2 x 22 48pt Optima Bold<\/p>\n
New Cabinet needs to
\nnegotiate on onerous debt<\/p>\n
The new Cabinet faces a tight schedule in the following weeks.
\nPolitical economist Revrisond Baswir of the Yogyakarta-based
\nGadjah Mada University shares his concerns.
\n
\n Question: What do you see as President Megawati
\n Soekarnoputri's priorities?<\/p>\n
Answer: Her priority should be the management of the budget
\nwhich is related to many things that are right before us, such as
\nthe Paris Club meeting (in September), the meeting of the
\nConsultative Group on Indonesia and also the government's budget
\nproposal for 2002. The Paris Club talks are related to the 2001
\nbudget; if we fail (to negotiate for debt rescheduling) at the
\nClub we could experience a default.<\/p>\n
We need here a grand design on how to manage such matters.
\nWhat is the fundamental solution of the government regarding our
\nmaturing debts? Are we going to ask for amnesty or is there
\nanother way? This needs to be clear.<\/p>\n
The threat of a deficit is there because of our these debts,
\nboth (to lenders) inside and outside the country. Domestic debts
\nreaching Rp 53 trillion must be paid this year to Bank Indonesia
\n(central bank). With BI's interest rate of some 17 percent the
\namount could reach Rp 60 trillion.<\/p>\n
Interest for overseas debts which must be paid this year alone
\nwill reach at least Rp 23 trillion ... The government also has
\nthe burden of the earlier rupiah value of Rp 9,600 to the dollar
\nthis year. This means until the end of this year the rupiah must
\nstay below Rp 9,000. All such problems are in front of us --
\nwhich must be resolved before September.
\nThe Australian government and the World Bank has signaled that it
\nwill consider amnesty of part of Indonesia's debts. Your comment?<\/p>\n
Our debt should indeed be wiped out. The World Bank has all
\nthe information showing that Indonesia has fallen into a very
\nheavy debt trap. So if the World Bank says it will conduct a
\nstudy it wouldn't be about how deep we're in debt; it would be
\nmore likely on the prospects of Megawati's Cabinet. If the
\ngovernment is friends with the International Monetary Fund it
\nwill receive positive signals from them. They also want to see
\nwhether the government can hold out to 2004 and what the
\npolitical map of the Cabinet is like. If they are satisfied with
\neverything they should be helping us wipe out our debt.<\/p>\n
So Megawati's government should immediately follow up on this
\ngreen light from the World Bank?<\/p>\n
Of course. The amount of foreign debt compared to our gross
\ndomestic product has reached over 100 percent; this is the
\nstrongest indication of our debt trap.<\/p>\n
At the same time the government has a domestic debt of Rp 600
\ntrillion. The burden of installments for our due foreign debts
\nthis year is around US$14 billion. Meanwhile next year the burden
\nof debt installments to our export revenues will reach 54
\npercent; this means a continuous, annual threat to our foreign
\nexchange reserves.<\/p>\n
So I see no choice for Indonesia other than to try to obtain
\ndebt amnesty. We should not be ashamed of being declared as
\nhaving defaulted on our debt payments, given the circumstances.
\nThe World Bank and Australia seem to be taking into account the
\ncorruption under the New Order regime.<\/p>\n
This is indeed the strongest reason (for appealing for
\namnesty). So our request for debt forgiveness would not only be
\nbecause of the above condition but because of our historic
\nreality that such huge debts have not reached the people because
\nof the corruption of the New Order elite. This is categorized as
\nodious debt.<\/p>\n
We should be grouped under the \"heavily indebted poor
\ncountries\" which get a reduction of 60 percent on debt
\nrepayments. Thirty-five countries are now in this category.<\/p>\n
With a targeted deficit of 3.7 percent from the gross domestic
\nproduct for this year, the government must seek income by getting
\nas much as possible from state firms, mainly through
\nprivatization. What are the prospects of privatization of state
\nfirms in the near future?<\/p>\n
If Megawati's Cabinet is really market friendly, there's a big
\npossibility that the pace of privatization will increase. This
\nmeans contributions from state firms (to state revenue) will no
\nlonger be from distribution of dividends but from the sale of
\nprivate firms.
\nWhat about the relation to other policies?<\/p>\n
The success of privatizing state firms is related to other
\npolicies. If the Cabinet is market friendly the response will be
\na stronger rupiah which will eventually attract investors to come
\nhere.<\/p>\n
Our sacrifice would be having to let go of the state firms
\nbecause foreign investors will clearly buy the firms whatever
\ntheir price in rupiah. Investors in strategic sectors will first
\nconduct due diligence studies before bargaining for the firms.
