A valid election in Aceh: Test-case for RI's democracy<\/p>\n
Sam Zarifi, New York<\/p>\n
Come Monday, most of Indonesia's 150 million registered voters
\nwill be able to cast (or not cast) their ballots in a relatively
\npeaceful environment. Indonesians should be proud that they have
\nreached yet another major political and logistical milestone on
\ntheir road to full democracy.<\/p>\n
But it is a shame that Indonesians living in Aceh (Nanggroe
\nAceh Darussalam) will not be able to share in the joy and pride
\nof freely participating in a legitimate election. The ongoing
\narmed conflict in the province was downgraded in May from a
\nmilitary to a civilian emergency, but little has changed on the
\nground.<\/p>\n
Fighting continues and restrictions on access remain in place.
\nThe majority of the population continues to live in fear, with
\nwidespread reports of killings, torture and disappearances.
\nLocal, national, and international media remains severely
\nrestricted in their ability to report impartially, or critically,
\non either the conflict or the election in Aceh.<\/p>\n
Ensuring that the people of Aceh can vote as they choose on
\nMonday would be a significant step in getting away from the
\nprovince's seemingly intractable conflict. Establishing a pattern
\nof respect for peaceful and democratic decisionmaking is the only
\nway likely to end the bloodshed in Aceh.<\/p>\n
Because, although largely forgotten in the political rhetoric
\nby all presidential candidates, the conflict in Aceh, and how to
\nend it, will be one of the most pressing and difficult tasks the
\nnewly elected president will have to tackle.<\/p>\n
Security has improved in Aceh's main towns, but conditions in
\nthe outlying districts are far from stable. Press reports
\nindicate a high, almost daily, level of fighting with fatalities
\nrecorded every week. Refugees continue to flee to Malaysia with
\nstories of extrajudicial executions, serious abuse, arbitrary
\ndetention, and restrictions on movement.<\/p>\n
On top of all this, there are troubling indications that
\nAceh's voters have faced improper pressure from both the
\nIndonesian military and GAM. In 1999 the majority of Aceh's
\nvoting population registered their discontent with Jakarta by
\nboycotting the national election.<\/p>\n
In April this year newspapers reported that the turnout at the
\npolls in Aceh was a staggering 95 percent -- a figure high for
\neven the most peaceful and prosperous of Indonesia's provinces.
\nThe Indonesian Military (TNI) claimed this as a vindication of
\nits hearts and minds campaign. But it is equally (if not more)
\nlikely that this high voting rate demonstrates at least in part
\nthe military's ability to intimidate the population into voting.<\/p>\n
Meanwhile, it seems clear that the Free Aceh Movement (GAM)
\nhas been doing its best to force the local population to boycott
\nthe elections. Civilians were trapped either way.<\/p>\n
Both the Indonesian government and GAM should make a public
\ncommitment to declaring and enforcing a cease-fire for at least
\nthe day of the election. Voters should be allowed to make their
\nown choice as to whether or not to participate in the election,
\nand be able to do so in a secure and peaceful environment.<\/p>\n
Creating an environment conducive to an election is one marker
\nfor a free and fair vote. Another is the presence of independent
\nobservers. Unfortunately, access to Aceh for election observers
\nremains severely restricted.<\/p>\n
During Indonesia's April legislative elections in Aceh,
\nelection observers from the European Union were only allowed into
\nthe province at the last minute, were unable to observe either
\nthe opening or closing of polling stations, and were unable to
\ntravel much outside the main towns without military escorts.<\/p>\n
Under these circumstances no assessment was possible of the
\nsecurity of ballot papers, or ballot boxes, either before or
\nafter the vote. EU observers were also ushered out of Aceh sooner
\nthan their counterparts in other provinces. Some embassies who
\nsent representatives to Aceh for the election encountered similar
\nproblems.<\/p>\n
Long and short term access to Aceh both before and after the
\nJuly election will be essential to assess the validity and
\nclimate of the vote in the province.<\/p>\n
In particular, if the presidential election indeed goes to a
\nsecond round stand off between two candidates in September, the
\npotential for political violence, intimidation and mobilization
\nwill increase. In case of a runoff, it is crucial to place long
\nterm observers throughout Aceh during the intermediate July to
\nSeptember period.<\/p>\n
The media, another essential check on mischief by the
\ngovernment and GAM, has suffered the same restrictions on access
\nas other independent monitors in Aceh. Journalists have been
\nregularly intimidated and threatened, by both Indonesian security
\nforces and GAM, over critical coverage of the conflict since the
\nwar began in May 2003.<\/p>\n
Restrictions, intimidation and threats against all media
\nshould cease immediately. A free and independent press is a key
\nindicator for the success or otherwise of an election. Failure to
\ndo so will throw the credibility of the vote into question.<\/p>\n
A valid election in Aceh will be an important test for
\ndemocracy in Indonesia. National elections can not exclude
\nspecific provinces. A failure to hold free and fair elections in
\nAceh will be a failure to provide Indonesian citizens with their
\nbasic right to political participation.<\/p>\n
The writer is Deputy Director for Asia, Human Rights Watch.<\/p>", "url": "https:\/\/jawawa.id\/newsitem\/a-valid-election-in-aceh-test-case-for-ris-democracy-1447893297", "image": "" }, "sponsor": "Okusi Associates", "sponsor_url": "https:\/\/okusiassociates.com" }