A guide to the 2004 elections<\/p>\n
International Crisis Group (ICG), Jakarta<\/p>\n
Indonesia faces at least two and probably three national
\nelections in 2004, including a presidential vote, but they are
\nunlikely to bring fundamental change. Citizens are increasingly
\ndisillusioned with the half-decade of democracy and \"money
\npolitics\" they have experienced since the collapse of Soeharto's
\nauthoritarian New Order.<\/p>\n
The first election, on April 5, 2004, will fill almost 16,000
\nseats in legislatures at the national, provincial and district
\nlevels. The second, on July 5, 2004, will be its first direct
\npresidential vote ever. If, as is almost certain, no candidate
\nmeets the criteria for election in the first round, a run-off
\nbetween the top two vote-getters will take place on Sept. 20. The
\nprocess needs to be completed before President Megawati
\nSoekarnoputri's term expires on Oct. 20.<\/p>\n
Public disillusionment with the performance of democratic
\ngovernment since the first post-authoritarian election in 1999
\nhas been spreading rapidly. The elected government is widely seen
\nas having failed to cope with the massive challenges that the
\nnation is facing. Elected politicians at all levels are commonly
\nperceived as venal and corrupt.<\/p>\n
And the ordinary people who constitute the poor majority
\ncomplain that democracy has not brought any improvement in their
\neconomic welfare. Indeed, a credible public opinion poll
\nindicated that 58 percent of respondents believe that conditions
\nwere better under Soeharto's New Order.<\/p>\n
Political reformers have called for a thorough overhaul of the
\nconstitution and the electoral system to ensure that leaders are
\nresponsive and accountable to the voters. The most important
\nreform has been the adoption of direct presidential elections in
\nplace of the indirect system that was mired in the backroom
\ndealing of political parties and \"money politics\".<\/p>\n
Reform of elections to the legislatures has been more limited.
\nApart from the removal of appointed military and police
\nrepresentatives, those bodies will be elected through
\nproportional representation, much the same way as before.<\/p>\n
The main difference is that the old province-based
\nconstituencies will be reduced in size in the large provinces so
\nthat representatives, theoretically at least, will be closer to
\ntheir constituents. This limited reform, however, may entrench
\nrather than overcome the political fragmentation that has
\nbedeviled post-authoritarian democracy.<\/p>\n
Public opinion surveys indicate that the two leading parties
\nin 1999 -- President Megawati's PDI-P and Golkar, the party of
\nthe Soeharto government -- are again likely to occupy the top
\npositions. However, the polls suggest that many who voted for the
\nunderdog PDI-P in 1999 have been alienated by its behavior and
\nare returning to Golkar.<\/p>\n
Among potential presidential candidates, Megawati retains the
\nmost support, but the gap is narrowing. Golkar, however, has been
\nunable to capitalize on its growing support because of inability
\nto determine its presidential candidate. The party's chairman,
\nAkbar Tanjung, is appealing against a three-year prison sentence
\nfor corruption. Meanwhile seven potential candidates (including
\nAkbar) remain in the race for the party's nomination, which will
\nbe determined only in April 2004.<\/p>\n
Six months ahead of the first round of the presidential
\nelection, four possible scenarios suggest themselves.<\/p>\n
If the PDI-P clearly wins most votes, it is likely that Golkar
\nwill be satisfied with the vice-presidency and will join a
\ncoalition supporting the re-election of President Megawati.<\/p>\n
If Golkar wins more votes than -- or roughly the same number
\nas -- PDI-P, it is likely to nominate its own presidential
\ncandidate. Following Golkar's \"pre-convention\" in October 2003,
\nretired Gen. Wiranto has emerged as a leading candidate.<\/p>\n
The second possibility, however, could lead to a nightmare for
\nGolkar. If it nominates its own candidate, Megawati could respond
\nby offering her party's vice-presidential nomination to a Golkar
\ncandidate, perhaps Akbar Tanjung or Coordinating Minister for
\nPeople's Welfare Jusuf Kalla. This could not only split Golkar's
\nvotes, but lead to a major division within the party itself.<\/p>\n
The PDI-P's nightmare scenario, on the other hand, follows
\nfrom the first scenario above. A Megawati-Golkar team would
\nalmost certainly come out far ahead of its nearest rival in the
\nfirst round of the presidential election although without
\nsufficient support to win outright in that round.<\/p>\n
The candidate running second might take only 10 to 15 percent
\nof the votes but could then launch an \"Anyone-But-Mega\" campaign
\nin the second round. Such a campaign could mobilize Muslim votes
\nagainst the secular-nationalist Megawati. The most dangerous
\npotential run-off rival for Megawati would be the current
\nchairman of the People's Consultative Assembly, Amien Rais,
\nalthough his prospects of reaching the second round seem bleak.<\/p>\n
Another dangerous rival would be Coordinating Minister for
\nPolitical and Security Affairs General (Ret.) Susilo Bambang
\nYudhoyono, if his tiny Democrat Party is able to secure the
\nbacking of one of the larger parties. In December 2003 another
\npossible challenger emerged, former President Soeharto's eldest
\ndaughter, Siti Hardijanti Rukmana, but her chances look slim at
\nthis stage.<\/p>\n
Whatever the result of the presidential election, the next
\ngovernment will be based on a coalition of rival parties. In the
\nabsence of a strong leader capable of imposing cohesion on such a
\ngovernment, its performance will be hamstrung by many of the
\nproblems that hampered the previous three.<\/p>",
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