A question mark hangs over Indonesia's long-term future<\/p>\n
Dr. Damien Kingsbury, executive officer of Monash Asia
\nInstitute, author and editor of six books on aspects of South-
\nEast Asian politics, is a TNI (Indonesian Armed Forces) observer.
\nHis latest book is Guns and Ballot Boxes: East Timor's vote for
\nindependence, published last year by Monash Asia Institute, and a
\nforthcoming book, Southeast Asian Politics, will be published by
\nOxford University Press.<\/p>\n
The following are excerpts from a interview with Dr.
\nKingsbury, currently in Dili, by The Jakarta Post's Melbourne-
\nbased contributor Dewi Anggraeni, which was conducted by email
\nand telephone.<\/p>\n
Question: Since our interview in March this year, several
\nthings have happened which proved your visions then were not far
\nwrong, one being, any reform in TNI would be heavily politically
\nmotivated, and the scope of reform would be limited. What do you
\nsee as being the greatest impediment to reform? And what things,
\nif any, are helping reform?<\/p>\n
Answer: The greatest impediment to reform is that the TNI
\nremains necessary to ensure Indonesia's territorial integrity. If
\nthe TNI gave up its territorial function the tendency for
\nIndonesia to disintegrate would be considerable and the options
\nfor stopping it limited.<\/p>\n
So, the territorial function remains, yet that is in itself
\nperhaps the greatest obstacle facing reform. There is one,
\nincreasingly thought about, view that suggests that real reform
\ncannot exist in Indonesia for structural reasons, and that if
\nthere is real reform Indonesia would cease to exist.<\/p>\n
Q: You also mentioned that former Kostrad Chief Agus
\nWirahadikusumah may not be successful in overhauling the TNI.
\nWell, he was dropped even before he went as far as shaking up the
\nterritorial structure. What was his biggest mistake? Trying too
\nmuch too soon (uncovering massive corruption in Kostrad)?<\/p>\n
A: Agus Wirahadikusumah tried too much too soon. He was also very
\nnoisy. I admire his efforts at reform, but he should have known
\nto go gently until he had secured a strong position.<\/p>\n
Of course, he would always have been on the outer with the
\nTNI's conservatives, and even achieving Panglima (commander)
\nwould not have secured real change, as we saw with one or two
\npanglimas under Soeharto, who failed to exercise real control
\nover what was then ABRI.<\/p>\n
In Agus' favor, there is also the view that had he waited
\nuntil securing more power, he would have in effect been endorsing
\nthose problems he wanted to get rid of. That is, if you don't act
\nagainst corruption you are complicit in it. It now seems that Gus
\nDur (President Abdurrahman Wahid) will consider Agus for a
\nministerial appointment.<\/p>\n
It is good to have people like him and Susilo Bambang
\nYudhoyono in the cabinet, although it does mean that the real
\nreformers are no longer in the TNI, which tends to reinforce its
\nconservative elements.<\/p>\n
I should add here that Kiki Sjahnakri's rise (to Army Deputy
\nChief of Staff) might take over from where Agus has left off.
\nContrary to some observations, I do not believe that Kiki
\nrepresents the conservative element in the TNI. I think that he
\nis committed to the reform agenda, if perhaps on a more careful
\nbasis than Agus.<\/p>\n
Kiki has identified some oknum (unscrupulous officers) as
\nbeing behind the Timor militias, for example, and while he has
\nnot stamped out the militias, no doubt due to them receiving
\npowerful support from other places, he has identified their
\nsource of backing and I think can be expected to move against
\nthem as his own position consolidates.<\/p>\n
Q: Do you think Gus Dur has done anything beyond superficial
\nreform in terms of TNI? The musical chair game with positions of
\nhigh ranking officers seems to have only made TNI even more
\nunprofessional and uncontrollable.<\/p>\n
A: Gus Dur's responses to the TNI, and to other institutions,
\nseem to be based on changing personalities but not changing the
\nstructure. If there is not structural change then the problems
\nwill persist, or recur at a later date. Personalities are short-
\nterm responses and do not address the fundamental problems of the
\nstate, in law, the economy and, of course, the TNI.<\/p>\n
Q: Looking back, what has the separation of the National Police
\nForce from the Armed Forces done to national security?<\/p>\n
A: It was a part of the \"New Paradigm\" plan, which has in part
\nbeen implemented. But separating the police from the TNI was
\nreally only a small step and has not made a real difference to
\nanything. The police still feel that they are under the indirect
\ncontrol of the TNI and are usually afraid to try to control TNI
\nelements that are behaving inappropriately.<\/p>\n
Q: Can you give examples where this has happened?<\/p>\n
A: Events in East Timor up to the end of September 1999 are the
\nclearest example of this, where the National Police was afraid to
\ncontradict TNI initiatives, or to use force to control TNI who
\nwere openly breaking the law. Of course, there have also been
\nmany other examples, such as in Kupang and throughout Nusa
\nTenggara, in Maluku and, in lesser, more day to day instances,
\nthroughout the archipelago<\/p>\n
Q: Will the police force ever be really independent?<\/p>\n
A: Not while the president fails to introduce structural reform
\nwhich, of course, is extremely difficult.<\/p>\n
Q: Do you think, the fact that the military is still the most
\norganized power group in the country, despite no longer being
\ndirectly involved in government, is a major reason why Gus Dur
\ndoes not have enough muscle to tackle them?<\/p>\n
A: The TNI still has an important block in the People's
\nConsultative Assembly and is still represented at a local level.
