Abdurrahman Wahid implements half-hearted autonomy<\/p>\n
Question: What challenges are facing the plan to implement
\nregional autonomy?<\/p>\n
Answer: Great challenges, obviously, despite the fact that the
\nautonomy concept was already contained in the 1945 Law No. 1.<\/p>\n
Imagine, thinking and wishing for something for 50 years and
\nonly seeing it turning into reality, God willing, next year.<\/p>\n
For 14 years after 1949, we tried to uphold democracy in
\nIndonesia. In many ways we were successful. But after 1959, when
\n(founding president) Sukarno issued his decree reinstating the
\n1945 Constitution, we found ourselves drifting even further away
\nfrom (our goal of) democracy.<\/p>\n
All that time we were given promises that were never kept.
\nThat's why the outer regions then lost their patience, and
\nexpressed this in the form of establishing their own regional
\nadministrations.<\/p>\n
Look at the string of rebellions that have taken place since
\nindependence, the DI\/TII (Islamic state), the regional
\ndifferences which peaked with the Permesta\/PRRI rebellion.<\/p>\n
All those were demands for autonomy. And what did they get?
\nNot autonomy, but more centralized power. Under Sukarno and
\nSoeharto, any hopes for autonomy faded away, despite it being
\nalways touted in their promises. Soeharto issued a law on
\nregional administration in 1979, but it was only during (the
\nadministration of) B.J. Habibie that the idea received greater
\nattention.<\/p>\n
Now, the administration of Gus Dur is implementing the law
\nhalfheartedly.<\/p>\n
Q: What do you mean halfheartedly?<\/p>\n
A: What has his administration done to facilitate the
\nimplementation of the rulings that he himself introduced?<\/p>\n
The two laws concerned need a number of implementing
\nregulations. The government once promised to put it into effect
\nin March 2000, but postponed it to April, then to September. How
\nmany new rulings has he produced? Only a few, while actually one
\nlaw needs dozens of directives.<\/p>\n
And now, in a recent meeting with local legislators, Gus Dur
\nsaid \"regional autonomy has been too hastily arranged.\" This
\nshows how unprepared he is. So what we have now is a government
\nthat is ill-prepared to implement the laws, and regional
\nadministrations who are also far from ready.<\/p>\n
All this time the government sapped dry all of the regional
\nresources and only returned (a small portion) back to the
\nregions. This way, the regions became very much dependent on the
\ncentral government. Law No. 25 was introduced to correct this --
\nsome authority will be returned to the regions so they will be
\nable tend to their own financial affairs. The regional
\nadministrations will then be able to collect their own taxes and
\nlevies without going through the central government as they have
\nalways done.<\/p>\n
But I wonder if the replacement of finance ministers has
\ndissipated the country's resolve (to implement the autonomy
\npolicy). This should not have happened. The ministers should be
\nable to come and go, but policies should remain the same.<\/p>\n
We have only one month left, (it will not be) possible to
\nproduce the regulations necessary for the implementation of the
\nautonomy policy in such a short time.<\/p>\n
Q: How ready is Indonesian society for autonomy?<\/p>\n
A: The regions are basically divided into two: those rich in
\nnatural resources, and the poor regions. The rich regions, such
\nas Aceh, Riau, East Kalimantan and West Papua or Irian Jaya are
\nthose that made the early demands for autonomy because they have
\nbeen the largest contributors to our GNP.<\/p>\n
They believed that reducing the flow of income to the central
\ngovernment would automatically increase the flow to their own
\ntreasuries, thus enabling them to run development programs as
\nthey see fit. The other regions are, on the other hand, heavily
\ndependent on the central government. They are not ready for
\nautonomy.<\/p>\n
Another problem relates to human resources. It is obvious that
\nurban centers have better prepared human resources. The larger
\nthe cities, the better prepared they are. Look at Jakarta,
\nMakassar or Medan. The farther away from the urban centers, the
\nmore ill-prepared the regions are. We would have a Java - outer
\nregions dichotomy because the regions that are relatively ready
\nare those in Java.<\/p>\n
Another factor to be looked at is cultural resources -- which
\nshow that no region in Indonesia is ready for autonomy. We are so
\nused to centralization, to paternalism, authoritarianism, that we
\nare no longer able to see alternatives to those patterns.<\/p>\n
