A stable Indonesia vital for Southeast Asian security<\/p>\n
By Paul Dibb<\/p>\n
The following article is based on a paper presented at an
\ninternational conference recently held in Bogor, co-hosted by the
\nJakarta-based Research Institute for Peace and Democracy. This is
\nthe first of two articles.<\/p>\n
BOGOR: Despite the dramatic events in Indonesia, Southeast
\nAsia is not an area of high priority for the major powers.<\/p>\n
Developments in Northeast Asia, and particularly the tensions
\nbetween China and the United States over Taiwan, as well as the
\nrisk of war between India and Pakistan in South Asia, will
\npreoccupy the major powers.<\/p>\n
This is not to argue that Southeast Asia is strategically
\nunimportant. The ten ASEAN countries have a combined population
\nof over 500 million people and they stand astride very important
\nstraits that account for about 40 percent of the world's maritime
\ntrade. The region is flanked by the crucial strategic landmasses
\nof Northeast Asia and South Asia.<\/p>\n
To a growing extent, the interests of the great powers are
\nlikely to overlap in Southeast Asia. But it is important to
\nunderstand that, unlike Northeast Asia and South Asia, major
\npower war is most unlikely to occur in Southeast Asia.<\/p>\n
This gives the region an essentially peaceful outlook. Within
\nSoutheast Asia, it seems highly improbable that one regional
\ncountry will attack another, despite tensions and disagreements
\nbetween some members of ASEAN.<\/p>\n
What is of much greater security concern is political and
\nsocial stability within the ASEAN countries themselves and the
\nrisk that serious upheaval or fragmentation, especially in
\nIndonesia, will infect other parts of Southeast Asia.<\/p>\n
Indonesia's stability is central to the national security of
\nits neighbors: Singapore and Malaysia to the north, the
\nPhilippines and Papua New Guinea to the east, and Australia to
\nthe south.<\/p>\n
With this analysis in mind, we now examine the outlook for
\nregional security. This will include the role of the major
\nexternal powers.<\/p>\n
Overall, it is my view that we are unlikely to see a major
\ndisruption to Southeast Asia's security, leading to serious armed
\nconflict.<\/p>\n
This is an important judgment. It depends crucially upon an
\noptimistic view of the outlook for stability in Indonesia.<\/p>\n
We live in a period, the post-Cold War era, of great strategic
\nchange and unpredictability. Who would have foreseen the demise
\nof the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact, let alone the Asian
\neconomic crisis and the overthrow of the Soeharto regime in
\nIndonesia?<\/p>\n
It is easy, therefore, for former defense planners -- such as
\nmyself -- to be cautious about the future. At the very least, we
\nshould be wary of predicting a fail-safe and optimistic outlook
\nfor Southeast Asia.<\/p>\n
Responsible security analysts should ask themselves what might
\ngo wrong. This is not to indulge in \"worst-case\" scenarios.
\nRather it is to examine a range of credible alternative outcomes
\nfor regional security, so that our political leaders are not
\ncaught by surprise when something goes badly wrong.<\/p>\n
What are some of these alternative futures then? They range
\nfrom conflict between Thailand and Myanmar and Cambodia and
\nThailand over border disagreements, through to a repeat of the
\nmilitary clashes that occurred in the late 1970s between Vietnam
\nand Cambodia or China being tempted again to \"teach Vietnam a
\nlesson\". Most of these scenarios are unlikely, except for the
\ngrowing problems between Myanmar and Thailand.<\/p>\n
Further to the south, there are periodic tensions between
\nMalaysia and Singapore over territorial and ethnic matters but
\nthese two countries seem to have learnt how to manage a difficult
\nrelationship.<\/p>\n
The Philippines still faces serious problems of insurrection
\nin its southern province of Mindanao and it is very concerned
\nabout China's claims to Philippines' territory in the South China
\nSea.<\/p>\n
To the east of Indonesia, Papua New Guinea is a weak state
\nfacing potential economic collapse and strong secessionist
\nmovements.<\/p>\n
From Australia's perspective, it now confronts an arc of
\ninstability to its near north stretching from Indonesia through
\nto Papua New Guinea and the Solomon Islands, where there is an
\nactive insurrection.<\/p>\n
New Zealand's defense policy, which is to structure its armed
\nforces primarily for peacekeeping, means that that country is
\nbecoming more of a strategic liability than a defense asset for
\nAustralia.<\/p>\n
In contemplating the strategic future, there is a growing
\nconsensus that Southeast Asia will be the focus of what is called
\n\"the new strategic agenda\".<\/p>\n
In other words, the region will increasingly experience the
\neffects of illegal migration, drug trafficking, piracy, and
\ntransnational environmental damage.<\/p>\n
Whilst these non-traditional security concerns are unlikely to
\nlead to armed conflict between nations, they do add to regional
\ninstability and tensions, especially between neighboring
\ncountries.<\/p>\n
In theory, these problems should lend themselves more readily
\nto cooperation among countries of the region than the more
\ndemanding issues of military cooperation and transparency.<\/p>\n
But in several regional countries drug trafficking, economic
\nactivities that lead to severe environmental damage, illegal
\nmigration, and even piracy involve vested interests, including
\nthe military. It will, therefore, be difficult to eradicate these
\nserious problems.<\/p>\n
The Asian economic crisis of 1997 and 1998 demonstrated just