\nI'm sure the state firms will still be bought at the lowest price
\nlevels.<\/p>\n
What about the role of the Indonesian Bank Restructuring
\nAgency (IBRA)?<\/p>\n
Their contribution is expected but the main priority is
\nrestructuring the organization and revamping their work program.
\nThe impression is that IBRA is too messed up. An overhaul is
\nneeded although the target of its contribution to the state
\nbudget can still be determined. The government is also slated to
\nincrease fuel prices again this year given subsidy reduction.<\/p>\n
This is quite sensitive. The fuel prices will depend on the
\ndevelopment of the rupiah and interest rates. I think subsidies
\nand the fuel price are still debatable; is an increase really
\nneeded to cover the deficit or is another review needed, given
\nthat some things are not yet clear on the actual production costs
\nof Pertamina.<\/p>\n
What about the fiscal balance between Jakarta and the regions?<\/p>\n
Very early in her term Megawati has had to face this problem
\nin the form of the CPP Block contract (with PT Caltex Pacific
\nIndonesia) .... This is a good start. So (the government) should
\nnot harbor any wish to reduce regions' revenue, because regions
\nof course want more, not less. In general the Megawati government
\nshould also resolve the implementation of regional autonomy and
\npay attention to issues around Aceh, Papua (Irian Jaya) ... and
\nother potentially restive areas.<\/p>\n
The government must realize that the crucial issue raised by
\nresource-rich areas affects investors' interest. Pride and
\nidentity are important but the Acehnese would not raise their
\nvoice if they didn't know there were gas resources there;
\nlikewise people in gold-rich Papua and oil-rich Riau.<\/p>\n
Megawati's government which seems to be compromising and
\npragmatic has promised to please the market. This will lead to a
\nparadox; even the military may be used to face the regions, which
\nwill face the demands of the local public.<\/p>\n
Wiping out corruption is also important in securing investors'
\ntrust. What can this government do?<\/p>\n
Megawati's government is compromising here and there,
\naccommodating a number of political forces, so we can't expect
\nmuch regarding corruption. The paradox is while the government
\nhas to be market friendly, corruption and money politics
\ncontinues to be widespread.<\/p>\n
Combating corruption is related to decentralization of the
\nfiscal balance. By reducing the concentration of funds at the
\ncenter, the possibility for abuse of state funds at the center
\nbecomes smaller.<\/p>\n
It's true that giving regions the authority to manage big
\nfunds can also lead to corruption but at least the management of
\nlocal administrations is closer to their people, enabling better
\ncontrol. Strong monitoring by the public must be established.<\/p>\n
I'm worried about the influence of (Megawati's) Indonesian
\nDemocratic Party of Struggle (PDI Perjuangan) which gives too
\nmuch emphasis on the notion of unity, which may imply reducing
\nthe spirit of giving a chance to regional administrations. The
\nparty could very well sponsor efforts to amend the regional
\nautonomy law. (Asip A. Hasani)<\/p>\n
2. 5Riswanda --<\/p>\n
Megawati juggles need for professionals, appeasing opponents<\/p>\n
2 X 20 36pt NCSBi<\/p>\n
New Cabinet makeup:
\nTo please and appease<\/p>\n
Lecturer in politics Riswandha Imawan of the Gadjah Mada
\nUniversity in Yogyakarta looks at the result of what he says is a
\ncareful balance in the new, \"transitional\" Cabinet composition.<\/p>\n
Question: How do you view the Cabinet lineup?<\/p>\n
Answer: It clearly shows President Megawati Soekarnoputri's
\ncareful effort to place figures that pose a low threat of
\nresistance from among the public.<\/p>\n
The structure is not that different from the Cabinets of
\nformer president Abdurrahman Wahid (Gus Dur); it's not slimmer.
\nMegawati seems to be avoiding confrontation. She wants to embrace
\nall political groupings. She also seems to realize that she
\ndoesn't have much time to realize her Cabinet's program.
