A breath of fresh air?<\/p>\n
Edward McMillan, Jakarta<\/p>\n
That Jakarta's air is polluted is no great secret. Tall
\nbuildings seem to be perpetually covered in a dirty-brown haze,
\nwhile traffic policemen peer out from ominous filter-masks and
\ntrees wilt in the face of constant chemical attack.<\/p>\n
The temptation is to ignore it. After all, there's nothing
\nmuch that can be done on a day-to-day basis, and what's the point
\nin worrying about things out of our control? Nonetheless, it's a
\nsobering thought that every breath you take is potentially
\nkilling you. Each year, Jakarta's air pollution causes six
\nthousand premature deaths. The city's rate of respiratory
\ninfection is twice that of the country as a whole. Indonesian
\nasthma rates are at their highest in Jakarta and Bogor. One in
\nevery ten children living in Jakarta suffers from shortness of
\nbreath.<\/p>\n
To read what we're inhaling makes for depressing reading.
\nSulphur dioxide, emitted primarily by factories and power plants,
\nis a harsh lung irritant. Nitrogen dioxide, produced by vehicles,
\nis associated with oedema, bronchitis, pneumonia and asthma.
\nOzone, produced when nitrogen dioxide reacts to sunlight, causes
\neye, nose and throat irritation. Soot particles have been linked
\nto lung cancer. And so on. To live in Jakarta is, almost
\nliterally, death by breath.<\/p>\n
The solutions to air pollution have long been known and are
\nactually pretty obvious: Install filters in factory chimney
\nstacks to purge emissions of key pollutants, enforce strict
\nvehicle emission rules, provide public transport alternatives to
\ncommuters, and plant more trees to purify the air.<\/p>\n
The problem is, these solutions aren't politically attractive.
\nWhile the politicians have certainly mastered the art of talking
\ntough -- recall President Soeharto's "Year Of The Environment" in
\n1993 and President Megawati's "Green Jakarta" program in 2003 --
\ntheir words haven't been backed up by deeds.<\/p>\n
The fundamental problem is what economists refer to as the
\n"down-up" phenomenon: Sensible policies may incur short-term
\ncosts before realizing long-term benefits. Elected politicians
\nhave little incentive to antagonize voters with painful policies
\nthat may reap rewards only after they have left office. Hence
\nJakarta's ongoing pollution problems. After all, why annoy car
\nowners with higher fuel prices and jeopardize industrial growth
\nwith stricter regulations when the political benefits are
\nintangible and potentially years away?<\/p>\n
What is needed is a mechanism to shape politicians' long-term
\nthinking, just as periodic elections shape their short-term
\npolicies. And economists think they have it: The incentive
\ncontract.<\/p>\n
The concept is simple. Candidates must brandish incentive
\ncontracts when campaigning for office. The contracts stipulate
\nthat, in the event of subsequent re-election, the politician's
\npay in the second term will depend on specific policy outcomes --
\nfor instance, a low unemployment rate or more public hospital
\nbeds -- arising from the first term.<\/p>\n
It doesn't matter whether candidates draw up their own
\nincentive contracts or whether the contracts are imposed by an
\nindependent third-party: The effect is the same. It serves to
\nreward politicians who undertake necessary but painful reforms in
\ntheir first term, knowing that the benefits will only become
\napparent after their initial term of office has expired.<\/p>\n
Much of the academic work on political incentive contracts has
\nfocused on economic variables such as unemployment and inflation.
\nBut the concept lends itself rather well to tackling Jakarta's
\nair quality, which can be easily monitored and quantified. The
\nfight against air pollution need not "crowd out" other pressing
\npolicy concerns such as education and law-enforcement:
\nPoliticians would still be able to roam freely between policy
\nareas.<\/p>\n
But the fact would remain that if politicians did not achieve
\ncertain measurable improvements in air quality, they would be
\nforced to forego a fraction of their pay. And if that failed to
\nremedy the problem, the financial penalty could be progressively
\nratcheted up until it did provide sufficient incentive to act.<\/p>\n
Of course, there would be practical issues to overcome. For
\nexample, when the United Nations reported in the 1990s that
\nJakarta was the third most polluted city on the planet, the
\npoliticians' response wasn't to clean up their act: Instead, they
\n"improved" air quality merely by moving the monitoring stations
\nto less polluted areas. Such "massaging" of the figures would
\nhave to be strictly regulated.<\/p>\n
Nonetheless, introducing an element of financial incentive --
\nsomething that has long existed in the private sector -- to the
\npolitical sphere would finally push politicians into addressing
\npainful-but-necessary reforms. "Read my lips: No new taxes",
\nGeorge Bush Senior's 1988 pledge to U.S. voters, might in future
\nvery well become "Read my contract: No more sulphur dioxide."<\/p>\n
The writer is a British freelance writer based in Jakarta.<\/p>", "url": "https:\/\/jawawa.id\/newsitem\/a-breath-of-fresh-air-1447893297", "image": "" }, "sponsor": "Okusi Associates", "sponsor_url": "https:\/\/okusiassociates.com" }