A model by default from Lebanon<\/p>\n
By Chibli Mallat<\/p>\n
BEIRUT, Lebanon (JP): Every other day brings in news of
\nanother massacre in Indonesia, the latest being the killings in
\nthe province of Aceh. In Lebanon, this sounds all too familiar,
\nas it does in the Balkans, Central Africa, or Ireland, at
\ndifferent rhythms and on a different scale.<\/p>\n
What do Lebanon and Indonesia have in common? The answer is
\nprecisely this: fissiparous and violent trends in society, which
\nmake countries implode. This may be accompanied by foreign
\ninterventions involving neighboring or far-away powers which
\neither fan the flames by siding with a given minority, or find
\ntheir "peacekeeping" troops at war in the midst of chaos, another
\nword for the all too current trend of Lebanonization.<\/p>\n
There are significant differences between the situation in
\nLebanon between 1975 and 1990, and that of Indonesia after the
\ndemise of the Soeharto dictatorship. The most important, however,
\nis historical.<\/p>\n
Indonesia offers today the prodromes of what Lebanon was in
\nthe mid 1970s: immense economic and social disparity,
\nuncontrolled political change, collapse of the rule of law,
\nmilitias taking over from the state, and the judiciary undermined
\nby inefficiency and the corruption of the executive branch.<\/p>\n
This is why these significant differences offers opportunity
\nfor Lebanon to "export" the lesson drawn from its harsh
\nexperience. This lesson may forestall Indonesia's descent into
\nmayhem, as advocated by Omar Halim in a thoughtful piece in this
\nnewspaper of May 30 2000 ("Avoid copying Lebanon's mistakes").<\/p>\n
This descent seems inevitable in face of the looming horrors,
\nthe country's dislocation along ethnic and sectarian lines, and
\nthe flight of the educated elite and of international and local
\ninvestment, followed by a decade or so later by a slow licking of
\nthe wounds and the painful piecing together of the puzzle.<\/p>\n
The scales, naturally, are different. The Indonesian
\narchipelago consists of over 7,000 islands, some with
\nunparalleled density. Denys Lombard, the author of Le Carrefour
\nJavanais (Paris 1990), underlines at the outset of his three-
\nvolume masterpiece the country's geographical importance.<\/p>\n
The archipelago stretches over a surface equivalent to the
\nwhole of Europe, from Iceland to Turkey. In addition, Indonesia
\nis the world's largest Muslim nation, with over 220 million
\ninhabitants, including dozens of ethnicities, religions, and
\nlanguages.<\/p>\n
These characteristics mean that civil conflict is a constant
\ndanger, and requires a high degree of statesmanship to avoid, as
\ncould be observed in the repeated Dayak insurrection in
\nKalimantan against the Madurese last month, and simmering
\nAcehnese separatism which resulted in the continuing killings.<\/p>\n
So what can Lebanon offer as a model, if by default?<\/p>\n
First, how does one support the moderate middle ground of
\nIndonesia against the warring extremes who find themselves, by
\nthe sheer spiral of ethnic and sectarian violence, courted and
\n"respected?"<\/p>\n
Secondly, how does one draw the line between legitimate socio-
\neconomic and political grievances, for instance the indigenous
\nDayaks who slowly found themselves marginalized and bereft of
\ntheir livelihood by "immigrants" from other islands, and who
\nrespond with ethnic cleansing?<\/p>\n
Or the Acehnese, who offered a little known but unique Muslim
\ntradition, underlined over 100 years ago by the great Dutch
\nOrientalist Snouck-Hurgronje, against Javanese who are accused of
\ntaking away their oil and squeeze Acehnese natural resources
\nwhile ignoring their representation and their region's unique
\nIslamic legacy of jurisprudence?<\/p>\n
Thirdly, how does one avoid the misuse of the army, which is
\ntagged as "a factor of stability," at a time when any army should
\nbe kept away from assuming law and order because its role is to
\ndefend the frontiers of the nation, and not get involved in
\nethnic problems which its structure and mission are incapable of
\nconfronting?<\/p>\n
There are naturally, no copycat answers. Nor did Lebanon find
\na definitive solution to any of these questions. It did, however,
\nprovide a useful beginning.<\/p>\n
Lesson one would be the strengthening of the moderates. How
\ndoes one support and vindicate the "Raymond Eddis" of Indonesia?