\nTherefore, she seems to regard her Cabinet as a transitional one.<\/p>\n
That she picked figures of various backgrounds also shows that
\nshe's avoiding many people getting annoyed. The appointment of
\nFaisal Tamin (former chairman of the Association of Indonesian
\nCivil Servants KORPRI) as State Minister of Administrative
\nReform, Ali Marwan Hanan (of the United Development Party, PPP,
\nthe largest faction in Muslim-oriented axis force) in charge of
\ncooperatives, and Bachtiar Chamsah (of PPP) as Minister of Social
\nAffairs are examples.<\/p>\n
Yet, she did not assign them for key positions. She realizes
\nvery well that the ministers in charge of cooperatives or social
\naffairs won't directly affect the heart of her leadership as well
\nas the core of the political dynamics. Therefore, she picked only
\nprofessionals for key positions.<\/p>\n
Key positions are those directly related to the core tasks of
\nthe Cabinet, which include economic recovery, restoring security,
\nhandling the threat of disintegration and upholding supremacy of
\nthe law.<\/p>\n
The appointment of Susilo Bambang Yudhoyno as Coordinating
\nMinister for Politics, Social and Security Affairs is an example.
\nIndeed he's a (retired) military officer, yet he's an
\nintellectual in uniform. He knows very well the concepts of
\npolitics, social and security affairs. The appointment of
\nDorodjatun Kuntjorodjakti as Coordinating Minister for the
\nEconomy is another example ...<\/p>\n
What about the appointment of Yusuf Kalla as the Coordinating
\nMinister for People's Welfare?<\/p>\n
I wonder why Megawati picked him, especially considering his
\nbackground as a businessman as well as former minister of
\nindustry and trade, whose orientation was profit. Now he must
\nswitch his orientation to a non-profit one.<\/p>\n
The assignment of Matori Abdul Djalil as defense minister also
\ncould be a problem in the future. Megawati's not just
\ndemonstrating her gratitude to Matori, but has also considered
\nwhat was repeatedly said by former defense minister Mahfud M.D.,
\nthat Gus Dur's has said the position should be for civilians.
\nThis way, Megawati wants to avoid the resistance that would ensue
\nif the position was given to a military officer.<\/p>\n
But by choosing Matori Megawati will need more time to
\nreconcile with Gus Dur's supporters -- Matori has also become a
\nproblem for them. Moreover, people can also see ... that the
\nappointment was based mostly on the close friendship (between
\nMegawati and Matori).<\/p>\n
Likewise the appointment of Said Agil Munawar as Minister of
\nReligious Affairs. He was the one who said we could have a woman
\nas president during the controversy regarding a woman president.
\nI fear she's just showing gratitude.<\/p>\n
Could such considerations for choosing ministers harm the
\nCabinet's performance?<\/p>\n
I prefer to say, \"no\". The position as, say, defense
\nminister, does not directly influence the heart of political
\ndynamics here. The key position is the military commander. So I
\ncan only conclude that the Cabinet formation was based firstly on
\nprofessionalism, second, balance of political power, third,
\nbalance of regional power and fourth, in return for services
\nrendered.<\/p>\n
And the impact on the Cabinet's overall performance?<\/p>\n
As long as professionals are in key positions, it will not
\nhave a bad impact. Budiono (Minister of Finance) and Rini
\nSuwandhi (Minister of Industry and Trade) are both experts in
\nthose fields. Purnomo Yusgiantoro (Minister of Mining and Energy)
\nhas expertise in management and mining ... For education, we have
\nMalik Fajar in charge of education ... The outstanding
\ndevelopment of universities under Muhammadiyah (second largest
\nIslamic organization of which Malik is an executive) is proof of
\nhis great work. He has a clear vision on how education should be
\ndeveloped. His reputation as a rector, too (of Muhammadiyah
\nUniversity in Malang) is very good.<\/p>\n
What is annoying is the appointment of Bambang Kesowo as State
\nand Cabinet Secretary. I cannot understand why Megawati decided
\nso, especially given people's suspicion that Bambang still holds
\nthe New Order mentality. Combining the two positions could only
\nresult in power centralization, which could again make the
\npresidency a sacred institution.<\/p>\n
Also of annoyance is the appointment of (former legislator
\nfrom the military faction) Hari Sabarno as Minister of Home
\nAffairs and Regional Autonomy. He has no track record in the
\nfield. Megawati will need more time to learn about the
\nministry ...<\/p>\n
What about the new State Ministry of Communication and
\nInformation?<\/p>\n
It will certainly receive strong reactions, especially from
\nthe press. So an explanation is needed on what it deals with ...<\/p>\n
Yet, overall the new Cabinet lineup is market friendly,
\nespecially with Kwik Kian Gie (Minister of National
\nPlanning\/Chairman of National Planning Development Board) and
\nLaksamana Sukardi (Minister of Finance)Menteri negara BUMN not
\nfinance minister) in it. The world sees them as reliable sources
\nfor economic analysis on Indonesia.<\/p>\n
But regarding Kwik, if everything is decentralized and the
\nDevelopment Board is not as it was before, Kwik's expertise will
\nnot be fully utilized there. (Sri Wahyuni)<\/p>\n
3. 5Defense --<\/p>\n
Security threats: Chinese dragon or uncle Sam's cabin?