\nhow closely economics and security are intertwined. The speed and
\ndepth of the crisis was unprecedented in modern Asian economic
\nhistory.<\/p>\n
It fundamentally shook the confidence of the region. It also
\nundermined the idea that Asian countries had found a foolproof
\ncombination of political authoritarianism and state capitalism
\nthat would ensure economic growth for all time.<\/p>\n
But the crisis also demonstrated that democracy was alive and
\nwell in South Korea, Thailand and the Philippines where
\ndemocratic elections led to a smooth handover of power.<\/p>\n
The story was different in Indonesia, which was much more
\nprofoundly affected by the crisis than any other country. But
\neven there the collapse of Soeharto's military regime was
\nrelatively peaceful.<\/p>\n
Even so, the economic crisis has set back Indonesia's
\nprosperity by at least ten years. Unemployment remains extremely
\nhigh and democracy is fragile. The economic crisis has had
\nserious security implications for Indonesia.<\/p>\n
It has also made the rest of the region much less confident
\nand more introspective. This means that most countries in the
\nregion have less time to give to broader regional security
\ncooperation.<\/p>\n
What is the likelihood of another economic crisis?<\/p>\n
While most countries in the region are making a remarkable
\neconomic recovery, they have done little to address the
\nfundamental structural problems that made them so vulnerable to
\nthe crisis of 1997.<\/p>\n
The key issues of banking reform, financial accountability,
\ncurrency volatility, as well as corruption, have hardly been
\ntouched in many instances. This means that the region is
\nvulnerable to another crisis.<\/p>\n
The fear must be that few if any, countries in Asia have
\nlearned much from the crisis of 1997 and 1998. There is an
\nimperfect understanding of the nexus between economics and
\nsecurity in the region.<\/p>\n
But the balance of power and the role of the external powers
\nshould also be of serious concern to Southeast Asian security
\nplanners.<\/p>\n
The most obvious issue of contention is China's claim to all
\nthe islands and reefs in the South China Sea and their
\nsurrounding waters. The Chinese authorities continue to issue
\nmaps which show that China effectively claims the whole of the
\nSouth China Sea and there is evidence that the People's
\nLiberation Army continues to militarize China's claims.<\/p>\n
Recently there have been clashes between some ASEAN countries
\nand China over their South China Sea claims. China has used
\nmilitary force on more than one occasion in the South China Sea.
\nThe solution to this serious territorial issue is clearly
\nnegotiation and compromise.<\/p>\n
But China is a rising power that sees itself as the natural
\nleading power in Asia. It is acquiring, with assistance from
\nRussia, modern military equipment that will enable it to prevail
\nmilitarily in the South China Sea against any regional power, if
\nit so wishes. Were China to succeed in asserting sovereignty over
\nthe South China Sea it would be able to penetrate deeply into
\nSoutheast Asia and threaten freedom of navigation.<\/p>\n
There are serious questions surrounding the rise of China to
\npower. Will China be a responsible and cooperative member of the
\ninternational community, abiding by its rules of non-aggression
\nand non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries?<\/p>\n
Or will China become an expansionist power, as have other
\nrising powers in the past?<\/p>\n
World history has been marked by the rise of ambitious new
\npowers seeking to displace weaker powers. But China is many
\ndecades away from being a peer competitor with the dominant world
\npower, the United States.<\/p>\n
The main danger to Southeast Asia in the short term is not
\nChinese military aggression. It is the risk that the next theater
\nof Cold War confrontation will be between the United States and
\nChina. There is a growing sentiment in America that sees China as
\na strategic competitor, if not the next \"evil empire\".<\/p>\n
While there is an important convergence of interests with
\nrespect to North Korea and the spread of nuclear weapons, China
\nand the U.S. increasingly diverge on a long list of key strategic
\nissues. These include Taiwan; Japan's regional security role;
\nIran and Iraq; the expansion of North Atlantic Treaty
\nOrganization (NATO); the strengthening of other U.S. alliances;
\nmissile exports; theater and national missile defenses; and the
\nU.S. security role in the Asia-Pacific.<\/p>\n
David Shambaugh claims that growing \"strategic competition\" is
\nlikely to characterize Sino-American relations for most of the
\ncoming decade, irrespective of the new American administration
\nthat comes to office in 2001. I would assert that the risk is
\nhigher than this: for those of us who live in the Asia-Pacific
\nregion it is that there will be a struggle for power between the
\nUnited States and China, leading to military confrontation.<\/p>\n
The greatest risk is over Taiwan. War between the United
\nStates and China in the Taiwan Straits would risk drawing in
\nAmerica's allies, including Australia.<\/p>\n
Washington would expect its other allies, particularly Japan
\nand South Korea, to support it. Such expectations could seriously
\ndamage America's alliances in the region.<\/p>\n
Short of such cataclysmic events, the main danger for
\nSoutheast Asia is that it will be under increasing pressure to
\nside with either China or the United States in their struggle for
\npower and influence. This could divide the region. There are
\nalready signs that Malaysia and Thailand incline towards China.