\nIt also retains its territorial function, which instills its
\nauthority down to village level. The TNI may be weaker than it
\nonce was, but so are the other institutions of the state, so the
\nTNI could probably be considered more powerful than in recent
\nyears, in relative terms.<\/p>\n
Q: Could Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono do better?<\/p>\n
A: Yudhoyono could do better by being a little more open and
\nhonest about who is doing what to whom. For example, his
\nengagement with oknum and militia leaders from Timor does little
\nto enhance his credibility, along with his statements that
\nIndonesia had a program to resolve issues in West Timor and hence
\ndid not want the intervention of the UN.<\/p>\n
I can understand why he said this, as he is under a lot of
\npressure not to alienate the more \"nationalist\" members of the
\nelite. But it does little to help the cause of reform to pretend
\nthat problems don't exist where they so clearly do.<\/p>\n
Having said that, I would like to think that Susilo is moving
\nquietly to institute some genuine changes. He is probably the
\nonly person in Indonesia who has both the will and the capacity
\nto do so, hence his appointment by Gus Dur to his current
\nposition. I wish him luck!<\/p>\n
Q: If you observe political developments in Indonesia so far, do
\nyou see any real threat to national disintegration?<\/p>\n
A: The threat to national disintegration comes from the diverse
\nnature of the state, and its somewhat arbitrary construction.
\nHaving been a colony is not a sound basis for a modern state, nor
\nis political repression, which has kept it together so far. There
\nis, no doubt, a strong sense of \"Indonesianess\" in many
\nIndonesians, but it is greater at the center and is far from
\nuniversal in the outer regions.<\/p>\n
History is long and Indonesia is young. It might survive, but
\nit is too early to say that it will still be around in, say,
\nanother 50 years.<\/p>\n
Q: What will regional autonomy do to the cohesion of the nation?
\nWill it help placate secessionist aspirations?<\/p>\n
A: The limited autonomy program, if properly implemented, is
\nprobably the best way to stop Indonesia falling apart. By giving
\nsome power back to the regions, some of the sense of grievance at
\nbeing a part of a \"Javanese empire\" will be addressed.<\/p>\n
However, placing more political and economic power in the
\nhands of some -- perhaps even territorial commanders -- could
\ncreate a warlord situation, which would be bad for the future of
\nthe state. Let's just say that both options have problems, but
\nthe current arrangement is clearly not working, so something else
\nwill have to be tried.<\/p>\n
Q: The situation in West Papua and Aceh has brought to the
\nsurface the specter of the National Emergency Bill again. What
\ndangers or threats do you see if the Bill is passed?<\/p>\n
A: The bill could be used to reassert the authority of the TNI.
\nThere is certainly a view within some elements of the TNI that
\nIndonesia needs another strong president, preferably with a
\nmilitary background. It could be that, if the situation
\ndeteriorated enough, the bill could be used to impose an
\neffective state of martial law, which could lead to such a new
\npolitical situation.<\/p>\n
Q: The new Minister for Defense, Mohamad Mahfud suggested that
\nIndonesia should have a new National Intelligence Body. Do you
\nthink Indonesia really needs it? Why?<\/p>\n
A: Indonesia does not need a new national intelligence body and
\nMahfud, I think, is very much the wayang (puppet) of some
\npowerful military people. He has been a very disappointing
\ndefense minister, especially after the intelligence and clarity
\nof Juwono Sudarsono.<\/p>\n
Q: Mahfud also seems to have inherent suspicions about the West's
\nintentions about Indonesia, Australia included. Many see this as
\na nationalistic reaction to what is seen as bullying from the
\nmighty West. What do you think?<\/p>\n
A: Mahfud seems to be a man of either limited intellect or else
\ntotally beholden to people who wish to run a very particular
\nagenda that is aimed at strengthening the role of the TNI.<\/p>\n
There is, of course, international concern and pressure on
\nIndonesia from many countries, but this is not unusual in
\ninternational affairs and Mahfud should understand that
\nIndonesia, like all other countries, is but one country in a
\nglobal community. It is not a law unto itself.<\/p>\n
I would have thought he and others like him would have learned
\nthat from the experience in East Timor after the ballot result
\nwas announced and the international community was obliged to step
\nin to control a situation that factions of the TNI were so
\nclearly orchestrating.<\/p>\n
Q: Mahfud was personally appointed by Gus Dur. What does it say
\nabout Gus Dur?<\/p>\n
A: I think it says one of three things: that Gus Dur's judgment
\non this matter was very poor, which is possible; that he
\nappointed a weak defense minister to allow Yudhoyono to exercise
\nreal authority in that field, or that Mahfud's appointment was at
\nthe behest of conservative elements both within and retired from
\nthe TNI, whom Gus Dur is attempting to placate.<\/p>\n
I suspect it is a combination of that latter two points,
\nalthough no-one knows for sure, including some of those who are
\nclose to Gus Dur.<\/p>\n
Q: Do you see Gus Dur staying on in power?<\/p>\n
A: Gus Dur will stay in power until there is a suitable
\nalternative. At the moment there are no real alternatives that
\ncould receive the broad support that Gus Dur initially had, and
\nIndonesian politics is now much more factionalized and sectarian
\nthan a year ago, so agreement on a new president would be
\ndifficult to achieve.<\/p>",
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