiators were arrested,
\nkilled or went in hiding.<\/p>\n
However, as the Army and GAM resorted to fierce battles, some
\nmilitary elements secured the local resources, aggravating the
\ncrisis around the Exxon oil and gas plant and elsewhere. Hence
\nJakarta soldiers were accused -- so the local saying goes -- of
\n\"arriving with M-16 (rifles), but returning home with 16 M-
\n(millions of rupiah)\".<\/p>\n
Second, with GAM's retreat from some areas, the trend of
\nrefugees fleeing out of Aceh has significantly increased to some
\n40,000 people. The GAM, too, was guilty of human rights
\nviolations, including the intimidation of the local press. But
\nreports clearly indicate that the new trend was the result of the
\nactions of the newly formed pro-Army militias in South and
\nSoutheast Aceh -- the so-called Galaksi region.<\/p>\n
Third, the casualties have dramatically increased and expanded
\nto the civilian sector, taking its toll among legislators,
\nintellectuals and human rights activists. At least 1,400 people
\nhave been killed since April. The Army may have won the battles,
\nbut the war could be at the expense of the remaining trust of the
\nAcehnese to the republic.<\/p>\n
With the euphoria gone, in Irian Jaya, too, the military has
\nreturned to the old security approach. The Papuan pro-independent
\nmovement may lack a tough army like GAM, but it has built a
\nstronger legitimacy at home than GAM did in Aceh. Despite Irian
\nJaya's complex topography and geopolitical ethnic map, the Papuan
\nPresidium has succeeded in socializing its cause -- \"down to the
\nvillage level,\" a Jakarta document admits.<\/p>\n
Indeed its unifying pan-Irian Jaya Congress in May 2000, the
\nfirst of its kind in history, which supported a peaceful strategy
\ntoward independence, has been crucial for its course.<\/p>\n
It was this congress that changed Jakarta's policy towards
\nPapua. As then president Abdurrahman's reconciliation gesture was
\nattacked, he had to retract his promises to attend the congress
\nand to allow the Morning Star flag to represent Papua.<\/p>\n
\"You should understand, Pak Theys, I was put under pressure
\nfrom all sides,\" the late Theys Eluay, recalling Abdurrahman's
\nwords, told this writer last year.<\/p>\n
In November last year, the Jayapura weekly Tifa Papua
\npublished a memorandum signed by Ermaya Suradinata, then home
\naffairs director general of national unity. The document, which
\nresulted from the meeting his ministry held with the military and
\nintelligence community (Bakin, Bais, Kostrad and Kopassus) on
\nJune 8, 2000, suggested that Jakarta should anticipate the
\nactions of the \"conspirational groups\" in Irian Jaya.<\/p>\n
Abdurrahman's honeymoon with Papua, thus, ended as thousands
\nof Kostrad (elite force) and mobile brigade soldiers were dropped
\nin Jayapura to intimidate the celebration of Dec. 1, 2000
\nanniversary of Papua's \"Declaration of Independence\". This
\napproach was seen as contradictory to Jakarta's reformist claim.<\/p>\n
Whether or not the Kopassus units were involved in the
\nassassination of Theys Eluay, the Papuan perception that they
\nwere the killers, is politically crucial. In addition, the recent
\nrevelations of two retired United Nations top officials -- one
\nwas the former Undersecretary Gen. Chakravarthy Narasimhan --
\nthat the 1969 plebiscite in West Irian was \"a sham,\" could
\nstrengthen the Papuan perception of the \"illegitimacy\" of
\nJakarta's rule.<\/p>\n
No one would wish to see Aceh and Papua becoming Indonesia's
\nwar-torn Northern Srilanka or Northern Ireland. Yet unless
\nJakarta brings its generals, who were responsible for atrocities
\nin Aceh and Irian Jaya to justice, and firmly controls its
\nsoldiers, few would hope for a new dialog and reconciliation. The
\nlanguage of violence may succeed only at the expense of the
\nrelationship of the two peoples to the republic. Human values,
\nunfortunately, are not always compatible with the nation's
\ndesire.<\/p>\n
2. Taliban -- SLAUGHTER OF TALIBAN PRISONERS CAN'T BE IGNORED
\n2 x 32 48pt Bodoni<\/p>\n
Slaughter of Talibans untolerable
\ndespite their horrifiying deeds<\/p>\n
By Jonathan Freedland in London =<\/p>\n
THE CARAVAN of war wants to move on, but Afghanistan is not quite
\nready to let go. The planners and politicians in Washington are
\nitching to look beyond Kabul, towards Baghdad or elsewhere, but
\nAfghanistan has not finished with them just yet. The country is
\nstill losing and shedding blood, still making winners and losers
\nof the foreign powers who want to influence it and still raising
\nsome dark and troubling questions - including some that reach
\nuncomfortably close to home.
