A pointless decision<\/p>\n
The government's decision, as announced by Coordinating
\nMinister for Political and Security Affairs Susilo Bambang
\nYudhoyono this week, to extend martial law in the special
\nterritory of Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam is a perfect study in
\ncontradiction. Given the performance thus far by both the
\nmilitary (TNI) and the local administration in Aceh, the decision
\nto extend martial law in the province, possibly until after the
\ngeneral elections in April next year, makes little -- if any --
\nsense at all.<\/p>\n
Consider, for example, Susilo's own admission: \"In terms of
\npersonnel and weaponry, GAM (the separatist Free Aceh Movement)
\nrebels remain strong and they have modified their tactics to full
\nguerrilla warfare.\" And this, despite the fact that the TNI has
\nabout 400,000 troops deployed in the province to fight some 5,000
\nGAM rebels, who have for years been fighting for the independence
\nof their territory from Indonesia.<\/p>\n
More than half of GAM's total strength of some 5,000 men (and
\nwomen) have reportedly either been killed or captured, but only
\n459 weapons have so far been confiscated from the rebels'
\narsenal, estimated to contain 2,000 arms of various types and
\nmakes. While their ranks have been reduced, GAM guerrillas have
\nspread themselves across a wider area and slipped through
\nmilitary cordons into rougher and more remote areas in a change
\nof guerrilla tactics.<\/p>\n
Not much has been heard, meanwhile, of the Rp 1.3 trillion
\n(the equivalent of about US$153 million), which the government
\nallocated for what it has termed \"integrated operations,\" to
\ninclude, besides military operations, the dispensing of
\nhumanitarian assistance to the population and restoration of the
\nfunctioning of local administrations to the lowest levels within
\nthe restive province.<\/p>\n
What all this amounts to is, in short, that the government and
\nmilitary have failed to deliver on their promise to eliminate GAM
\n\"down to its roots\" and restore peace and order in the province
\nwithin the six months it was given.<\/p>\n
That, certainly, is cause enough for concern, but it is only
\none aspect of a larger set of problems that have plagued the
\nspecial province of Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam and befouled its
\nrelationship with its mother country, the Unitary Republic of
\nIndonesia, almost since the start of Indonesia's independence.<\/p>\n
In these past six months of integrated operations in Aceh, the
\npolicy has not resolved the question of eliminating the climate
\nof continual discord that exists between Jakarta and Banda Aceh,
\nthe capital of the troubled province, due to perceived
\ninjustices, exploitation and repression carried out by successive
\nIndonesian administrations.<\/p>\n
What the integrated operations have, in general terms, failed
\nto achieve is to alleviate the suffering of the Acehnese
\npopulation, even in areas that have been freed of GAM, which, in
\nany case, is believed in its heyday to have controlled only a
\nhandful of Aceh districts and subdistricts. Indeed, in many
\nareas, the hardship that the population has to bear is reported
\nto have increased. What it has achieved is to lessen
\naccountability on those who hold power.<\/p>\n
Given the complex situation that exists in the province, it is
\nappropriate to suggest that first of all the government evaluate
\n-- carefully and thoroughly, and by involving experts outside the
\ngovernment if necessary -- whether or not the integrated
\noperations in Aceh have been successful. If the answer is in the
\naffirmative, obviously there is no need for an extension. On the
\nother hand, if the answer is negative, the TNI does not deserve
\nto be granted the option of an extension to its operations.<\/p>\n
This brings us to the task of finding alternative ways to
\nsolve the decades-old problem. One alternative would be to
\nreplace the present martial law administration with a new one,
\neither civilian or military, or a mixture of both. The efficacy
\nand acceptability of such an administration, however, would very
\nmuch depend on the character and qualifications of those chosen
\nto govern. Such a changing of the guard would not be acceptable,
\nas it would be unlikely to ease the burden and suffering of the
\nAcehnese people.<\/p>\n
Another, more acceptable, alternative would be to install a
\nnew administration -- neither military nor the one currently in
\npower -- but a transitional administration, whose main job would
\nbe to create an atmosphere conducive to the establishment of a
\ndemocratic civil society in Aceh, based on an improved law on
\nregional autonomy and provided with clear targets for the
\nbetterment of life for the Acehnese. Only by doing this can the
\nnation hope to settle Aceh's long-standing problems once and for
\nall.<\/p>",
"url": "https:\/\/jawawa.id\/newsitem\/a-pointless-decision-1447893297",
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