\n1 x 40 36pt Optima Bold<\/p>\n
India's security threats, from China to U.S.<\/p>\n
NEW DELHI: George Bush plans to go in for Nuclear Missile
\nDefense (NMD) to ensure his country is not taken by surprise by a
\nrogue state. India itself faces this problem. A nuclear holocaust
\nby any miscalculation or intense hatred of a country considered
\nhostile will be the end of a civilized world.<\/p>\n
Violent reactions are naturally expected from Russia, once a
\nsuper power and still a powerful nuclear state; and China with
\nambitions to dominate Asia. Every country determines its
\nperception of threat and plans its defense accordingly. Weak
\nnations seek allies as happened after World War II, creating
\nalliances such as North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and
\nWarsaw pact. With the break up of the USSR, the US is the only
\nsuper power, militarily and financially. And they have no
\nintention of losing this status.<\/p>\n
The strong criticism of America by our experts and opposition
\npolitical parties is surprising. Their main fear is that America
\nwill become the sole super power and our endorsement will
\nadversely affect our relations with Asian allies. No names,
\nhowever, are mentioned. To be frank we have no friends in Asia or
\nthe world. It is incomprehensible that our experts are ignorant
\nof our recent history since 1947. Vajpayee has clarified that the
\naim of NMD is to ensure safety of the world against any
\nmisadventure by a rogue state. Bigotry and blind hatred developed
\nover the years does not help in international relations.<\/p>\n
There are no permanent friends or permanent enemies. Only the
\ncountry's interests are permanent. Our governments since 1947
\nflourished on slogans and sermons oblivious of threats to the
\ncountry. Let's look on our relations with China and Pakistan.
\nNehru, of the imperious temperament, was intolerant of any
\nadvice. He ignored Sardar Patel's 1950 suggestion to beware of
\nChina. His gospel of non-violence, panch-sheel and Hindi-Chini-
\nBhai-Bhai became the hallmark of our foreign policy. The Chinese
\noccupation of Tibet in March 1959 opened his eyes but it was too
\nlate. The final humiliation came in November 1962 when China
\nlaunched an unprovoked attack in Arunachal Pradesh, which
\nshattered Nehru both physically and mentally.<\/p>\n
At this hour of humiliation only two powers, America and
\nBritain came to our assistance, the two countries derided by us.
\nOur friends in the non-aligned movement, Nasser of Egypt and Tito
\nof Yugoslavia advised us restraint. For the Russians the Chinese
\nwere their fraternal brothers and the Indians just friends. Let
\nus never forget this.<\/p>\n
The Chinese again intruded in Arunachal in 1986 and occupied
\nSum Dorong Chu Valley and still lay claim to Arunachal, Sikkim,
\nDarjeeling and 90,000 km, not yet specified, besides having
\noccupied Aksai Chin area. Recent reports by our ministry of
\ndefense that every major city in India is within the reach of
\nChinese missiles and that China is augmenting Pakistan's
\ncapabilities in its striking power to include submarine launched
\nballistic missiles, in order to achieve its goal of being a
\nsuperpower in the Asian Continent, somewhat akin to the South
\nEast Asia Co-Prosperity sphere the Japanese had dreamt in World
\nWar II.<\/p>\n
It is not only India that is wary of China but Vietnam and
\nJapan as well. Jane's Fighting Ships 2000-01, the most authentic
\nsource of information on armed forces, throws light on the latest
\nChinese activities against India and Vietnam. \"In 1998 Beijing
\nwrested control of a number of Vietnamese islands in Spratly
\nIslands in the south Pacific and hence the latter has beefed its
\nmilitary presence fearing a repeat episode.\" None of its
\nneighbors trusts China and I say this because of my impressions
\nduring one year's stay in Vietnam, Laos and Kampuchea.<\/p>\n
Though weak these countries are proud of their heritage and
\nrefuse to accept Chinese lordship. In the 1970s, Vietnam was
\ninvaded twice by the Chinese.<\/p>\n
Nearer home, \"Tension in Indo-China Border\" in Jane's
\nIntelligence Digest in November 2000 is an eye opener. In the 18
\nmonths China committed over \"100 incursions especially in Ladakh
\nand Arunachal Pradesh at an alarming level.\"<\/p>\n
Chinese naval activity in the Pacific and nuclear submarines
\nseen in the Indian Ocean left no option except to adopt a pro-
\nactive policy by India. No wonder Vajpayee's government was
\nforced to declare China as enemy no 1 and Pokhran tests II and
\nIII ordered in 1998. What a hue and cry was raised in India then
\nby political parties. But all kept silent when China became a
\nnuclear power. The CPI had not even condemned China during the
\n1962 war.<\/p>\n
According to the Jane's Digest even Japan is alarmed at the
\nChinese activities in the Pacific and Indian Oceans. This is
\nleading to changing political equations in Southeast Asia. Even
\nMalaysia and Singapore are apprehensive. India has already
\nestablished regular defense consultations with Vietnam and Japan
\nand held joint naval exercises including Malaysia in 2000.