\nVietnam, the Philippines and Singapore favor the U.S.. Indonesia
\nhas traditionally been hostile to China. But President
\nAbdurrahman Wahid has talked recently about a triangular
\nrelationship with China and India that would offset Indonesia's
\ntraditional closer relationship with the United States.<\/p>\n
The future course of Indonesia's relations with China will be
\nfollowed with the utmost scrutiny, not least by the United States
\nand Australia. The purchase by Indonesia of arms from China, for
\ninstance, would raise alarm.<\/p>\n
There is the further issue that China does not accept the
\nrationale for the U.S. forward military presence in Asia. It
\nexplicitly calls for the abrogation of all alliances, claiming
\nthat they are not conducive to maintaining peace and security in
\nthe post-Cold War world.<\/p>\n
Before his visit to Australia last year, President Jiang Zemin
\nproclaimed that alliances were \"obsolete\". (What in fact is
\nobsolete is Communism}.<\/p>\n
Chinese officials have openly called for the removal of U.S.
\nforces from the region. China must accept that the U.S. is not
\ngoing to withdraw from Asia and America's alliances are not going
\nto disappear.<\/p>\n
China needs to understand that Asia without the United States
\nwould be a dangerous place. It would leave the region open to
\nChinese hegemony and to the potential for conflict between China
\nand Japan. None of this would be conducive to peace and stability
\nin the region.<\/p>\n
As China's influence in Southeast Asia grows, India -- which
\nis also a major power -- will seek to compete with China. Until
\nrecently, India's poor economic performance, its alliance with
\nthe former Soviet Union, and its military preoccupation with
\nPakistan have served to limit its interests in Southeast Asia.<\/p>\n
But India now seems set on a path of economic reform and its
\neconomy is growing strongly. The military balance on the
\nsubcontinent now firmly favors India and with each year that
\npasses India's superior economic performance will improve its
\nmilitary advantage.<\/p>\n
India, therefore, will be able to lift its strategic horizons
\naway from its obsession with Pakistan. Southeast Asia is a
\nnatural area for India's future focus.<\/p>\n
India has long-established historical ties to the region
\n(including with Indonesia) and its territory, including the
\nAndaman and Nicobar Islands, are in close proximity to Southeast
\nAsia.<\/p>\n
Already, India is seeking to strengthen its old relationship
\nwith Vietnam, as well as with Japan. This competition between
\nIndia and China will benefit the region because it will ensure
\nthat neither power predominates.<\/p>\n
Japan should have strong strategic interests in Southeast Asia
\nbecause more than half of its imports, including most of its oil,
\npasses through the straits of the region.<\/p>\n
If a potentially hostile power were to gain control over the
\nmaritime approaches to Southeast Asia, Japan's economic health
\nwould be fundamentally threatened. As long as the United States
\nremains the dominant world power, and has a strong alliance with
\nJapan, this will not occur.<\/p>\n
Of greater concern is Japan's inability to provide leadership
\nin Asia commensurate with its economic power. Partly, this is to
\ndo with lingering memories of Japan's aggression in the World War
\nII. But it also stems from Japan's preoccupation with its
\ndomestic economic problems, which have seen its economy virtually
\nstagnant for the last decade.<\/p>\n
Moreover, as we saw in the Asian economic crisis three years
\nago, the United States is not willing to allow Japan to take on
\nthe role of financial leader in Southeast Asia.<\/p>\n
It is important that Japan has more of a leadership role in
\nthe region both to offset the growth in China's influence and
\nbecause its economy accounts for 60 percent of Asia's Gross
\nNational Product. But China -- whose economy is less than a fifth
\nthe size of that of Japan -- has a much higher political profile
\nin the region.<\/p>\n
Russia, which is the other major power, is unlikely to be a
\nsignificant influence in Southeast Asia for the foreseeable
\nfuture. It will remain preoccupied with its internal political
\nand economic affairs and the situation along its borders,
\nespecially the territories of the former Soviet Union.<\/p>\n
Russia's ability to supply advanced conventional weapons to
\nChina and India is, however, a matter of concern. Arms exports
\nare one of the few competitive products produced by the ailing
\nRussian economy. Russia has the capacity to upset the regional
\nmilitary balance and it is already doing this through its arms
\nsupplies to China.<\/p>\n
Overall, it is unlikely that any one major power will become
\nthe hegemony in Asia. Instead, what we are likely to see is a
\ncompetitive struggle for influence between the United States,
\nChina, Japan and India.<\/p>\n
The key relationship here is the one between the United States
\nand China, which must not be allowed to deteriorate into military
\nconfrontation and war.<\/p>\n
Prof. Paul Dibb is head of the Strategic and Defense Studies
\nCenter in the Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies at the
\nAustralian National University. He was formerly Deputy Secretary
\nand Director of the Joint Intelligence Organization in the
\nAustralian Department of Defense.<\/p>",
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