A democratic multiparty system<\/p>\n
By Mulyana W. Kusumah<\/p>\n
JAKARTA (JP): Indonesia is witnessing the blooming of new
\npolitical parties, a phenomenon virtually beyond any political
\nprediction a short time ago.<\/p>\n
Aside from the Democratic People's Party (which was banned by
\nthe government) and the Indonesian Democratic Union Party, set up
\nin 1996, some 20 new political parties have now made the light of
\nday.<\/p>\n
They include the Indonesian National Educational Party, the
\nIndonesian People Party, the Indonesian Workers' Party, the
\nIndonesian Reform Party, the Indonesian Women's Party, the New
\nMasyumi, the MKGR Party, Nahdlatul Ummat, the Party of East
\nIndonesian People's Sovereignty, the Ulema Functional Party and
\neven the Chinese-Indonesian for Reform Party.<\/p>\n
Parties already fused to existing parties, such as the former
\nMurba Party and the Indonesian Islamic League Party, and certain
\nproreform quarters, are also ready to establish new parties. Many
\nother social groups and organizations also have something in
\ncommon: They want to actualize themselves politically through
\ntheir own parties.<\/p>\n
Although the 1945 Constitution never refers to \"political
\nparties\", a prevailing decree of the People's Consultative
\nAssembly (MPR) and Law No. 3\/1985 on political parties and Golkar
\nonly recognize the presence of two parties aside from Golkar, and
\nthe demand for reform in the political system has apparently been
\nkicked off with the establishment of parties.<\/p>\n
In this respect, even President B.J. Habibie has said that
\nanybody can set up a new party as long as it does not contradict
\nthe five-point state ideology Pancasila and the Constitution and
\nstays away from issues related to ethnicity, religion, race and
\nintergrouping.<\/p>\n
In a democratic political system, a party performs a number of
\nfunctions, some of which are:<\/p>\n
* A political institution linking the power holders and the
\npeople.<\/p>\n
* A vehicle by which sociopolitical interests are articulated
\nand aggregated.<\/p>\n
* A means for political socialization and recruitment.<\/p>\n
* A mechanism to institutionally accommodate social conflicts.<\/p>\n
During the Soeharto administration, parties were very weak in
\nperforming such functions. Parties could never get themselves
\nfree of government control through a number of policies and
\npower-related practices, varying from the subtlest to the
\ncrudest, such as the one causing the disputed replacement of
\nIndonesian Democratic Party executives in 1996.<\/p>\n
A \"political fostering\" concept, confirmed by laws, such as
\nLaw No. 5\/1974 on the principles of regional administrations, was
\neffectively put into practice by the government and local
\nadministrations, while the \"floating mass\" policy was
\ndeliberately designed to keep the people away from political
\nparties. One's political career in a party depended very much on
\nthe closeness of one's relations with the government.<\/p>\n
Also, the bargaining power of parties was very weak in
\ndetermining their representatives in the House of Representatives
\n(DPR) and the MPR and in resisting pressures to recall their
\nrepresentatives. The political system which restricted the
\nfunctions and the role of parties continued to be applied until
\nmoments after Soeharto resigned from his presidency on May 21.<\/p>\n
The role of parties was taken over by various groups of
\npolitical lobbyists with direct access to the center of power and
\nparty leaders were less powerful than community figures capable
\nof articulating popular demand. Parties also moved too slowly to
\nrespond to proreform movements.<\/p>\n
Increasing chances and wider political choices offered by
\nHabibie during his early days of administration have led to the
\nemergence of new political actors and aroused the spirit of old
\ncrack-political actors to establish, along with their supporters,
\na new \"political identity\" as manifested in a party.<\/p>\n
The problem now is not simply a matter of legality, such as
\nthe revocation of MPR decrees which recognize only two parties
\nplus Golkar, neither is it just a necessity to amend a number of
\nlaws. Most importantly, critical evaluation must be made to find
\nout whether these new parties are capable of gathering support
\nwithin a relatively short span of time.<\/p>\n
It seems that the masses, as the legitimacy basis of a party,
\nhave not shown any interest, let alone enough trust, to support
\neither old or new parties.<\/p>\n
As a very bad impact of the Soeharto administration's strategy
\nof depoliticization, the politics of violence might be applied to
\nthose engaged in political practices differing from those of the
\npower holder, and political doubts might pose as constraints to
\nparties in recruiting members or followers.<\/p>\n
It must also be borne in mind that the development of a
\nmultiparty system may give rise to the following conditions.<\/p>\n
* The emergence of divisions in pluralism when cultural and
\nemotional commitments and loyalty to religion, race, ethnicity
\nand ideologies have become the frame of reference of values in
\nthe establishment of new parties. Such a tendency does appear as
\na background to the birth of some new parties.<\/p>\n
* New parties can always pave the way for the restoration of
\nSoeharto's authoritarian regime if they are used to accommodate
\neither factionalism of the old regime or reactionary elements. It
\nis interesting to note that most of the founders of the new
\nparties are not those in the front ranks of proreform forces --
\nthey were previously known a supporters of the old regime. The
\nproreform quarters seem to be in doubt as to whether they should
\nconsolidate their victory by establishing parties.<\/p>\n
* New parties may engage themselves in competition to share
\n\"political luck\" among themselves or with effective groups of
\nlobbyists when the old regime has really collapsed, or they may
\nalso give rise to political conspiracies which manipulate
\npeople's sovereignty.<\/p>\n
* If they fail to mobilize mass support or accommodate the
\naspirations of the masses, this failure may become a good reason
\nto justify the old party system.<\/p>\n
However, the impact of the presence of new parties must be
\nanticipated without having to postpone the drawing up of a
\nnational consensus and legal basis for a democratic multiparty
\nsystem.<\/p>\n
The reform movement toward a democratic multiparty system must
\nbe geared toward the establishment of parties with a real mass
\nbasis. Parties must be representative and responsible to their
\nconstituents and their leaders must be able to fight for people's
\nstrategic interests. Only such parties will be able to recruit
\nsupporters in a short time and compete with honesty in the coming
\ngeneral election.<\/p>\n
In this context, it is necessary to speed up legal and
\npolitical recognition of newly established parties.<\/p>\n
The benefits of passing this recognition are that, on the one
\nhand, the government will not have to pay greater attention to
\nthe aspirations of groups claiming themselves as acting on behalf
\nof the people or for the sake of reform, and on the other hand,
\nthat the process of making people more politically aware and
\nmature will be intensified.<\/p>\n
The writer is a lecturer at the University of Indonesia's
\nSchool of Social and Political Sciences, and secretary-general of
\nthe Indonesian Independent Committee of Election Monitoring.<\/p>\n
Window: Most importantly, critical evaluation must be made to find
\nout whether these new parties are capable of gathering support
\nwithin a relatively short span of time.<\/p>",
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