2004 general election: Civilian nationalism versus military
\nnationalism<\/p>\n
Otto Syamsuddin Ishak, Civil Society Alliance for Democracy
\n(Yappika), Jakarta<\/p>\n
The political dynamics in 2004 are accelerating as the general
\nelection nears. Political observers link this phenomenon to the
\nfact that the process of the 2004 general election is of much
\ngreater complexity than that of the 1999 elections. This great
\ncomplexity, unfortunately, is yet to be coupled with well thought
\nout preparation.<\/p>\n
There may be a significant relationship between the
\nincreasingly heated atmosphere and the amendment to the elections
\nlaw. However, in this article, I will try to describe this
\nsituation from the perspective of nationalism that Jack Snyder
\nintroduced. (Snyder is Professor of International Relations in
\nthe political science department and Institute of War and Peace
\nStudies at Columbia University). This means that the 2004 general
\nelection is viewed as an arena where civilian nationalists and
\nmilitary nationalists will compete.<\/p>\n
Civilian nationalism is usually found in countries where the
\ndevelopment of democracy has become fully fledged. In these
\ncountries, representative institutions are stronger than
\ngovernment institutions. Meanwhile, since Soeharto stepped down
\nin 1998, Indonesia has reached only a transitional point expected
\nto lead the country to a more democratic state.<\/p>\n
Unfortunately, the 1999 general election only produced
\npeople's representatives of a poor quality, better known as
\ncrooked or rotten politicians. As a result, this transitional
\nperiod has become a time in which government institutions have
\nbeen re-entrenched, particularly in regard to the political
\nposition of the military.<\/p>\n
The re-entrenchment of the political position of the military
\nbegan when the generals displayed their disobedience to the
\npolitical policies of the supreme commander of the military,
\npresident Abdurrahman Wahid, a phenomenon that brought down Wahid
\nand put Megawati in his place. In this context, obedience to the
\nsupreme commander was pitted against the interests of national
\nsovereignty.<\/p>\n
Since the early years of Indonesia's independence, national
\nfoes have continued to be produced in order to maintain the
\nexistence of military nationalism. During the Sukarno years,
\nforeign countries were named the nation's enemies. During
\nSoeharto's era, the communists were used. Today, the enemies are
\nseparatists, and they are linked with terrorism so that the
\ncountry can enjoy foreign support.<\/p>\n
In this transitional period -- to quote Snyder -- the efforts
\nthat the military nationalists make will be consist of dominating
\nthe definition of a situation, introducing social segregation and
\ncontrolling the press.<\/p>\n
On the one hand, the act of dominating the definition of a
\nsituation is represented by a statement about the threat of
\nnational disintegration posed by the separatist movements in Aceh
\nand Papua. The military nationalists demand that the civilian
\ngovernment provide \"a political umbrella\" and a military
\noperation budget.<\/p>\n
On the other hand, civilians must stop pushing for human
\nrights trials linked with military leaders. Continuing with the
\nhuman rights trial, they argue, will only demoralize the soldiers
\nnow fighting to save national sovereignty.<\/p>\n
The main agents that the military nationalists employ for
\nsocial segregation are hoodlums. They are aroused to claim that
\nhuman rights and prodemocracy activists betray nationalism and
\nhave become the lackeys of separatists and foreign powers. In
\nfact, as Jack Snyder put it, military nationalists are hostile to
\nupholding human rights and democracy, which simultaneously means
\nupholding people's sovereignty.<\/p>\n
To control information, military nationalists have developed
\ntheir project of \"embedded journalism\". Journalists are trained
\nto assume their stance and take action in defending national
\nunity. Journalists are controlled so that there is only one
\ninformation source for their reporting. Unfortunately, the
\njournalists themselves have been brought face-to-face with
\nhoodlumism, which is backed by military nationalists.<\/p>\n
When the military nationalists have begun to gain strength,
\nthey will endeavor to impress upon the people that they are
\nbetter saviors of national sovereignty than the civilian
\npolitical leaders. At the national level, they will begin to
\nlabel a civil society movement as an enemy. The military has
\ndefined the judicial review of Law No. 12\/2003 on elections as an
\nattempt to foil the elections, coupled with conflicts involving
\npolitical party followers and money politics.<\/p>\n
Then the Army chief of staff has said that if the general
\nelection is marred with bloodshed resulting from conflicts
\ninvolving followers of political parties contesting the
\nelections, the Army will intervene.<\/p>\n
Then the chief of the National Intelligence Agency (BIN)
\nannounced five threats to the elections, namely terrorism,
\nseparatism, neoimperialism and colonialism, ultra-liberalism and
\ncommunism. Finally, the National Resilience Institute (Lemhanas)
\nhas made public its findings of 28 spots of potential trouble
\nduring the elections.<\/p>\n
Efforts by civil society organizations to proceed with
\ndemocratization in a systemic way are instead defined as sabotage
\nagainst democracy. Worse still, this definition of situation has
\nearned a nod from members of the military elite in the Cabinet of
\nthe present civilian government and also from politicians in the
\npolitical parties and in the House of Representatives.<\/p>\n
Besides, the military has continued to entrench itself by
\nestablishing raiders troops, purchasing more military equipment,
\nproviding training to people and mobilizing support from veteran
\norganizations.<\/p>\n
Meanwhile, the political elite has responded with statements
\nwarm to the military. Amien Rais has said that he will have a
\nvice presidential running mate from the military, while Nurcholis
\nMadjid has warned care must be taken to ensure that the military
\nwill not feel they have been set aside. Meanwhile, a number of
\nretired generals and civilian figures have set up an organization
\ncalled the Front for the Revival of Greater Indonesia.<\/p>\n
Indeed, a fundamental difference between the general elections
\nin 1999 and in 2004 lies in the spirit of nationalism. The 1999
\ngeneral election was wrapped n an atmosphere dominated by the
\nspirit of civilian nationalism, more popularly known as a reform
\natmosphere. The 2004 elections are so far marked with a revival
\nof military nationalism.<\/p>\n
We can draw a conclusion that the spirit of military
\nnationalism will be dominant throughout 2004. As a result, there
\nwill be a clash between the civilian nationalists and their
\nmilitary counterparts. The question is whether this political
\ntension, clash and turmoil will lead to the establishment of
\nstronger civilian representative institutions or their
\nsubordination by military-controlled bureaucratic institutions.<\/p>",
"url": "https:\/\/jawawa.id\/newsitem\/2004-general-election-civilian-nationalism-versus-military-1447899208",
"image": ""
},
"sponsor": "Okusi Associates",
"sponsor_url": "https:\/\/okusiassociates.com"
}