\nTo date, Lebanon has failed to acknowledge formally that the one
\nnational hero who was right throughout the civil war was Raymond
\nEddi, who died in exile in Paris last year.<\/p>\n
The fact that the most honest politician of the land remained
\noutside the country to his death will remain as the ultimate mark
\nof the failure of Lebanese politics to date. Indonesia must
\ncherish preserve and strengthen its honest, moderate, non-violent
\nRaymond Eddis.<\/p>\n
Who are they, nationally and locally, and how is it possible
\nto make sure that the present rifts between the president, the
\nvice-president and the speaker remain at a level which does not
\nthreaten the unity of the country?<\/p>\n
Lesson two is to recognize the local and national problems,
\nand respond with formulas of autonomy and\/or federalism, economic
\nand political, that involve the locals seriously and engage them
\nin their own affairs.<\/p>\n
The gaping wound of south Lebanon over the 20th century has
\nstill not been resolved, but the problem is at least recognized.
\nIt is the misery of the South which made it prone in the 1960s
\nand 70s to become a festering wound for guerrilla wars, directed
\ntowards Israel first, and then inwards.<\/p>\n
And despite the withdrawal of Israel from the Occupied South
\nin May 2000, the region remains a worrying source for the
\nstability of the whole of Lebanon. Only a determined action at
\nstate level, by reviving the region economically, and
\nestablishing the rule of Lebanese law all the way to the borders,
\nwill prevent the South from threatening the stability and welfare
\nof the country as a whole. In the same way, Indonesia must
\nprevent its regions from becoming Lebanese Souths.<\/p>\n
Lesson three is that the strengthening of law and order cannot
\noperate by way of the army, and that the rule of law should be
\nassumed first by a competent and effective judiciary, which must
\nbe made to oversee the police and the use of legitimate force.<\/p>\n
Nor is this problem, despite the precedents of the Ahdab coup
\nof March 1976 and the Feb. 6, 1984 collapse, both instances in
\nwhich the army split asunder because of its ethnic composition,
\nrecognized enough in Lebanon.<\/p>\n
The army is not the solution in Indonesia, unless it comes to
\nsupport judicial mechanisms which are grounded in the basics of
\nthe rule of law. This is arguably the most difficult dimension in
\nview of the continuing unrest. Accordingly, whether in Lebanon or
\nin Indonesia, some parameters are needed: the army needs to be
\nmore professional, this means that the control of the civil
\nauthorities must be paramount, especially the judiciary.<\/p>\n
The army needs to be trained "judicially", and a crash program
\nat an institute like the Defense Institute of International Legal
\nStudies under the Department of Defense in the United States, or
\neven human rights organizations, would give the right signal.<\/p>\n
It might also be useful to consider limited international
\nsupport for law and order, to prevent the need of a later massive
\nintervention to prevent mass ethnic genocide. The United Nations,
\nor friendly governments like America's, might be helpful in this
\nregard.<\/p>\n
It is unfortunate that the Indonesian minister of foreign
\naffairs, who had been scheduled to be in Beirut last month, chose
\nat the last moment to change his plans. In addition to a welcome
\nsupport from a great Eastern nation to our struggling state, we
\ncould have started reflecting in common on how "Lebanonization"
\ncan be avoided for Indonesia, and whether that frightful
\ncommonality can be "sold" or marketed intellectually to the many
\ncountries going down the mayhem path, from Indonesia to Rwanda.
\nFor sooner or later, with the rise of the massacres, the
\ninternational community will be called upon to do something in
\nIndonesia.<\/p>\n
It is up to the likes of Paul Wolfowitz, the U.S. deputy
\nsecretary of defense and former ambassador to Indonesia who wrote
\nan opinion piece last year in the Wall Street Journal, to chart
\nthe course of the international response, rather than the
\npowerless Lebanese.<\/p>\n
But an "anti-Lebanonization package" is needed for Indonesia,
\nwhich would save millions of lives.<\/p>\n
Then of course, Lebanon must learn Indonesian lessons in
\nreverse, especially since the shadows of Lebanon's own history
\nstill loom large over its future, from the rise of extremism, to
\njustified grievances of minorities and communities, to the misuse
\nof the army.<\/p>\n
The writer, a professor who chairs European Law at Universite
\nSaint Joseph, is a lawyer at the Indonesian Embassy in Beirut.
\nHis award-winning book, The Renewal of Islamic Law (Cambridge
\n1993) was recently translated into Indonesian. The above views
\nare personal.<\/p>",
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