{
    "success": true,
    "data": {
        "id": 1553691,
        "msgid": "a-scramble-for-energy-resources-1447893297",
        "date": "1997-07-20 00:00:00",
        "title": "A scramble for energy resources?",
        "author": null,
        "source": "TRENDS",
        "tags": null,
        "topic": null,
        "summary": "A scramble for energy resources? Asia's Deadly Triangle: How Arms, Energy and Growth Threaten to Destabilize Asia Pacific By Kent E. Calder Nicholas Brealey Publishing, London, 1996, 253 pages SINGAPORE: In a recently published book, Asia's Deadly Triangle, Princeton University's Kent Calder has raised the specter of a future energy \"gap\" developing in East Asia in the next few decades.",
        "content": "<p>A scramble for energy resources?<\/p>\n<p>Asia&apos;s Deadly Triangle: How Arms, Energy and Growth Threaten to<br>\nDestabilize Asia Pacific<\/p>\n<p>By Kent E. Calder<\/p>\n<p>Nicholas Brealey Publishing, London, 1996,<\/p>\n<p>253 pages<\/p>\n<p>SINGAPORE: In a recently published book, Asia&apos;s Deadly<br>\nTriangle, Princeton University&apos;s Kent Calder has raised the<br>\nspecter of a future energy &quot;gap&quot; developing in East Asia in the<br>\nnext few decades.<\/p>\n<p>Calder&apos;s basic thesis is that if the region&apos;s rate of economic<br>\ngrowth is sustained at around current levels there will be<br>\nincreasing competition for oil and other non-renewable energy<br>\nresources. This may lead to supply bottle-necks, cost increases,<br>\nor both, which will increase tensions among energy deficient<br>\nstates scrambling for a diminishing and more expensive share of<br>\nthe energy cake.<\/p>\n<p>Calder points out that the levels of energy dependence in<br>\nNorth-east Asia, already high, are rising. Japan relies on<br>\nimports for 88 percent of its primary energy supply and 90<br>\npercent of its oil. South Korea has an even higher level of<br>\nenergy dependence than Japan, North Korea has no oil at all and<br>\nTaiwan has major energy vulnerabilities.<\/p>\n<p>The situation in South-east Asia is more complex. Thailand,<br>\nCambodia and Singapore are major energy importers. Vietnam, Laos<br>\nand possibly the Philippines are likely to be future modest net<br>\nexporters, while Malaysia and Indonesia are significant suppliers<br>\nof energy, mainly to the Asian region.<\/p>\n<p>But here again the overall energy picture is worsening, Calder<br>\nargues, because of sky-rocketing domestic demand, high energy<br>\nexploration and development costs, political and strategic<br>\nuncertainties associated with some economically exploitable<br>\nenergy deposits, and a decline in recoverable oil reserves.<\/p>\n<p>However, the really bad news on the energy front is that the<br>\nproduction of oil from Indonesia, the region&apos;s largest oil<br>\nsupplier, is falling, while domestic demand in Indonesia and East<br>\nAsia&apos;s other emerging economic giant, China, is soaring.<\/p>\n<p>Indonesia&apos;s oil production has fallen steadily since the late<br>\n1970s and it will become a net importer shortly after 2000.<\/p>\n<p>The situation in China is even bleaker. Although possessing<br>\nsubstantial reserves of its own and, having been a significant<br>\noil exporter as recently as 1990, China&apos;s energy balance<br>\ndeteriorated so quickly, thereafter, that by 1993 it was being<br>\nforced to import oil, mainly from the Middle East. Energy experts<br>\npredict that China will be importing as much oil as the United<br>\nStates by 2015.<\/p>\n<p>Calder makes two important points about these developments.<br>\nThe first is that because China accounts for nearly a quarter of<br>\nthe world&apos;s population its thirst for energy threatens to create<br>\neither an energy gap, or at least introduce major uncertainties<br>\ninto the market.<\/p>\n<p>The second is that East Asian energy demand is focused to an<br>\nunusual degree on oil. Alternative energy sources may be able to<br>\nfill some of the potential gap in supply. However, the high level<br>\nof regional oil dependence, allied with problems and costs linked<br>\nto alternative sources of power - solar, geothermal, LNG, coal<br>\nand nuclear - will limit oil&apos;s substitutability.<\/p>\n<p>Is Calder right? Like all forecasts of this kind, Calder&apos;s<br>\narguments rest on a number of assumptions about aggregate energy<br>\nsupply and demand which are open to interpretation.<\/p>\n<p>If regional economic growth slows significantly, or the market<br>\nresponds more quickly and effectively than Calder anticipates to<br>\nrising East Asian demand, then the forecast energy gap, like the<br>\n&quot;missile-gap&quot; of the 1960s, may prove to be illusory.<\/p>\n<p>Calder&apos;s assessment that the demand for oil in China will rise<br>\nfrom 600,000 barrels a day to three million a day by 2010 is not<br>\ncontested, but some oil industry analysts believe that future<br>\nglobal production is sufficient to meet this level of demand<br>\nwithout major disruptions in supply.<\/p>\n<p>Yet he does make compelling reading. His basic energy demand<br>\nforecasts are supported by several authoritative studies, and his<br>\nskepticism about finding economically viable and environmentally<br>\nacceptable substitutes for oil is well founded.<\/p>\n<p>There is also little doubt that China&apos;s latent potential<br>\ndemand for energy has the capacity to profoundly affect world oil<br>\nmarkets, even if the impact and time frame is difficult to<br>\nforecast precisely.<\/p>\n<p>The issue transcends simple supply and demand calculations. If<br>\nthe perception develops that shortages are possible, the level of<br>\neconomic and strategic uncertainty will rise, and governments and<br>\nthe market will react accordingly.<\/p>\n<p>If oil prices rise, richer countries such as Japan will be<br>\nmuch better placed to compete on international oil markets than<br>\nEast Asia&apos;s less wealthy economies. Should the rises be<br>\nsubstantial, then growth may be significantly impaired,<br>\nparticularly among the region&apos;s less developed states, with<br>\nobvious implications for social and political stability.<br>\nOne other point which Calder touches on, but could have developed<br>\nmore, is that certain kinds of energy usage will incur growing<br>\nenvironmental and political costs.<\/p>\n<p>Coal and nuclear power are two notable examples. Coal, while<br>\nrelatively abundant, is polluting and a primary source of<br>\ngreenhouse gas emissions, which are directly linked to global<br>\nwarming.<\/p>\n<p>Nuclear power, on the other hand, produces no greenhouse gases<br>\nbut has an environmental image problem and is politically<br>\ncontentious, domestically and internationally, because of past<br>\nnuclear accidents and waste disposal problems.<\/p>\n<p>These factors will complicate future energy usage and<br>\nexacerbate the energy vulnerabilities of East Asian states.<\/p>\n<p>-- Alan Dupont<\/p>\n<p>Alan Dupont is the Director of the Asia-Pacific Security<br>\nProgram at the Australian National University&apos;s Strategic and<br>\nDefense Studies Center.<\/p>",
        "url": "https:\/\/jawawa.id\/newsitem\/a-scramble-for-energy-resources-1447893297",
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    "sponsor": "Okusi Associates",
    "sponsor_url": "https:\/\/okusiassociates.com"
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