A long road ahead to resuming U.S.-RI military ties<\/p>\n
A number of problems feature in the controversy surrounding
\nthe resumption of U.S.-Indonesian military ties, writes Dr.
\nKusnanto Anggoro, senior researcher at the Centre for Strategic
\nand International Studies and lecturer in the postgraduate
\nstudies program at the University of Indonesia, Jakarta.<\/p>\n
JAKARTA (JP): Military ties are expected to be a test in the
\nrelations between the United States and Indonesia. The ties were
\ncurtailed in the 1990s and then suspended because of the
\nIndonesian Military's (TNI) involvement in the East Timor debacle
\nin 1999. The relations have been extremely limited ever since,
\nthough the TNI was invited to observe Cobra Gold and the Navy
\nparticipated in the exercises of Cooperative and Readiness Afloat
\nTraining.<\/p>\n
Washington has recently signaled an early resumption of closer
\nmilitary ties with the TNI. Changes in Washington and Jakarta
\nhave made the benefits of a stable Indonesia far outweigh
\nconcerns about the military's human rights violations. East Timor
\nis no longer part of Indonesia. Still, new concerns have emerged
\nin the White House about a more assertive China and about
\nprolonged instability in Indonesia.<\/p>\n
There still remains a big question mark as to when the plan
\nfor closer military ties can eventually take off. The White House
\nmay touch off a bitter fight with Congress which has in place
\nrestrictions on what Washington can do with TNI. The Leahy
\nAmendment on limitations on assistance to security forces
\nrequires Jakarta's commitment to investigations and prosecution
\nof members of the TNI and militia responsible for human rights
\nviolations in Indonesia and East Timor. This remains unfulfilled.
\nTwo generals have been declared suspects; none have been sent to
\ncourt.<\/p>\n
Meanwhile, the scope of cooperation is no less problematic. At
\nthe bureaucratic level, there still appears a split between the
\nPentagon and the U.S. State Department. The former wants swift
\nmoves to reestablish closer ties with the Indonesian Military.
\nThe latter favors a more cautious course in light of the
\nintensification of repression and violence in Indonesia. This
\nwould surely close down the possibility of an early resumption of
\nties.<\/p>\n
Under the circumstances, the Bush government must approach the
\nIndonesian government with caution and this would include
\nprogress on accountability for human right abuses. That East
\nTimor has now split from Indonesia may not necessarily change the
\nminds of many in Washington. Even a strong proponent of an
\nearlier resumption of military cooperation such as Adm. Denis
\nBlair, the Commander of the U.S. Pacific Fleet, demands \"to see
\ngood behavior\" from the (Indonesian) military in Aceh and Irian
\nJaya.<\/p>\n
It would be wrong to argue that the resumption of military
\nties is only a matter of time. A \"sooner or later\" argument does
\nnot resolve the dilemma that Americans face in their military-to-
\nmilitary cooperation, which in fact has never been an effective
\ninstrument of foreign policy. Events during the late years of the
\nSoeharto regime and the East Timor debacle, were strong evidence
\nthat Washington could not use the widely touted \"leverage\" that
\nmilitary assistance and ties allegedly provide to rein in the
\nIndonesian Military.<\/p>\n
Military cooperation with Indonesia will continue to be
\nconstrained by a patchwork of existing American regulations,
\nbureaucratic politics and vulnerability to hostile public
\nopinion. A challenge for Washington is to find legitimate and
\njustified military assistance to Indonesia. Selling of defensive
\nweapons and\/or nonlethal spare parts may be tolerable in certain
\ncircumstances. But no one would accept the U.S. military training
\ntheir Indonesian counterpart in a broad range of lethal tactics,
\nincluding \"advanced sniper techniques\" and \"psychological
\noperations\".<\/p>\n
Instead, they may be able to assist the TNI in developing
\nroles and missions appropriate not only to their more democratic
\npolicy but also to a more interdependent world. As such, devising
\nmodern military doctrines and strategies to guide the Indonesian
\nMilitary in multilateral cooperation and\/or in cooperative
\nmanagement of transnational issues would be of great importance.
\nIt may also be useful for the U.S. military to enlighten the TNI
\non the importance of transparency and accountability in defense
\nand security policy.<\/p>\n
Regardless of such technical considerations, reengagement with
\nTNI would only benefit the people of Indonesia if it does not
\nundercut civilian control over the military. In fact, this is the
\ngreatest challenge. Washington should understand that Indonesia's
\ndefense and security policy making are still in the hands of
\nmilitary personnel, including retired as well as officers-turned
\npoliticians. The post-Soeharto regime has largely failed to
\n\"civilianize\" the defense ministry, despite having a civilian
\ndefense minister.<\/p>\n
Worse still, civilian members of the legislature are not well
\nversed in the subject of defense and security. Most journalists,
\nacademics and activists are interested more in vague issues of
\nmilitary politics and a purist moral view of human rights. As a
\nresult, there is no serious attempt by civilians at defining the
\npractical mechanism and instruments for democratic control of the
\narmed forces. It will be a long time before civilians can use
\ntheir leverage to rein in the military.<\/p>\n
If the Bush government is to re-establish their ties with the
\nTNI, they must also complement this with programs to empower
\ncivilians.<\/p>",
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