\nStart with the obvious: the fighting is not over. For all the
\ntemptation to \"pocket\" the Afghan triumph and move on to Phase
\nTwo against Iraq, this victory is not complete. The Taliban
\nremain in control of their heartland in Kandahar. A thousand U.S.
\nmarines have just arrived nearby, charged with finishing the
\nTaliban off - and meeting America's prime objective, the
\nelimination of Osama bin Laden.
\nSo the south is where this epic revenge story will reach its
\nclimax, as the Americans finally confront the foe they blame for
\nthe great calamity of September 11. The last spasms of Taliban
\ndefiance in the north have been snuffed out; officially, it's all
\nquiet on the northern front. But while Kunduz and Mazar-i-Sharif
\nhave fallen, we cannot forget their names just yet.
\nFor those places have witnessed scenes so brutal, they should not
\nbe notched up as mere successes and filed away. In Mazar just
\nover a fortnight ago 520 Taliban fighters, most of them
\nPakistanis, were either shot or crushed to death by Northern
\nAlliance tanks - not on a battlefield, but in a school. The
\nTaliban had been holed up in there as they mounted their last,
\ndefiant stand. A week later the Red Cross were still pulling
\nbodies from the wreckage.
\nThe Northern Alliance insist this was no massacre; they offered
\nthe Taliban the chance to surrender and the Taliban refused. Of
\ncourse, no one feels much sympathy for Afghanistan's former
\nrulers, least of all for the foreign volunteers who tend to be
\nthe movement's most zealous fighters. So no one wanted to look
\ntoo closely at how those 520 men met their deaths.
\nNor did we allow ourselves to be too troubled by those TV
\npictures of victorious Northern Alliance troops beating Taliban
\nprisoners with rifle butts before shooting them at point-blank
\nrange. The liberators' happiness to perform this ritual in front
\nof witnesses and cameras might have given us pause, but mainly we
\ncontented ourselves with a string of cliches: we always knew the
\nTaliban's opponents were not choir boys; Afghanistan is a tough
\nneighbourhood; war makes for unholy alliances; my enemy's enemy
\nis my friend.
\nBut the latest events in Mazar cannot be soothed away nearly so
\neasily. The fall yesterday (Tuesday) of Qala-i-Jhangi, a 19th-
\ncentury fortress on the edge of town, will require more
\nexplanation than that. For now the details of what happened there
\nare wreathed in that greatest of cliches - the fog of war - and
\nthe British and American militaries may well want to keep it that
\nway.
\nThe official version is that perhaps 800, mainly foreign, Taliban
\nfighters were brought there from Kunduz, to be held as prisoners
\nof war. Some of them resisted and launched a prison revolt,
\neventually seizing weapons from the fort's armoury. The Northern
\nAlliance moved to quell the uprising with British and American
\nhelp, and in the process every last one of those Taliban fighters
\nwas killed. Depending on how many prisoners were there in the
\nfirst place, the death toll could be anything from 400 to 800.
