A new opportunity in Cancun's failure<\/p>\n
Balakrishnan Rajagopal, Director, Program on Human Rights and Justice,
\nMassachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, U.S.A, Yale Center
\nfor the Study of Globalization<\/p>\n
In 1955, twenty-nine nations from Africa and Asia gathered in
\nBandung, Indonesia in the first-ever meeting of the former-
\ncolonized, non-white nations.<\/p>\n
The emergence of the bloc of G-22 countries at the recent
\nCancun World Trade Organization meeting can be seen as a
\ncontinuation of the spirit of Bandung, a desire by Third World
\nstates to catch up with the North and effectively challenge the
\noverwhelming power of their former colonial masters. And just as
\nBandung defined North-South and led to the formation of the Non-
\nAligned Group of countries, the new trade bloc will likely have a
\nfar-reaching impact.<\/p>\n
At Cancun, the G-22 group of developing countries, which
\ncomprises well over 50 percent of the world's population and
\nincludes Brazil, China, India and South Africa, was able to
\npresent a coherent stand on a variety of issues that are of
\nimportance to the Third World in trade negotiations.<\/p>\n
The issues of particular concern were cross-border investment,
\ncompetition policies, trade facilitation, and government
\nprocurement. Cancun also marked a new solidarity between G-22
\nstates and a coalition of civil society organizations from around
\nthe world.<\/p>\n
How should we interpret these new developments? Is G-22 the
\nre-initiation of a Third World bloc, carrying forward the spirit
\nof Bandung? And what is the significance of the new alliance
\nbetween Southern states and a global social movement focused on
\neconomic justice?<\/p>\n
First, it is likely that the G-22 is here to stay, though some
\nmembers of the group such as Peru and Colombia have opted out
\nunder U.S. pressure. The Chairman of the U.S. Senate Finance
\nCommittee, Charles Grassley, has warned that the behavior of
\nLatin American countries at Cancun would influence future
\ndecisions. Yet despite such pressure from the U.S. and the EU,
\nthe G-22 seems to have a core that is capable of holding on.<\/p>\n
That \"core\" consists of the three large Southern industrial
\ndemocracies -- Brazil, India and South Africa -- which are now
\nattempting to challenge the hegemony of Northern democracies.
\nThey have recently formed a G-3 -- perhaps as a counterweight to
\nthe G-7 -- and have announced a range of measures to strengthen
\ntheir trilateral relationship.<\/p>\n
Trade between the three has increased rapidly in recent years;
\nBrazil and India are exchanging top-level visits; and MERCOSUR is
\nconcluding preferential trade agreements with South Africa and
\nIndia. In 2002, Brazilian exports to India were larger in
\npercentage terms than to any other country. The total bilateral
\ntrade in 2002 reached US$1.2 billion.<\/p>\n
If similar relations emerge between other members of the G-22,
\nespecially China, Egypt, and Turkey, it would constitute a very
\nsignificant challenge to Euro-American hegemony of the world
\neconomy. Celso Amorim, the foreign minister of Brazil, doesn't
\nhide that the G-3 aims for expansion to China and perhaps even to
\nRussia.<\/p>\n
Consider this. Between 2000 and the end of 2002 China received
\n21 Brazilian trade missions, and Brazil received 24 Chinese trade
\nmissions during the same period. In May of this year exports from
\nBrazil to China increased by 375 percent compared to three years
\npreviously. Moreover, Brazilian exports to India were larger in
\npercentage terms than to any other country including the U.S.,
\nUK, China, Germany, and Japan.<\/p>\n
Along with their closer economic ties, the G-3 democracies may
\ninfluence global politics as well -- all share an ideological
\ncritique of the current world order, which they perceive to be
\nwestern-dominated. They may jointly advocate for global changes,
\nfrom the reform of the UN Security Council to reduction of
\nagricultural subsidies.<\/p>\n
Secondly, the new alliance between civil society and Third
\nWorld states at Cancun is also likely to be a powerful world
\npolitical player, and could last for decades. The civil society
\nmovement began with the onslaught against the WTO meeting in
\nSeattle in 1999, which also collapsed without an agreement, and
\nhas continued in virtually every world economic gathering.<\/p>\n
The World Social Forum in Porto Allegre gave shape to the
\ninstitutionalization of \"alternative-globalization\" viewpoints.
\nFor middle-ranking states such as India or Brazil, the emergence
\nof this movement is a useful political development which gives
\nthem additional tools. Civil society actors who may oppose the
\nneoliberal reforms or right-wing rulers of host states are often
\nwilling to work with their state representatives in international
\nnegotiations when doing so is clearly pro-poor or pro-
\nenvironment.<\/p>\n
The deepening of democracy in major Southern states has also
\nled to linkages inside countries between ruling elites and civil
\nsociety actors. The clearest example of this comes from Brazil,
\nwhere the Lula-led Workers Party continues to have strong links
\nto trade unions and to social movements of landless workers.<\/p>\n
In this sense, what these countries are now saying is not very
\ndifferent from what the U.S. used to claim in trade negotiations:
\nWe are a democracy and therefore it is harder for us to make too
\nmany painful reforms.<\/p>\n
Also, in these Southern countries, democratic deepening is
\nalso a nationalist enterprise, which leads elites to strive for
\ngrand bargains in trade negotiations as it solidifies their
\npolitical gains domestically. The nationalist impulse in
\ndemocracies such as India comes from a sense that as large,
\nimportant civilizations, they ought to assume their proper place
\nin world affairs, and they see their increasing economic power as
\nkey to that goal.<\/p>\n
The civil society-state linkage has also emerged at a more
\npragmatic level. Organizations such as Oxfam have often provided
\ntechnical assistance on complex trade issues, such as by
\nproviding background papers, to poor, smaller countries that lack
\nsuch knowledge. When global power depends so much on expertise,
\nthe provision of such assistance by NGOs enables poor countries
\nto have more say in negotiations. The civil society movement is
\nnot without internal tensions, especially about attitudes towards
\nthe WTO and trade liberalization in general. Nevertheless, the
\ncoalition of states and civil society organizations seems likely
\nto persist, and will affect future trade negotiations and exert a
\nprofound influence on world politics.<\/p>\n
Guessing the future course of the G-22 is hazardous, but if
\nwhat happened in the recent FTAA (Free Trade Area of the
\nAmericas) talks in Miami is any yardstick, the small countries
\nare likely to be bullied into accepting bilateral deals with the
\nU.S. and EU while the larger ones, facing domestic opposition to
\nliberalization, will survive by accepting whatever they can.<\/p>\n
The meeting in Bandung in 1955 was a milestone simply because
\nit took place -- a meeting of the former colonized attempting to
\ndefine a \"third way\" free of western and Soviet hegemony. It was
\nalso important because it placed on the global agenda issues such
\nas racism and decolonization, which had not until then been
\nconsidered subjects of global politics. On its face, Cancun was
\nless momentous. Nevertheless, the emergence of state-civil
\nsociety coalitions, aided by the increasing power of middle-
\nranking countries, may mount a serious challenge to western
\nhegemony over the long-term.<\/p>\n
This article appeared in YaleGlobal Online,
\n(www.yaleglobal.yale.edu) a publication of the Yale Center for
\nthe Study of Globalization, and is reprinted by permission.<\/p>",
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