A third option for East Timor<\/p>\n
By Widjoseno Sastroamidjojo<\/p>\n
JAKARTA (JP): The announcement made earlier by Indonesian
\nForeign Minister Ali Alatas, particularly concerning the
\npossibility of releasing East Timor from Indonesia as a second
\noption should the offer of greater autonomy be rejected has taken
\nthe world greatly by surprise.<\/p>\n
Moreover, such a radical alternative has left the so-called
\nEast Timorese independence leaders at the crossroads. This could
\nbe seen clearly from their ambiguous political stance on the
\nfuture of East Timor. For instance, pro-independence advocate
\nJose Ramos-Horta who had been desperately seeking ways and
\nstruggling for the sake of East Timor's independence for many
\nyears surprisingly still preferred a referendum instead of
\nwelcoming the second option offered by Indonesia. The same goes
\nfor the Nobel Peace Prize laureate, Bishop Belo, who also opted
\nfor greater autonomy for the province.<\/p>\n
Apart from the comprehensive solution offered by Indonesia,
\nthe second political option unfortunately has become the object
\nof criticism not only from a segment of the international
\ncommunity, but also from certain sectors in this country. People
\ntend to jump to a conclusion much too quickly and think that the
\nIndonesian government will enforce the second alternative
\nunilaterally.<\/p>\n
Actually they forget that the second option is merely
\nconditional, and that it would only be implemented as a last
\nresort should the alternative of meaningful autonomy end in a
\ndeadlock. Moreover, many people are still questioning the
\nfeasibility of the second alternative, arguing that a unilateral
\ndecision by Indonesia would not be democratic unless the East
\nTimorese people are given a chance to determine their own
\npolitical future.<\/p>\n
These worries are understandable because the second option
\nitself tends to reflect the sense of arrogance some East Timorese
\nfind unacceptable and which may eventually be detrimental to
\nIndonesia's conduct of diplomacy in the near future.<\/p>\n
As an alternative to a referendum, the disengagement of the
\n27th province from Indonesia as stated by the government should
\nbe the ultimate solution. However, the verdict itself should not
\nbe determined solely by the next MPR General Session (SU-MPR).<\/p>\n
It would be better if a third alternative is also taken into
\naccount by giving the East Timorese (pro and contra integration)
\na last chance to determine their choices or preferences through
\nthe Regional House of Representatives (DPRD) as the duly
\nconstituted representation of the East Timorese people within the
\nIndonesian system.<\/p>\n
Therefore, the final decision on the fate of East Timor would
\nnot be determined by the MPR, but only approved by it (preferably
\nafter the June 1999 general election, in order to achieve a more
\ncredible result). The third alternative is a relatively neutral
\nsolution to the East Timor problem that can accommodate the
\npersisting differences between sides and parties. It is believed
\nthat this option will be more beneficial to the East Timorese as
\nwell as Indonesia in the future knowing that it was the East
\nTimorese themselves who asked to be integrated with Indonesia.<\/p>\n
Compared to the referendum as requested by foreign countries,
\nthe third alternative could also serve as \"a face-saving formula\"
\nfor the government and particularly the Armed Forces which had
\nfrom the very beginning the biggest role as well as interest in
\nthe process of integrating East Timor into Indonesia. More
\nimportantly, the net result of this solution will clearly reflect
\nthe true aspirations of the entire East Timorese nation without
\nhaving to go through a divisive referendum.<\/p>\n
In other words, the end result will be more acceptable to all
\nconcerned parties (national and international) without going
\nthrough a referendum which is considered unconstitutional by the
\ngovernment. In the long run, the implementation of this
\nalternative would help Indonesia avoid making the past mistake of
\nthe Portuguese in abandoning the territory indefinitely in 1975.
\nSuch an option will spare Indonesia the accusation of being
\nirresponsible and immoral.<\/p>\n
However if the second option is inevitable and knowing that
\nthere is a growing fear of insecurity in the territory, then
\nFalintil (Forcas Armadas de Lebertacao Nacional de Timor Leste)
\nshould guarantee the safety of the former pro-integrationists.<\/p>\n
Furthermore, in order to restore peace, order and security in
\nEast Timor the United Nations must immediately organize a general
\nelection to elect a trusted leader who represents all the
\ninterests of the East Timor people in their entirety.<\/p>\n
The writer, a political science graduate of the Nasional
\nUniversity, Jakarta, works at the Foreign Ministry. He has
\nwritten this article in a private capacity.<\/p>\n
Window: As an alternative to a referendum, the disengagement of
\nthe 27th province from Indonesia as stated by the government
\nshould be the ultimate solution. However, the verdict itself
\nshould not be determined solely by the next MPR General Session
\n(SU-MPR).<\/p>",
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