{
    "success": true,
    "data": {
        "id": 1422803,
        "msgid": "a-license-to-pillage-1447893297",
        "date": "1999-12-04 00:00:00",
        "title": "A license to pillage",
        "author": null,
        "source": "JP",
        "tags": null,
        "topic": null,
        "summary": "A license to pillage The revelation of Texmaco's huge bad debts, which totaled almost US$1.3 billion to state Bank BNI, is surely just the tip of the iceberg of accumulated excesses resulting from the abuse of political power under the 32-year authoritarian rule of former president Soeharto, who surprisingly remains legally clean. It is a classic example of Soeharto's patronage system, through which he dispensed favors and licenses to break laws and rules to pillage the nation.",
        "content": "<p>A license to pillage<\/p>\n<p>The revelation of Texmaco's huge bad debts, which totaled<br>\nalmost US$1.3 billion to state Bank BNI, is surely just the tip<br>\nof the iceberg of accumulated excesses resulting from the abuse<br>\nof political power under the 32-year authoritarian rule of former<br>\npresident Soeharto, who surprisingly remains legally clean. It is<br>\na classic example of Soeharto's patronage system, through which<br>\nhe dispensed favors and licenses to break laws and rules to<br>\npillage the nation.<\/p>\n<p>The case serves only to substantiate what has for a long time<br>\nbeen public knowledge within the country and overseas, but which<br>\nwas, until recently, successfully covered up to remain above the<br>\nreach of the law. Major cracks only appeared in the system once<br>\nthe corrupt, collusive and nepotistic (KKN) empire was exposed,<br>\nfollowing the fall in May 1998 of its patron (Soeharto), and the<br>\nousting in October 1999 of his protege, B.J. Habibie.<\/p>\n<p>Last week's announcement by the Indonesian Bank Restructuring<br>\nAgency that it would probably recover only about 4 percent of the<br>\nRp 267 trillion ($38 billion) in bad credits from state banks<br>\nconfirmed the extent of the damage and how Soeharto's family<br>\nmembers and cronies had blatantly robbed the state banks and left<br>\nthem high and dry. These banks now need more than Rp 255 trillion<br>\nin recapitalization funds.<\/p>\n<p>It is a pity that Marimutu Sinivasan -- a savvy entrepreneur<br>\nwho started his textile business in the 1950s -- has become<br>\nentangled in the Soeharto KKN web. His core business -- textiles,<br>\nsynthetic fibers, garments, textile machinery and machine tools<br>\n-- is well suited to the needs of a developing economy such as<br>\nIndonesia.<\/p>\n<p>Sinivasan's international credit rating had been fairly high.<br>\nBut problems started cropping up when his Texmaco Group rapidly<br>\nembarked on massive expansion and diversification into steel,<br>\ntrucks and car parts. Sinivasan may have been overly naive not to<br>\nrealize that all large-scale business in Indonesia then had to<br>\npass through the Soeharto patronage system. The system controlled<br>\nthe central bank, state banks and the entire business licensing<br>\nsystem.<\/p>\n<p>The documents chronicling the KKN process of the Texmaco loan<br>\napplication, as leaked to the mass media early this week,<br>\ndisclosed how Sinivasan's ambitious investment expansion led him<br>\nto a severe financial crisis. The huge devaluation in the rupiah<br>\nsteeply raised Indonesia's country premium risks, consequently<br>\nshutting down Texmaco's access to the international debt market<br>\nand forcing Sinivasan to ask for favors from the Soeharto KKN<br>\nclub. Now he must face the law.<\/p>\n<p>The documents also revealed how a memo from Soeharto acted as<br>\nan authoritative license for bank directors and the central bank<br>\ngovernor to break laws and rules without any fear that they would<br>\neventually have to account for their actions.<\/p>\n<p>What makes a mockery of any sense of justice in the case was<br>\nthe effortlessness of the multimillion dollar loans at a time<br>\nwhen the rupiah was under great pressure and the nation had to<br>\nkneel before the International Monetary Fund to obtain emergency<br>\nforeign exchange reserves.<\/p>\n<p>We hope the great fanfare in which the Texmaco case was<br>\nrevealed will not be relegated and forgotten like so many other<br>\ninstances of abuse uncovered under the Soeharto and Habibie<br>\nadministrations.<\/p>\n<p>There are disappointing precursors: consider for instance the<br>\ncorruption cases against Soeharto's youngest son Hutomo Mandala<br>\n\"Tommy\" Putra and Beddu Amang, former chief of the National<br>\nLogistics Agency. Both cases were thrown out of court. The Timor<br>\ncar project, the multibillion dollar clove monopoly, the<br>\nmultimillion dollar Balongan refinery fraud -- all of which were<br>\noutright KKN businesses from the outset -- are only a few of many<br>\nbig KKN cases that remain untouched by the law.<\/p>\n<p>Good governance has been proclaimed by President Abdurrahman<br>\nWahid to be one of the top priorities of his administration, so<br>\nAttorney General Marzuki Darusman should go all-out to expose the<br>\nmountain of past KKN practices. Only then will it be proved to<br>\nthe people and the international community that Indonesia is<br>\ndetermined to root out corrupt practices from its bureaucracy and<br>\nbusiness world.<\/p>\n<p>The task is obviously an uphill one; one Marzuki cannot change<br>\nthe system overnight, and hundreds of big KKN cases are waiting<br>\nto be unraveled. To face the daunting task, Marzuki must<br>\nestablish working priorities. He should first establish a core<br>\nteam of highly competent and honest prosecutors, assisted by<br>\nfinancial experts. He should assign the prosecutors to zero in on<br>\nseveral high-profile instances of KKN to send a warning to<br>\nofficials and the business community that from now on they must<br>\neradicate the culture of corruption from their activities.<\/p>\n<p>However, the risks of a new KKN empire arising remain great as<br>\nlong as ministers and officials are not subject to higher<br>\nstandards of accountability but can instead hide behind the<br>\nPresident's power, as those under Soeharto did. Marzuki should<br>\ntightly shut this escape route by forcing sycophant officials,<br>\ncabinet ministers and all other assistants to the President to<br>\naccount for their acts before the law.<\/p>",
        "url": "https:\/\/jawawa.id\/newsitem\/a-license-to-pillage-1447893297",
        "image": ""
    },
    "sponsor": "Okusi Associates",
    "sponsor_url": "https:\/\/okusiassociates.com"
}