The (long-standing) culture of power has destroyed the ability
\nto be independent. We are so used to being controlled as regards
\neven the smallest minutiae -- pencils, paper and typewriters were
\nsent to the outer regions from Jakarta for the sake of uniformity
\nand centralization.<\/p>\n
Let us take an example of a school in the hinterland of
\nKalimantan, where its desks, tables and chairs are imported from
\nJakarta despite the fact that the island is rich with timber
\nwhile Java no longer has forests. What happens is that people cut
\nthe Kalimantan trees, ship the timber to be processed in Java
\nbefore shipping back the goods to Kalimantan.<\/p>\n
So the least ready factor here is our own culture. We have
\nfailed to cultivate a culture that would support democratization
\nand autonomy.<\/p>\n
How regions will fare in the autonomy drive will depend on
\ncombinations of factors. There are certainly regions with certain
\nfactors that should enable them to progress and prosper under the
\nautonomy policy. As human resource is the most dominant factor,
\nthen urban centers will show a better response to the autonomy
\npolicy.<\/p>\n
Much will depend on the wisdom of the regional leaders. If the
\nrich regions are led by skilled persons, those who place a
\npremium on the interests of their people rather than on their own
\ninterests, then they will progress rapidly. Problems will abound
\nin the regions which are rich in natural resources, but have poor
\nhuman resources and cultural resources. This is where the worries
\nabout the possible emergence of local strongmen are justified.<\/p>\n
So the three factors need to be looked at simultaneously. Rich
\nregions can either progress rapidly or not progress at all
\ndepending upon the wisdom, or lack of it, of their leaders.<\/p>\n
Let's look at Malaysia, whose history since 1959 shows a
\nmarked contradiction to ours. In the period of 1945-1959,
\nIndonesia had good leadership, one that was very democratic and
\nput such importance on the people's interests that the leaders
\nwere willing to live simply. That was our golden age, despite the
\nsimplicity of life.<\/p>\n
Now Malaysia is enjoying such a period -- even if they were
\nhit by the same crisis that hit us, they rebounded sooner and are
\nnow on their way back.<\/p>\n
Q: A sociological theory says that, in the past, a region's
\nprosperity hinged on its geographical location, on whether it was
\na coastal area or a hinterland. Does this theory have any
\nrelevance given your assessment of the three factors above?<\/p>\n
A: Yes, although we also need to discuss several new dimensions
\nto the theory. The first dimension is (the presence of) the
\nconspiracy of centers of power. We need to differentiate between
\neconomic powers and political powers, which existed mostly in the
\nhinterland as most of the centers of (traditional) kingdoms were
\nin such regions.<\/p>\n
The centers of economic activity were found mostly along the
\ncoastal areas, because the agricultural system that we have
\ndeveloped is traditional in nature and even now is very much at
\nsubsistence level. Therefore, only a limited amount of
\nagricultural products are traded. But with the growth of import-
\nexport and other economic activities, the coastal areas would
\ncertainly developed further, and have done so in the past.<\/p>\n
The dichotomy of inland-coastal areas, however, gave rise to
\nvarious problems including cultural friction. People said that
\nculturally, the coastal regions were more egalitarian and
\nmoderate, while the inland areas tended to be more feudal and the
\npowerholders tended to be more repressive.<\/p>\n
Q: Because the autonomy policy will be based on Level II regions
\n(the regencies), may we conclude that coastal regencies will
\nprogress more rapidly than inland regencies?<\/p>\n
A: That is possible. But there will be variations because not all
\ncoastal regions are already developed. Maybe they are in Java,
\nbut not so in the outer islands. In South Sulawesi, for instance,
\nit is the inland regions that are relatively more developed. That
\nis because of the backwardness of the means of production in the
\ncoastal regions, while inland regencies have greater expanses of
\nagricultural production.<\/p>\n
In fact, we can say that the poorest and the most downtrodden
\npeople in Indonesia are fishermen; their income is the lowest of
\nall. In coastal areas, too, we see differences between coastal
\ncities and coastal villages. The fishermen live in coastal
\nvillages, which are much poorer than inland villages. (Ali Said
\nDamanik)<\/p>",
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