\nSingapore has also agreed in principle to join such exercises and
\none of its senior ministers felt that China and Pakistan are
\nrogue states. Recently our foreign minister during June this year
\nhad also visited Australia and New Zealand. There will be no
\npeace unless we either surrender to Chinese demands or we seek
\nallies to checkmate China.<\/p>\n
The Chinese ambassador to India has advised us not to support
\nthe NMD. The Ambassador also feels that Russia, China and India
\nshare similar views on world issues -- the latest kite flying
\nexercise. China has suddenly woken up to realities when its
\nhegemonism in Asia is threatened. India must be naive to fall in
\ntheir trap. Leftist intellectuals and prominent writers appeal
\nfor a settlement. But on what terms? Why do they not appeal to
\nthe Chinese to return Tibet to the Tibetans and openly declare
\nthat they have no designs or claims on our territory?<\/p>\n
One eminent writer has called our \"endorsement of NMD as
\ndemeaning\", another thought it \"long on flowery rhetoric, short
\non realism\". Our former foreign secretary, Salman Haidar wonders
\n\"how closely we have weighed the implications of our decision on
\nour traditional friendships and established ties.\" But he is
\nsilent on who these traditional friends are. We have none. The
\nNDA government is trying its best to have some.<\/p>\n
With the kind of foreign policy expertise that we have we
\nsuffered humiliation in 1962, and find ourselves in a mess in
\nJammu & Kashmir and in the northeast. Surprisingly, the world
\nignores Chinese hostility against India. I pose the following
\nquestion: rather than entering the Chinese Dragon or co-habiting
\nwith the Russian bear, would it not be safer to enter what some
\nwriters have derisively called \"Uncle Sam's Cabin\"? We gratefully
\naccepted this shelter in 1962. Now we have the strength somewhat
\nto stand on our legs after Pokhran tests II and III, and it
\nshould not be easy to kick us around.<\/p>\n
Hatred of India is the raison d'etre of Pakistan's existence.
\nIt fought four wars with India between 1947 and 1999, and is
\nwaging a proxy war for over a decade. China developed close
\nrelations with Pakistan since 1966 on the basis of the old
\nstatecraft -- your enemy is my enemy. Thanks to China's nuclear
\nand missile technology, Pakistan has attained nuclear status.
\nDuring Chinese premier Zhu Rongji's recent visit to Pakistan in
\nMay, he lauded Gen. Musharraf for the 1999 coup and praised him
\nfor establishing stability in Pakistan. As a quid pro quo the
\nGeneral endorsed China's fear of the NMD and TMD (Theater Missile
\nDefense).<\/p>\n
Trade, commerce, and cultural relations are not feasible
\nbetween India and Pakistan while the two armies face each other
\nin J&K and Pakistan is engaged in proxy war against India.