\nOnce again, many will baulk at calling this a massacre because
\nthe Taliban seemed to bring their fate upon themselves by
\nrebelling, thereby forfeiting their right to Geneva convention
\nprotection as prisoners of war. But there are some awkward
\nquestions. Was this a revolt of all the captives or just some,
\nand if it was the latter then why was it necessary to kill all of
\nthem? Did the dozen or so British and American special forces
\nreportedly directing the entire operation, including the bombing
\nof the fort from the sky, want merely to quash the revolt, or
\nwere they seizing the opportunity to do away with the hated
\nforeign Taliban, whom few want to keep alive as inconvenient
\nprisoners? What do we make of Time magazine's Alex Perry, on the
\nspot throughout the battle, who said, \"The mission by the
\nAmericans and Northern Alliance is to kill every single one of
\nthem now?\" How does that square with international law on PoWs?
\nAt the very least, the events in Mazar both now and a fortnight
\nago are a reminder of the perils of letting Afghanistan simply
\nslide, ping-pong style, from the brutish hands of the Taliban to
\nthe Northern Alliance. The need for a broader-based government in
\nKabul is urgent and the talks now underway in Bonn are an
\nessential start. But they won't be enough. The bloodbath of Qala-
\ni-Jhangi suggests the Afghans are not about to construct some
\nnew, inclusive rainbow nation: the United Nations will have to be
\non hand, effectively governing the country for a while to come.
\nIf war in Afghanistan is still hot, so is great power politics.
\nThe Washington hawks may be more interested in Iraq, but those
\ncloser to Afghanistan are eyeing up the current spoils. Little
\nnoticed throughout has been the role of perhaps the war's biggest
\nwinner so far: Russia.
\nThe arrival in Kabul on Monday of 12 Russian military cargo
\nplanes confirmed Moscow's triumph: they have got in while Britain
\nremains frozen out. The Northern Alliance have welcomed their old
\nRussian sponsor, even as they show the cold shoulder to the 100
\nBritish soldiers shivering at Bagram airbase. Now Moscow has what
\nit wants and what it lost more than a decade ago: a compliant
\nfriend in Kabul.
\nBetter still, Moscow has won that prize without angering its
\nerstwhile rival in Washington. The US now speaks of Russia as a
\nclose ally, with not only shared interests but shared values. In
\nreturn for siding with George Bush's war on terrorism, Vladimir
\nPutin has won a clutch of rewards. He has a free hand to crush
\nhis own Muslim militants in Chechnya; an ever closer
\nrelationship, including intelligence sharing, with Nato; a US
\npromise on nuclear arms reduction, and even the prospect of a
\nlucrative deal to sell Russian oil to an America anxious to wean
\nitself off the politically- unstable, Gulf variety. As if to
\ncrown Putin's achievement, the Northern Alliance were kind enough
\nto time their seizure of Kabul to coincide with the president's
\nvisit to Washington. Everything has gone Putin's way.
\nBritain cannot say the same. Tony Blair's bid for influence, in
\nthe form of a 6,000-strong troop presence, was rebuffed by both
\nthe US and the Northern Alliance. Blair's aid-and-rebuilding
\nagenda elicits only tepid American backing, suggesting that his
\ninstant and full-throated support for Bush has not quite won the
\nclout he hoped for.
\nPakistan is a loser, too, forced to watch as its Taliban friend
\ndies a slow death. Iran, an ally of the Northern Alliance, is a
\nwinner. That's how it goes in Afghanistan, same as it always has
\n- the chessboard where, even now, the great powers play their
\ngreat games. COPYRIGHT: GUARDIAN NEWS SERVICE copyright 1901 The
\nGuardian, London
\n- END OF SECOND GUARDIAN CAST -<\/p>\n
GetDPA 1.10 -- NOV 28, 2001 05:14:06<\/p>", "url": "https:\/\/jawawa.id\/newsitem\/aboeprijadi-santoso-1447893297", "image": "" }, "sponsor": "Okusi Associates", "sponsor_url": "https:\/\/okusiassociates.com" }