A dubious accomplishment<\/p>\n
Finally, after weeks of deliberation, Indonesia's legislature,
\nthe House of Representatives (DPR), approved on Thursday the
\ncontroversial state security bill, despite the objections of
\nthousands of critics and protesters across the country. It now
\nonly requires the signature of the President to turn the bill
\ninto a law -- a final procedure that many expect will be
\ncompleted within days.<\/p>\n
Looking back on the tumultuous events of the past few weeks
\nthat preceded approval of the law, one could ask what all the
\nagitation was about. After all, every country, even the most
\ndemocratic, has legal provisions to enable it to cope with
\nthreats that might endanger its security, or indeed its very
\nexistence. In such times of emergency, it is a matter of course
\nthat civil liberties must be curtailed for a period of time and
\ninconveniences imposed on the public.<\/p>\n
It is also true to say that the security bill is an improved
\nversion of the first draft, deviating in several significant ways
\nfrom the original submission considered by the government. For
\none thing, although both versions empower the president to
\ndeclare a state of emergency, in the final version it is
\nmandatory for the chief executive to consult the legislature
\nbefore this step is taken. This is an important step in the right
\ndirection, because it can prevent the president (or the military)
\nfrom arbitrarily using the extra powers provided in such an
\nemergency situation.<\/p>\n
So why, then, the continuing opposition to the bill? One
\nimportant reason is that there is a widely held perception that
\nthe new legislation was approved under pressure from the
\ngovernment, and the military in particular. For what purpose?
\nObviously in order for the authorities to deal with emergencies
\nshould the necessity arise. But under the current conditions,
\nwhere the government's credibility is practically nil, and the
\ntrack record of the Indonesian Military over the past 35 years or
\nso is tarnished by incidents of harsh repression and human rights
\nabuses, the public's suspicions are easily -- and perhaps
\njustifiably -- aroused.<\/p>\n
The question that befuddles most of the public is: Why were
\nthe authorities unable to wait a few more weeks until the new
\nlegislature was in place -- unless, of course, some ulterior
\nmotives were present? Given the far-reaching implications of the
\nnew law, and the serious civil rights issued that are involved,
\nthe question is a pertinent one. After all, who does the present
\nHouse of Representatives actually represent? As the June 7
\nGeneral Election has irrefutably shown, the Indonesian Democratic
\nParty (PDI) faction in the current House represents only a few
\nmillion people scattered in a few areas of Java. Even the
\nmajority Golkar faction was elected in polls that observers and
\nformer officials now openly admit were heavily rigged in Golkar's
\nfavor.<\/p>\n
At this stage though, there is little point in dwelling on the
\nproprieties that have been ignored. With the current legislature
\npoised to go into its final recess, for now, there seems little
\nneed to fear that the momentum will be used by the Habibie
\ngovernment to reinforce its position, or by the military to re-
\nentrench itself in Indonesian politics. The best thing that can
\nbe hoped for under the circumstances is that the new legislature,
\nwhich will convene at the beginning of next month, will revise
\nthis controversial law, if not rescind it, and polish any points
\nthat need polishing to ensure that the process of democratic
\nreform is not obstructed or derailed.<\/p>",
"url": "https:\/\/jawawa.id\/newsitem\/a-dubious-accomplishment-1447893297",
"image": ""
},
"sponsor": "Okusi Associates",
"sponsor_url": "https:\/\/okusiassociates.com"
}