\nGeneral Musharraf has often threatened a nuclear war. Power is
\ntoo serious a matter to be left in the hands of generals, and
\nabsolute power corrupts absolutely.<\/p>\n
During the 20th century two generals changed the future of
\ntheir countries and enhanced their prestige the world over --
\nGen. Kemal Ataturk of Turkey and Gen. De Gaulle of France. Let us
\nhope Musharraf succeeds as the Ataturk of Pakistan, an ambition
\nhe expressed after his coup in October 1999.<\/p>\n
4. 5Troops -- U.S. troop withdrawal
\n2 x 15 36pt NCSB<\/p>\n
U.S. should pull out
\nof the South: N.Korea<\/p>\n
SEOUL: North Korea is yet again calling for the withdrawal of
\nU.S. troops from South Korea. Or, for the 121st time since 1948
\n-- if a quasi-governmental think tank is correct in its
\ncalculations. Still, the latest call was particularly noteworthy,
\ncoming after a lengthy silence and alleged acquiescence by
\nPyongyang. The problem is, the ongoing fuss seems set to amount
\nto little more than another political dogfight.<\/p>\n
During a weekend summit highlighting his almost month-long
\ntrain visit to Russia, North Korean leader Kim Jong-il re-
\nemphasized that the American troops should leave Korea, saying it
\nis \"very urgent\" for peace and security in the Korean Peninsula
\nand Northeast Asia. President Vladimir Putin expressed
\nunderstanding of the North's position, albeit wisely stopping
\nshort of supporting it.<\/p>\n
The reversal put President Kim Dae-jung into an awkward
\nposition. President Kim had frequently said his North Korean
\ncounterpart showed tacit approval of the American military
\npresence even after unification at their historic summit in June
\n2000. The opposition lost no time to criticize the President,
\nsaying he either lied to the people or was cheated by Kim Jong-
\nil.<\/p>\n
Neither should necessarily be true, though. Most voters would
\nlike their elected leader to be neither a deceiver nor a dupe.
\nRather, the North Korean strongman might have changed his mind in
\nthe face of hardball tactics by the new U.S. administration. Or
\nhe just referred to the U.S. troops' presence in the capacity of
\na peacekeeper than occupying forces.<\/p>\n
In any case, the latest change in Pyongyang appears to be
\nstrategic rather than fundamental. The North has often hyped up
\nits propaganda whenever there arises the need for cementing
\ninternal solidarity or appeasing hard-liners. Officials and
\nanalysts here view it as an eye-for-an-eye tactic to dilute
\nWashington's proposed agenda of conventional arms reduction.<\/p>\n
Also noteworthy in this regard is the U.S. response -- or lack
\nof it -- to the latest development. This in part reflects the
\nU.S. confidence in its role as a non-regional balancer, which it
\nbelieves is recognized by all regional players. Former U.S.
\npresident Jimmy Carter recalled here Tuesday even the late North
\nKorean founder Kim Il-sung acknowledged the American presence in
\na different, smaller form.<\/p>\n
The rival political camps should stop their childish and
\nunproductive bickering over this and other inter-Korean issues.
\nTheir \"politicizing\" of the South-North relationship has gone
\nbeyond the tolerable level. The ruling party should no longer
\nmonopolize the northern policy as a means of staying in power.
\nNor must the opposition try to trip up the government in every
\ntrivial step.<\/p>\n
Fundamentally, the 37,000 American troops' presence here is a
\nmatter between the United States and its host -- South Korea. No
\nthird parties can or need to have a say in this. More frankly,
\nthe decision is almost entirely up to Washington, the sole
\nsuperpower in post-Cold War era, based on its global geopolitical
\nstrategy.<\/p>\n
A recent report by Rand Corp., a conservative U.S. think tank,
\nwell illustrates the point. To the relief of most Korean
\nnationalists, the paper envisions the earlier-than-expected
\npullout of U.S. ground troops from Korea and Japan for relocation
\nin Southeast Asia. The new strategy, based on possible
\nreunification of the two Koreas, is aimed at encircling China,
\nAmerica's potential new rival.<\/p>\n
The study specifically cited three expected outcomes:
\ndiverting expenditure saved from reduced ground forces to
\ndeveloping new weapons, such as a missile shield; weakening the
\nalliance between North Korea, China and Russia; and stepping up
\npressure on South Korea for arms purchases. And all of these are
\nbased on deepening of regional conflicts instead of easing them.<\/p>\n
Few Korean with a modicum of national identity -- even the
\ndiehard anti-Communists -- would welcome the presence of foreign
\ntroops on their soil for good. The latest debate on the North's
\nposition here also comes amid increasing frustration and
\ndiscontent with the U.S. military presence, along with the
\ngrowing hosting costs, environmental degradation and other
\nviolations.<\/p>\n
Koreans have a long, shameful history of calling in foreign
\nsoldiers under the pretext of national security, but actually out
\nof hatred and distrust of rival compatriots. Until when will we
\nneed foreigners to seek partisan interests at the expense of our
\nown people? In this vein, Kim Jong-il should recognize it is only
\nthe rapid reconciliation between two Koreas that can undermine
\nthe rationale for a U.S. troop presence<\/p>",
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