A partisan president<\/p>\n
Meidyatama Suryodiningrat, Journalist, Jakarta<\/p>\n
The office of the president, despite the corruption of its
\npowers during the Sukarno and Soeharto eras, remains very much an
\nicon of national sovereignty and dignity. With the advent of
\ndirect presidential elections in 2004, it will become the
\nparamount embodiment of the democratic process.<\/p>\n
Critics have argued that the recently passed laws on the
\nelection of the president only augment the role of the big
\npolitical parties. They decry the fact that under the present
\narrangements individual candidates have no avenue for
\nrepresentation and all potential nominees have to succumb to the
\nhegemony of the party system.<\/p>\n
Despite the altruistic intentions of this argument, experience
\nin more advanced democracies has shown us that the solid linkage
\nbetween a president and a political party often becomes a
\nnecessity rather than a luxury for the maintenance of an
\neffective and stable government.<\/p>\n
The president should not only serve as a beacon of national
\npurpose, the chief executive and head of the armed forces, he
\nshould also function as the country's political boss. In other
\nwords the president must become a focus of steady political
\nleadership in a system where the House of Representatives (DPR)
\nis susceptible to the sway of centrifugal forces in a political
\nenvironment fraught with antagonism.<\/p>\n
It is predicted that the post-2004 legislature will remain
\ndivided in patchy political coalitions with no single party
\nhaving a majority. If the nationalist-secularist parties (Golkar
\nand PDI-P), who are expected to at least occupy a combined 40
\npercent to 50 percent of seats in the House, cannot coalesce to
\nforge a common political agenda, divisions will only be further
\nheightened. This fragmentation represents both a threat and an
\nopportunity for the incumbent president.<\/p>\n
The threat results from the likely pressures that could be
\nbrought to bear upon the executive as a result of these divisive
\nfissures along party lines. The opportunity lies in the prospect
\nof the president imposing leadership to rally legislators given
\nthe absence of a predominant faction within the House.<\/p>\n
In a system where the legislature has de facto equal powers of
\npersuasion to the executive, it thus becomes necessary for the
\npresident to play politics. Whenever possible, it is important
\nfor the president to marshal his political arsenal to guide the
\nlegislature -- within the bounds of propriety and without
\nsubverting the fundamental principle of checks and balances -- so
\nas to ensure the effective running of government.<\/p>\n
The primary lesson of the Abdurrahman Wahid administration
\nmust be that any president who is personally or politically
\nincapable of maintaining amicable cooperation with the House is a
\nliability to the country.<\/p>\n
Apart from the executive's prerogative powers and privileges
\nto make appointments, the president's most effective weapon of
\npersuasion vis-a-vis the House is his function as a leading
\nfigure, if not the chief, of a political party. As party chief,
\nthe president has a foothold in the affairs of the House. The
\npresident can also take advantage of his party position to bridge
\nthe constitutional ambivalence in the relationship between the
\ndifferent branches of government.<\/p>\n
The president's dabbling in politics is, unfortunately, a
\nnecessary evil. The image of our chief executive plowing the
\npolitical field -- stroking unsavory politicians, calling and
\nhanding out favors for the sake of political expedience, and even
\nendorsing candidates of little worth -- is a reality that must be
\nfaced if the president is seeking to run a government relatively
\nfree of House interdiction. Such practical necessities can only
\nbe effective if the president has established ties with political
\nparties.<\/p>\n
Beyond the general elections, the president -- despite having
\nbeen legitimately elected by the plurality -- cannot draw his
\npower from such woolly sources of influence. Electoral prowess is
\nonly effective immediately before or after the ballot process. In
\nthe intervening years it is the clout of the political parties
\nthat will determine the sway of a legislature. Consequently, the
\npresident's power is rooted in his position as party chief.<\/p>\n
It is questionable whether an "independent candidate", as
\nsought by our critical friends, could govern effectively in such
\nan environment. It is a situation that cannot be wished away by
\nutopian dreams. It is the prevailing reality, one that is the
\nrule, rather than the exception, in similar systems around the
\nworld.<\/p>\n
A president must thrive within a complex network of political
\nconstituents. His inherent powers as chief executive can help to
\nprop up his authority, but this alone may be insufficient in the
\npolitical battlefield. The chief executive must have other
\nsources of persuasion (a dominant political party) in order to
\nbuttress his standing before the legislature or face the prospect
\nof becoming a lame-duck president.<\/p>\n
The writer is managing editor with Jakarta-based consultancy
\nfirm Van Zorge, Heffernan and Associates.<\/p>",
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